In Takenaka & Maddox [2025] FedCFamC1A 243, Justice Campton of the Federal Circuit and Family Court (Division 1) dismissed an appeal by a self-represented father who sought to overturn extensive parenting orders. The appeal arose from findings that the father engaged in a sustained, four-year campaign of intimidation, threats, and coercive control against the mother. Despite voluminous filings and claims of judicial error, the Court upheld the trial judge’s assessment that the father’s domineering behaviour and lack of insight rendered shared care unsafe. The decision underscores the judiciary’s increasing recognition of coercive control as family violence under s 4AB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) and its cumulative impact on parenting capacity and the child’s best interests.

Facts and Issues:

• The parents separated in 2021 after the birth of their child, who suffers from selective mutism and anxiety.
• The father repeatedly accused the mother of mental illness, reporting her to hospitals, police, and child services despite clinical evidence that her postpartum depression had fully resolved.
• The father removed the child from the mother’s care without consent, made repeated false welfare calls, and attempted to isolate the mother from friends and supports.
• The primary judge found that the father’s conduct—through hundreds of messages, threats, and public disparagement—constituted a pattern of coercive control, satisfying the definition of family violence under s 4AB.
• Parenting orders granted the mother sole parental responsibility, imposed strict restraints on the father’s communications and access, and prohibited overnight stays in his “share house” until he obtained safe accommodation.
• On appeal, the father raised 11 grounds, including allegations of factual error, denial of procedural fairness, improper reliance on the Family Report, and overreach in orders restricting his access, travel, and communication.

Issue:

Whether the primary judge erred in law, fact, or discretion—particularly in:

1. Finding that the father’s conduct constituted family violence;
2. Granting the mother sole parental responsibility; and
3. Imposing restrictions on contact, overnight stays, and travel that the father claimed were excessive or procedurally unfair.

Rule (Law):

• Appellate Intervention: As established in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499, appellate courts will not interfere unless the primary judge made an identifiable error of law, overlooked a material fact, or reached an outcome that was plainly unjust.
• Family Violence Definition: s 4AB Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) defines family violence broadly to include coercive, controlling, or intimidating behaviour causing a family member to fear for their safety.
• Parental Responsibility and Best Interests: Under s 60CA and s 61DA, the child’s best interests are paramount; the presumption of equal shared responsibility is rebutted where family violence is found.
• Discretionary Nature of Parenting Orders: In CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172 and Kellerman & Kellerman [2024] FedCFamC1A 126, the High Court affirmed that different judges may reach opposing but reasonable conclusions in parenting cases.
• Procedural Fairness: The Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 line of authority requires that parties be given an opportunity to be heard, but courts may limit irrelevant or repetitive evidence.

Application (Analysis):

1. Family Violence and Coercive Control

Justice Campton upheld the trial judge’s cumulative assessment that the father’s behaviour—harassment, threats, misuse of institutions, and intimidation—constituted family violence. The father’s repeated false reports about the mother’s mental health were designed to undermine her parenting and demonstrated domineering control and lack of insight. The Court confirmed that coercive control, even absent physical harm, falls squarely within the statutory definition of violence under s 4AB.

2. Parenting Capacity and Sole Parental Responsibility

The trial judge found the father’s parenting capacity “significantly compromised” by his aggression, unsafe living environment, and failure to engage with the child’s selective mutism treatment. Justice Campton agreed that these findings were reasonably open on the evidence. The discretion to award sole parental responsibility to the mother was properly exercised given the father’s lack of respect and insight, consistent with Rafferty & Spencer (2016) FLC 93-710.

3. Overnight Care and Accommodation Restrictions

The appellant’s challenge to being barred from overnight care in his share house failed. The Court accepted that the father’s decision to rent rooms to male tenants and prioritise income over safety justified the restriction. As the judgment observed, “the father’s share house arrangement was unsafe for the child” and inconsistent with her welfare needs.

4. Procedural Fairness and New Evidence

Although the Court allowed two additional emails into evidence, Justice Campton found no procedural unfairness—holding that most documents were available at trial and that the father had full opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. The complaint of bias against the ICL was dismissed as unsubstantiated.

5. Appellate Standards and Discretion

Applying Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118 and Lee v Lee (2019) 266 CLR 129, the Court reiterated that appellate intervention in parenting discretion is limited. The appeal attempted to “re-try” factual disputes rather than identify a clear legal error, contrary to House v The King.

Judgment:

• Application in Appeal: Allowed in part to admit two documents (emails).
• Substantive Appeal: Dismissed in full.
• Costs: The father ordered to pay $1,045 to the mother and $20,000 to the Independent Children’s Lawyer.

Justice Campton concluded that the primary judge’s 404-paragraph judgment reflected a careful, evidence-based analysis and that none of the father’s claims of procedural or factual error were made out.

Reasoning:

The Court found the father’s grounds “a gallimaufry of appellate terminology” — a confused mix of claims lacking legal substance. Justice Campton emphasised that appellate courts will not “hunt through” vague grievances or reweigh credibility findings. The trial judge was entitled to prefer the mother’s credible, child-focused evidence and the family report’s cautionary recommendations.

In line with CDJ v VAJ and Pickford & Pickford [2024] FedCFamC1A 249, the appellate court affirmed that different judges may reasonably reach differing but valid conclusions about the same facts.

Take-Home Lesson:

This case reaffirms that coercive control is family violence and will decisively influence parenting outcomes. A parent’s fixation on control, litigation, and personal vindication—rather than the child’s emotional safety—will undermine claims for shared care. Appeals that merely re-argue factual disputes or misapply appellate standards will fail. Respectful co-parenting, insight, and evidence—not volume or aggression—determine outcomes.

In Conner & Conner (No.3) [2025] FedCFamC1A 235, Justice Schonell of the Federal Circuit and Family Court (Division 1) was asked to expedite an appeal concerning interim parenting orders. The mother (appellant) alleged that the child was at risk of harm in the father’s care and sought urgent consideration of her appeal. The Court, however, refused to grant expedition, finding that the appeal—already listed within three months—was effectively being fast-tracked and that no compelling basis existed to prioritise it over other pending appeals.

Facts and Issues:

• The parties were engaged in protracted and highly conflictual parenting litigation under Pt VII of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
• The father had been granted sole parental responsibility and the child was ordered to live with him following the mother’s repeated frustration of prior orders.
• The mother sought to expedite her appeal against these interim parenting orders, asserting that the child was at risk of harm in the father’s care.
• The appeal was already listed for hearing in February 2026, less than three months away.
• The central issue was whether the circumstances justified expedition — i.e., should this appeal take precedence over others awaiting hearing.

Issue:

Whether the Court should expedite the appeal under s 94(2D)(j) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), given the appellant’s assertion that the child was at risk of harm in the respondent’s care.

Rule (Law):

• Under s 94(2D)(j) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) and r 15.06 of the Family Law Rules 2021 (Cth), the Court has discretion to expedite an appeal where circumstances justify priority over others.
• Justice Schonell adopted the criteria set out in Villa & Villa [2025] FedCFamC1A 214, which itself applied Aldridge J’s summary in Gallea & Gallea [2020] FamCAFC 322 [6]:

Factors include whether the applicant has acted promptly, whether expedition would prejudice the respondent, and whether there are circumstances warranting priority to the possible detriment of other cases.

• The ultimate question: Should this appeal be heard before others already waiting?

Application (Analysis):

• Promptness:
• The appellant acted quickly—filing her notice of appeal within four days of the original order and her application for expedition within three more days.
• Urgency:
• Despite the appellant’s claims of risk to the child, she had previously consented to orders for unsupervised time and had unsuccessfully appealed similar interim decisions. Justice Schonell noted that the allegations did not introduce any new or compelling evidence.
• Prejudice and Priority:
• The appeal was already listed for February 2026, which the Court regarded as a de facto expedition. Granting further priority would unfairly delay other litigants also seeking urgent relief.
• Best Interests Context:
• While parenting matters are inherently urgent, the Court reaffirmed that procedural fairness and judicial efficiency require a balance between urgency and the orderly progression of appeals.

Judgment:

The Court dismissed the Application in an Appeal. Justice Schonell held that there was no extraordinary urgency or fresh evidence of risk justifying further acceleration. The February hearing date already constituted sufficient expedition.

“There is nothing in the appellant’s affidavit or submissions that is so compelling as to call for this appeal to be heard in preference to that of others.”

Reasoning:

Justice Schonell’s reasoning centered on judicial economy and proportionality:

1. The appeal was already being heard within an expedited timeframe.
2. No new evidence supported the mother’s claims of imminent risk.
3. The Court must avoid queue-jumping, where one party’s anxiety or repeated filings displace other urgent family matters.
4. The mother’s history of non-compliance and litigation escalation (three appeals over interim orders) undermined claims of genuine urgency.

Precedents Relied On:

• Villa & Villa [2025] FedCFamC1A 214
• Gallea & Gallea [2020] FamCAFC 322

These decisions clarified the threshold for expedition and guided the Court’s balancing of urgency against procedural fairness to other parties.

Take-Home Lesson:

Even in emotionally charged parenting disputes, urgency must be demonstrated, not declared. The Court will not grant priority without clear, objective evidence of imminent harm or injustice. Filing quickly is commendable—but without new or exceptional circumstances, an appeal already listed within a few months will not be “re-expedited.”

In Provenza & Provenza (No 4) [2025] FedCFamC1A 232, the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1) delivered a sharp procedural reminder: even when family violence findings are damning, judicial power must remain within statutory bounds. The father’s appeal succeeded in part—not because the trial judge erred in substance, but because she made injunctions under s 68B of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) that conflicted with an existing State family violence order (FVO). Justice Austin found that this overlap breached s 114AB of the Act, rendering three injunctions invalid. The case underscores the limits of concurrent federal and state jurisdiction in family violence protection.

Facts and Issues

• The parents separated in June 2022.
• The mother held a final Queensland family violence order (FVO) against the father protecting herself and two of the three children, operative until July 2027.
• The trial judge, finding serious risk from the father’s conduct, made parenting orders granting the mother sole decision-making, the children to live with her, and additional injunctions restraining the father from any contact with the mother or the younger children.
• However, those injunctions mirrored or overlapped the existing State FVO terms.
• The father appealed, alleging jurisdictional and legal error among other discretionary grounds.

Core Issue:

Whether the primary judge had power to make federal injunctions under s 68B when a State FVO covering the same persons and conduct was already in force.

Law

Key provisions of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth):

• s 68B: permits injunctions for the personal protection of a child, parent, or other person.
• s 114AB: restricts the use of federal injunctions where a State or Territory law already provides protection — the federal court cannot duplicate or overlap orders if a State FVO is active and operable.
• reg 7 of the Family Law Regulations 2024 (Cth): identifies the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) as a prescribed State law for the purpose of s 114AB.

Precedents relied on:

• Phillips & Hansford (No 2) (2019) FLC 93-917; SCVG & KLD (2014) FLC 93-582 – scope of judicial reasoning on s 60CC factors.
• Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1 – appellate principle: a party is bound by the way they conduct their case.
• Metwally v University of Wollongong (1985) 60 ALR 68 – cannot raise new arguments on appeal.

Application of Law to the Facts

Justice Austin found that the trial judge had no power to make injunctions under s 68B that overlapped the Queensland FVO. Because the mother had already obtained a final State order, the Court’s jurisdiction was constrained by s 114AB(2) — the federal power could not operate concurrently over the same subject matter.

Specifically:

• Order 6 restrained the father from communicating with the youngest child or attending the mother’s home or workplace.
• Order 7 restrained communication with the middle child.
• Order 8 prohibited communication with the mother except in emergencies.

Each of these orders conflicted or duplicated existing FVO terms, making them ultra vires. Justice Austin emphasised that the error was curable by simply discharging the offending orders, without disturbing the remainder of the judgment.

All other grounds — including claims of bias, lack of reasons, and disproportionality — were dismissed as without merit. The appellate court confirmed the trial judge’s substantive findings of unacceptable risk, family violence, and impaired parenting capacity were sound and supported by evidence.

Judgment and Reasoning

The appeal was allowed in part.

Justice Austin:

“The provisions of s 114AB(2) of the Act deprived the primary judge of power to make the injunctions comprised by Orders 6, 7 and 8, as they either conflict or overlap with the terms of the operable State family violence order.”

Accordingly:

• The original Orders 1–22 (dated 5 August 2025) were set aside.
• The subsequently published orders (1–21) were confirmed as the valid final orders, minus Orders 6–8, which were discharged.
• No costs were ordered.

The partial success did not disturb the overall parenting outcome — the children remained in the mother’s care, with the father’s contact restricted due to risk — but it corrected the jurisdictional overreach of duplicative injunctions.

Why the Father “Won” This Ground

The father’s limited victory was purely technical, but legally significant.

• He demonstrated the trial judge acted without power, not merely erred in discretion.
• This form of error — jurisdictional excess — cannot be cured by consent or hindsight.
• It underscores that federal parenting injunctions cannot co-exist with State family violence orders covering the same protective ground.
• The correction preserved the hierarchical integrity between State and Commonwealth systems under s 114AB.

Take-Home Lesson

Even in high-risk parenting cases, the Family Court’s protective reach must respect the federal-state boundary. When a State family violence order already exists, duplicate injunctions are beyond power, no matter how well-intentioned.

This case illustrates that:

• Judges must check for operative State orders before issuing federal injunctions.
• Lawyers should identify and raise s 114AB issues early to prevent jurisdictional conflict.
• A technical win on power can occur even when the substantive appeal is lost — but it will not change the parenting outcome unless the underlying findings are wrong.

📘 Summary Table

IssueFindingResultFederal injunctions overlapping State FVOContrary to s 114AB – beyond powerOrders 6–8 dischargedRisk and parenting findingsSound and evidence-basedAppeal dismissedCostsNo order as to costsEach bears own

🧭 Key Precedent Established

Federal judges must avoid duplicating State protective orders — even if the federal orders appear more comprehensive. The error is jurisdictional, not discretionary.

In Walshe & Walshe [2025] FedCFamC1A 231, Justice Campton delivered an important appellate decision clarifying the powers and responsibilities of family judges when assessing risk in interim parenting disputes. The Court confirmed that, even when evidence is untested or conflicting, judges are not prohibited from making factual determinations necessary to protect children. The decision affirms the judiciary’s duty to act cautiously but decisively in child-related matters — particularly where allegations of sexual abuse or family violence arise.

Facts and Issues

The mother alleged that the father posed an unacceptable risk to their daughter (born 2019) due to sexual abuse, family violence, and emotional harm. Police obtained a provisional ADVO protecting the child after she disclosed that her father had touched her genital area while wiping her after using the toilet.

The father sought professionally supervised time with the child, claiming the mother had influenced her and that any disclosures were “innocuous.” The Independent Children’s Lawyer (ICL) supported a limited reintroduction of contact. The mother opposed, seeking dismissal of the father’s application.

The primary judge, considering the gravity of risk and the absence of evidence that reintroduction would ensure the child’s safety, refused to reinstate contact. The father appealed, arguing the judge erred in law by making “findings on contested facts” at an interim hearing without tested evidence.

The key issue before Justice Campton was:

Can a family court judge make factual determinations at an interlocutory stage when evidence has not been tested through cross-examination?

Application of Law to the Facts

Justice Campton rejected the father’s argument, holding that a judge is not prohibited from making factual determinations at an interlocutory stage if necessary to assess unacceptable risk and ensure a child’s safety.

Drawing on Pilot & Silver [2022] FedCFamC1A 191 and Banks & Banks (2015) FLC 93-637, His Honour noted that although findings on contested facts should be circumspect, evidence “must not be ignored simply because it is disputed”.

The Court reaffirmed the two-step test from Isles & Nelissen (2022) FLC 94-092:

1. Determine whether conduct allegations are established to the civil standard; and
2. Assess whether the proven or possible conduct creates an unacceptable risk of harm.

Importantly, s 102NJ of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) expressly empowers the Court to “make findings of fact in child-related proceedings at any stage”, confirming the Court’s obligation to weigh credible evidence even where full testing is not yet possible.

Thus, the primary judge was entitled — indeed, required — to make interim factual assessments to decide whether supervised contact was safe.

Judicial Reasoning and Analysis

Justice Campton’s reasoning emphasised the protective function of interim parenting orders:

• The Court must not “ignore credible evidence” merely because it is contested.
• Determining risk at the interlocutory stage involves a conservative evaluation of probabilities and potential harm.
• Judges must weigh both the benefit of contact and the risk of harm, even if the full factual matrix awaits trial.

The primary judge’s detailed reasoning — acknowledging the limits of interim evidence while evaluating consistent reports from the child, daycare staff, GP, and police — demonstrated “circumspect engagement” with the statutory duty to safeguard children.

Justice Campton held that the father’s complaint was “hollow” because the trial judge had not made definitive findings of guilt or abuse, but rather weighed the available evidence to determine that it was not safe to reintroduce time.

The appeal was dismissed, with costs fixed at $13,143.99 against the father.

How a Judge Can Make Factual Determinations at an Interim Stage

This decision is now a leading authority confirming that:

• Section 102NJ expressly empowers courts to make interim factual findings in child-related proceedings to assist in determining disputes.
• Judges are not confined to uncontested facts; they may engage with contested evidence when safety demands it.
• Findings are not final — they are “conservative assessments” to manage immediate risks pending trial.
• The obligation under ss 60CC and 60CG (Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)) to ensure safety means a judge must evaluate risk, even without cross-examination.
• As per Pilot & Silver and Fowler & Northwood (2022) FLC 94-114, ignoring credible evidence simply because it is disputed would be a failure to exercise jurisdiction.

In short, a judge’s duty to protect outweighs the procedural constraint of untested evidence.

Take-Home Lessons

✅ 1. Safety First, Facts Later: Interim hearings are not mini-trials, but courts must still engage with credible evidence to assess risk.

✅ 2. Section 102NJ confirms judicial power to make findings mid-proceeding.

✅ 3. Credibility ≠ Certainty: Disputed evidence may still be weighed for interim protection.

✅ 4. Appellate scrutiny is limited: Unless a judge’s interim reasoning is illogical or ignores statutory mandates, appeals will fail.

✅ 5. Risk assessment is evidence-based, not discretionary: The Court must balance probabilities and potential harm with great caution.

Cited Authorities

• Walshe & Walshe [2025] FedCFamC1A 231
• Pilot & Silver [2022] FedCFamC1A 191
• Isles & Nelissen (2022) FLC 94-092
• Banks & Banks (2015) FLC 93-637
• Kellerman & Kellerman [2024] FedCFamC1A 126
• Fowler & Northwood (2022) FLC 94-114
• Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 60CC, 60CG, 102NJ

The Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1) delivered a rare and scathing rebuke of solicitor conduct in Fing & Ma (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1A 230. The Full Court found that the solicitor, Mr AQ of Aston Legal Group, had departed from objective professional judgment and acted under emotional and religious influence in urging a grieving client to pursue a hopeless appeal based on her late father’s suicide note. The solicitor was ordered to personally pay over $97,000 in costs on an indemnity basis — a stark reminder that legal advocacy must remain dispassionate, evidence-based, and client-centred.

Facts and Issues

The case stemmed from a failed property appeal brought by the estate of a deceased man (“the deceased”), who had alleged that properties in Australia were held on trust for him. After the deceased’s suicide, his daughter was substituted as the appellant and continued the appeal under the encouragement of her father’s solicitor, Mr AQ.

The Full Court dismissed the appeal in September 2025, finding the arguments baseless and repetitive, and later heard competing costs applications. The respondents sought costs against both the appellant and her solicitor, arguing that the solicitor’s conduct — marked by emotional manipulation, poor legal reasoning, and refusal to heed offers of compromise — had unreasonably prolonged a hopeless appeal.

The issues were:

1. Whether the solicitor’s conduct amounted to “improper or unreasonable conduct” under r 12.15 of the FCFCOA (Family Law) Rules 2021; and
2. Whether the solicitor should personally bear the respondents’ and the appellant’s costs.

Application of the Law to the Facts

The Full Court, citing Cansdall & Cansdall (2021) FLC 94-052 and White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Flower & Hart (1998) 156 ALR 169, reiterated that costs orders against solicitors require more than poor judgment — they require conduct that is unreasonable, improper, or a serious dereliction of duty.

Here, Mr AQ’s actions met that threshold. His advice was not based on law or evidence, but on emotion, sentiment, and misplaced conviction:

• He told the appellant there was an “85 % chance of success” despite overwhelming contrary authority.
• He dismissed her concern about costs as “silly and ridiculous” and assured her it was “very, very, very, very rare” an executor would be personally liable.
• He invoked religious passages, writing, “Let justice flow like a river… since your father committed suicide, I now believe 100 % that the money belonged to him.”
• He rejected settlement offers that would have avoided further expense, framing them as “threats” by “Caucasian lawyers” and urging her to “finish the race” for her late father.

This, the Court held, showed a loss of objectivity and a crusading mindset, with the solicitor acting on “irrelevant and emotive considerations” rather than legal reasoning.

Analysis of the Judgment and Reasoning

The Full Court (Aldridge, Campton & Christie JJ) held that:

• The solicitor had “significantly departed from providing objective, dispassionate legal advice”.
• His advice was “extraordinary” and “coloured by emotion and religious sentiment” at a time when his client was in acute grief.
• His encouragement to pursue the appeal was “unreasonable in the sense used in the Rules” and caused substantial wasted costs.
• The appellant herself acted reasonably, having relied on her solicitor’s misguided assurances.

Accordingly, the Court ordered Mr AQ to personally pay:

• $72,249.10 – first and second respondents’ costs (indemnity basis);
• $20,266.90 – third respondent’s costs (fixed sum); and
• $4,727.53 – the appellant’s costs of responding to the costs application.

The Court relied on Colgate-Palmolive Co v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225 to justify indemnity costs in cases of wilful disregard of law, emotional manipulation, or imprudent rejection of settlement offers.

Take-Home Lessons

✅ 1. Emotion has no place in legal advice. Lawyers must maintain objectivity, even when a case involves grief or tragedy.

✅ 2. Duty to warn about costs is paramount. Failing to properly advise a client — especially a vulnerable one — about personal exposure is professional negligence in spirit, if not in law.

✅ 3. Faith or personal conviction cannot replace law and evidence. The Court condemned the solicitor’s reliance on Biblical passages as evidence of impaired judgment.

✅ 4. Costs orders against lawyers are rare but real. Improper conduct can result in personal liability — here, nearly $100,000.

✅ 5. Professional detachment safeguards justice. The solicitor’s “crusade” blurred advocacy with belief, undermining both client protection and the integrity of the legal system.

Cited Authorities

• Fing & Ma (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1A 230
• Cansdall & Cansdall (2021) FLC 94-052
• White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Flower & Hart (1998) 156 ALR 169
• Colgate-Palmolive Co v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225
• Forsyth v Sinclair (No 2) (2010) 28 VR 635
• Levick v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2000) 102 FCR 155

How a father’s six-figure legal bill turned into a cautionary tale about fairness, restraint, and the limits of costs recovery in family law.

In Langley & Mirza (No 2) [2025], Justice Austin delivered a sharp reality check for litigants pursuing large-scale cost recoveries in family law. Despite the father spending $252,235.91 in actual legal costs, he walked away with only $10,000 in costs on appeal — a stark illustration that family law costs are governed by proportionality, fairness, and reasonableness, not the magnitude of one’s legal bills.

The case demonstrates that even where a party “wins,” discretion and equity control the outcome — not accounting spreadsheets or punitive motives.

Facts and Issues

After a bitterly contested property trial, the father sought to recoup his substantial legal expenditure, applying for a costs order of $252,235.91 (actual) or alternatively $206,262.38 (party/party).

The mother opposed, arguing both sides had contributed to the protracted dispute. The trial judge agreed, fixing costs at $77,080.68, representing half of each party’s combined outlays — a rough, equitable division.

The mother appealed on five grounds:

1. The primary judge allegedly used indemnity rates despite rejecting indemnity costs.
2. She was denied procedural fairness, not being consulted on the numerical calculation.
3. Failure to consider all relevant Family Law Act s 117(2A) factors.
4. Overlooked one of her earlier Costs Notices (2021).
5. Inadequate reasons for fixing, rather than assessing, costs.

The key issue became whether the trial judge’s approach miscarried in law or principle — and whether the outcome was manifestly unfair.

Application of Law to the Facts

Justice Austin reaffirmed the well-established restraint on appellate interference: a costs discretion is “not to be lightly disturbed” unless there is error of principle or procedural unfairness.

• The judge found that no indemnity order was made — the trial judge had merely used each party’s actual legal spend as a “common baseline” for fairness, avoiding distortion that would occur if only one side’s lower party/party costs were used.
• Procedural fairness was not denied; both parties made extensive written submissions, and the Court was not obliged to reopen for discussion of raw figures.
• The s 117(2A) factors were expressly cited; the judge was not required to list each exhaustively.
• The alleged overlooked Costs Notice was never in evidence, and therefore irrelevant.
• Fixing costs, rather than ordering a protracted assessment, was consistent with the overriding purpose of efficiency under r 1.04 of the FCFCOA (Family Law) Rules 2021.

Analysis of the Judgment and Reasoning

Justice Austin dismissed the mother’s appeal entirely — but notably, while the father succeeded, his reward was symbolic rather than substantial.

His Honour awarded the father just $10,000 in appeal costs, expressly noting the appeal was “short and straightforward” and did not justify significant reimbursement.

The decision reinforced three principles:

1. Winning doesn’t guarantee full reimbursement.
2. Even after prevailing on all issues, the father’s recovery — less than 4% of his total legal spend — underscored that family law is about fairness, not restitution.
3. Fairness outranks financial precision.
4. The trial judge’s “half-the-combined-costs” approach was upheld as equitable and proportionate.
5. Efficiency trumps escalation.
6. Justice Austin commended the pragmatic choice to fix costs to avoid yet another dispute, preserving judicial resources and discouraging excessive litigation.

Take-Home Lessons

💡 1. Spending more doesn’t mean you’ll recover more.

Family law’s discretionary nature means cost orders are guided by fairness, not the scale of expenditure.

💡 2. Costs appeals are a dead end unless there’s clear error.

Courts protect discretionary judgments from re-litigation.

💡 3. Efficiency and proportionality rule the day.

A $252,000 legal saga yielded a $10,000 outcome — a reminder that family law punishes overreach and rewards reasonableness.

💡 4. Fixing costs protects both parties from endless disputes.

The court’s focus is finality, not financial revenge.

Cited Authorities

• Langley & Mirza (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1A 226
• Minister for Immigration v SZGUR (2011) 241 CLR 594
• SZBEL v MIMIA (2006) 228 CLR 152
• Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 117(2A)
• FCFCOA (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) r 1.04

In Conner & Conner (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1A 223, the Full Court of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia reaffirmed a fundamental principle of appellate law — not every order is appealable. The mother’s attempt to appeal procedural directions relating to a psychiatric assessment was dismissed as incompetent because the orders did not determine any substantive rights. The Court’s reasoning underscores the distinction between procedural and final orders and the importance of understanding when an appeal properly lies.

Facts and Issues

• The parties married in 2019 and have one child (born 2021).
• Following separation in 2022, multiple interim parenting orders were made allowing the child to live with the mother and spend time with the father.
• On 20 May 2025, the trial judge ordered both parents to undergo psychiatric assessments.
• On 24 July 2025, further procedural orders were made requiring the mother to attend an interview, allowing the psychiatrist to use a psychologist for testing, and warning that if she failed to comply, the matter might proceed on an undefended basis.
• The mother appealed these orders, arguing they unfairly prejudiced her case.

Issues before the Full Court:

1. Were the July 2025 procedural orders capable of being appealed under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)?
2. Did the orders prejudice the mother’s substantive rights or determine her legal entitlements?
3. Should the appeal be dismissed as incompetent or futile?

Application of Law to Facts

The Full Court (Christie, Strum & Brasch JJ) found that:

• None of the challenged orders constituted a “judgment” under The Commonwealth v Mullane (1961) 106 CLR 166, because they were purely procedural and did not determine any rights.
• The orders simply facilitated the preparation of expert evidence for the forthcoming trial and did not cause legal prejudice.
• Order 11 — warning that the case could proceed undefended if the mother failed to attend — was not prescriptive or enforceable and thus was not appellable.
• Even if appealable, the appeal was futile, as the dates for compliance had already passed and the psychiatric assessment process had concluded.

The Court relied heavily on earlier appellate authorities:

• Yule v Junek (1978) 139 CLR 1 — procedural rulings not determining rights are not appealable.
• Beale & Harvie (2023) 69 Fam LR 294 and Fierro & Fierro [2022] FedCFamC1A 72 — reaffirming that case management or interlocutory steps are not subject to appeal.
• Reece & Reece [2011] FamCAFC 24 — futility principle: the Court will not hear an appeal if there is no practical utility in doing so.
• Lainhart & Ellinson (2023) FLC 94-166 — directions lacking prescriptive effect are not orders.

The Court also noted that procedural orders are contemplated by r 1.33 and r 10.27(2) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court Rules 2021 (Cth), which empower the Court to continue hearings where parties fail to comply with directions.

Judgment and Reasoning

• The Court refused leave to appeal and dismissed the appeal.
• The mother was ordered to pay Legal Aid Queensland $5,612.68 for the Independent Children’s Lawyer’s costs.

Judicial Reasoning:

1. Appeal Incompetent: The procedural nature of the orders meant there was no “decision” under s 36 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth).
2. No Prejudice: The mother’s substantive rights were unaffected — she could still contest the psychiatric evidence at trial.
3. Futility: The timing of events rendered the appeal moot, as the psychiatric assessment had already occurred.
4. Overreach: The mother’s additional requests — such as excluding expert evidence or substituting treating practitioners — exceeded the appellate court’s remedial powers and were matters for the trial judge.

Take-Home Lessons

• Not all orders can be appealed. Only determinations that decide rights or cause prejudice are “judgments” for appeal purposes.
• Procedural fairness ≠ appealable error. Disagreement with case management decisions must usually be addressed at trial, not through appeal.
• Futility bars appeal. Even meritorious arguments fail if no practical remedy remains.
• Stay within appellate bounds. Appeals are not opportunities to reshape trial management or pre-empt evidentiary rulings.
• Costs follow failure. Frivolous or incompetent appeals may result in adverse costs orders, even against self-represented litigants.

In Mertz & Mertz (No 3) [2025] FedCFamC1A 222, the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia took an unprecedented stance on the misuse of Artificial Intelligence in family law litigation. The case serves as a cautionary tale for legal practitioners about the unverified use of generative AI in preparing submissions. When counsel submitted documents containing fake authorities and inaccurate case citations, the Full Court not only ordered costs against the appellant but also referred the lawyers involved to their respective professional conduct regulators. This decision sets a critical precedent on technological responsibility and professional ethics in modern advocacy.

Facts and Issues

• The appellant filed an appeal which was discontinued two days before the hearing.
• During preparations, the appellant’s legal team—comprising a solicitor and two barristers—used AI tools to generate a Summary of Argument and List of Authorities.
• The AI-generated material contained non-existent and misleading citations, which were later amended without clear explanation.
• The Court identified a lack of transparency and accountability in how the AI was used and questioned the supervision of junior staff.
• The respondent sought costs due to wasted preparation and requested disciplinary referral.

Key Issues:

1. Whether the use of AI-generated submissions containing false citations constituted professional misconduct.
2. Whether the appellant’s discontinuance warranted a party-and-party costs order.
3. What professional obligations arise from the use of AI in legal practice.

Application of Law to Facts

The Court referenced several key authorities and guidelines to frame its reasoning:

• Dayal [2024] FedCFamC2F 1166 — where a practitioner was referred to regulators for submitting AI-generated fake cases, establishing that lawyers must verify any material produced by AI.
• Helmold & Mariya (No 2) (2025) FLC 94-272 — warning that “reliance upon unverified research generated by AI has the capacity to confuse, mislead, and waste judicial time”.
• The Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 114Q and 114UB were cited concerning confidentiality obligations and costs discretion.
• The Court also considered the Supreme Court of NSW Practice Note SC Gen 23 (2025) and the Supreme Court of Victoria AI Guidelines (2024) as persuasive ethical standards for AI use in litigation.

Applying these, the Full Court found:

• The extent and nature of AI use were unclear, and the practitioners failed in their duty of diligence and candour to the Court.
• The solicitor’s delegation to a paralegal, without adequate supervision or disclosure, breached professional standards.
• The AI usage risked breaches of confidentiality, privilege, and the Harman undertaking, given the potential exposure of non-public information to third-party AI tools.
• The appellant’s late discontinuance caused wasted costs and prejudice to the respondent, justifying an award of $36,955 in costs, plus $10,000 in additional costs for correcting the AI-related errors.

Judgment and Reasoning

The Court ordered:

1. The referral of all involved practitioners—Ms G (solicitor), Mr AX KC, and Mr AY—to their respective professional regulatory bodies for investigation.
2. A costs order against the appellant for $36,955 on a party-and-party basis, and a further $10,000 payable by Ms G personally for the AI issue.

Reasoning:

• The Court emphasized that AI cannot be used as a substitute for human judgment or verification.
• Practitioners remain personally responsible for every word submitted to the Court, regardless of technological tools employed.
• Ethical and professional obligations—accuracy, competence, honesty, and respect for confidentiality—cannot be outsourced to AI.
• The referrals were made not as punishment but to protect the integrity of the legal profession and ensure future guidance for AI governance in law.

Precedents and Authorities Cited

• Dayal [2024] FedCFamC2F 1166 (AI misuse and referral).
• Helmold & Mariya (No 2) (2025) FLC 94-272.
• Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 114Q, 114UB.
• Supreme Court of NSW Practice Note SC Gen 23 (2025).
• Supreme Court of Victoria AI Guidelines (2024).

Take-Home Lesson

This case marks the first appellate-level rebuke of AI misuse by Australian family law practitioners. It underscores that:

• AI is not a research shortcut; unverified outputs can amount to professional misconduct.
• Lawyers must disclose AI usage, verify every citation, and safeguard confidentiality.
• Courts will sanction both the firm and individuals for negligence or lack of supervision in AI use.
• Transparency, accountability, and human oversight remain the cornerstones of ethical advocacy in the digital age.

In Joustra & Schuman [2025] FedCFamC2F 1478, Judge Suthers delivered a decisive ruling in a highly contentious second tranche of parenting proceedings. The mother, who initiated the case, alleged the father had sexually abused their six-year-old son. However, after multiple investigations by police and child protection authorities found no evidence, the Court determined that the mother’s persistent and unsubstantiated allegations caused emotional harm to the child. In a rare but clear outcome, the Court found the mother — not the father — posed an unacceptable risk to the child’s psychological wellbeing, granting the father sole parental responsibility and ordering that the child live with him.

📜 Facts and Issues

Facts

• The parties separated in 2021 and had one child, X, born in 2019.
• Final parenting orders in 2023 allowed X to live primarily with the mother and spend time with the father.
• In 2024, the mother unilaterally stopped contact after alleging that the father had sexually abused the child, prompting new litigation.
• Police, child protection (DCJ), and medical professionals investigated the allegations twice and concluded there was no evidence of abuse.
• Despite this, the mother continued to believe X’s claims, withheld time, and exposed him to repeated questioning by herself and others, including her therapist.
• The Court found the child had developed distress and confusion due to the mother’s conduct and exposure to false narratives.

Issues

1. Whether the father posed an unacceptable risk of harm to the child.
2. Whether the mother’s behaviour and allegations caused emotional or psychological harm.
3. What parenting orders would best promote the child’s welfare and safety.
4. How the new s 60CC(2)(e) framework (“relationship where safe to do so”) applies post-2023 reforms.

⚖️ Law

Legislative Framework

• Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), ss 60CA, 60CC(2)(a)-(e), 65DAAA.
• Family Law Amendment Act 2023 (Cth) — repealed “meaningful relationship” but retained “benefit of relationship where safe to do so.”
• United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Arts 8–9 (right to parental relationships unless unsafe).

Key Authorities

• Mazorski & Albright [2007] FamCA 520; (2008) 37 Fam LR 518 – “meaningful relationship” interpreted as one that is “important, significant and valuable.”
• McCall & Clark [2009] FamCAFC 92 – best interests determined through child’s safety and meaningful connection.
• Pickford & Pickford [2024] FedCFamC1A 249 – expanded definition of family violence.
• Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 – inferences from failure to call witnesses.

🔍 Application

1️⃣ Father’s Alleged Risk of Harm

The mother alleged sexual and physical abuse, but the evidence did not substantiate it.

• Both police and DCJ determined that the allegations were unfounded and that the child’s accounts were inconsistent or coached.
• The Court found the father’s evidence consistent, honest, and corroborated by contemporaneous records.
• At trial, even the mother conceded:

“It is my understanding that he did not [sexually assault the child]” (at [93]).

Judge Suthers concluded there was no probative evidence of abuse or family violence, and the father did not pose an unacceptable risk.

2️⃣ Mother’s Conduct and Psychological Risk

In contrast, the mother’s persistence in pursuing discredited allegations caused emotional harm:

• She repeatedly questioned X about “what Daddy did” and involved him in discussions with police and therapists.
• The child’s therapist and court expert observed that X had begun to express age-inappropriate and inconsistent statements, showing signs of anxiety and confusion.
• The Court found that the mother’s behaviour had become “emotionally contaminating,” creating a resist-refuse dynamic between father and child.

Accordingly, Judge Suthers held that the mother posed an unacceptable risk to the child’s emotional and psychological safety, though one that could be ameliorated through therapy and structured contact.

3️⃣ Orders and Outcome

The Court made significant protective orders:

• X to live with the father.
• The father to have sole parental responsibility.
• An eight-week moratorium on time with the mother.
• Gradual transition from supervised to unsupervised time, contingent on progress and compliance.

The Court also noted the child’s need for therapeutic support and the importance of reducing exposure to parental conflict at school.

💬 Analysis of the Judgment

Judge Suthers’ reasoning demonstrates the modern post-reform balance between child safety and relationship preservation under s 60CC(2)(e).

While Parliament removed “meaningful relationship” from the Act, the judgment reaffirmed that judicial discretion still requires a qualitative assessment of the child’s relationships — not just whether contact exists, but whether it is safe and nurturing.

The decision is a careful yet firm repudiation of speculative or unsubstantiated allegations.

The Court distinguished between genuine protective conduct and maladaptive overprotection, finding that the mother’s conduct crossed the line into emotional abuse through persistent false allegations and undermining the father-child bond.

🧠 Take-Home Lesson

“False allegations can backfire — emotional harm counts too.”

For practitioners and parents alike, Joustra & Schuman stands as a sobering lesson:

• Allegations without evidence can irreparably damage credibility and parenting outcomes.
• Unproven claims of abuse, especially when repeatedly made, can be viewed as emotionally harmful conduct.
• The Court will protect the child’s relationship with a safe parent, even where it means reversing primary care.
• Mothers (or any initiating parent) must appreciate that being the applicant does not guarantee judicial sympathy; evidence, not emotion, drives the outcome.

As the Court found, the mother’s insistence on relitigating disproved allegations transformed her from protector to risk — a pattern increasingly visible in post-reform family law jurisprudence.

In Willis & Mulder [2025] FedCFamC1A 217, Justice Austin of the Federal Circuit and Family Court (Division 1, Appellate Jurisdiction) overturned a property settlement after the wife uncovered explosive new evidence — her husband, who claimed to be a pensioner with no income, had secretly declared a $176,000 annual salary to a lender just months later. The appellate court found that while the trial judge made no legal errors based on the original evidence, the husband’s post-trial loan documents “collided violently” with his sworn testimony. This new evidence fatally undermined the trial findings under s 75(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), leading the Court to set aside the orders and send the matter back for rehearing.

📜 Facts and Issues

Facts

• The parties married in 2006 and separated in 2021.
• The wife commenced property proceedings in 2023; the husband, self-represented at trial, claimed he was on a Commonwealth old-age pension with no other income.
• The primary judge divided property 65/35 in the husband’s favour, rejecting claims of non-disclosure and finding both parties equally deficient in financial transparency.
• Shortly after judgment, the wife obtained loan application documents showing the husband declared an annual taxable income of $176,000, and affirmed he was self-employed.
• The wife appealed, arguing this new material proved both non-disclosure and a miscarriage in the primary judge’s s 75(2) assessment.

Issues

1. Whether the husband’s undisclosed income and post-trial loan documents justified admitting fresh evidence on appeal.
2. Whether the trial judge erred in failing to adjust property division under s 75(2) for financial disparity.
3. Whether non-disclosure or false evidence warranted setting aside the final orders.

⚖️ Law

Statutory Framework

• Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 75(2), 79 — financial and contribution-based adjustment principles.
• Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) s 35(b) — power to receive further evidence on appeal.
• Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 164 — corroboration not required for acceptance of probative evidence.

Key Precedents

• CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172 – new evidence on appeal admissible if credible, material, and likely to produce a different result.
• Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172 – power to remit matter for rehearing if justice requires.
• Weir & Weir (1993) FLC 92–338 – consequences of deliberate non-disclosure.
• Gould & Gould (2007) FLC 93-333 – degrees of non-disclosure and their forensic consequences.
• Franklin & Ennis [2019] FamCAFC 91 – non-disclosure is not self-punishing; its impact depends on circumstances.

🔍 Application

1️⃣ Admissibility of New Evidence

Justice Austin applied CDJ v VAJ and held the wife’s evidence — comprising a broker’s declaration, a tax agent’s letter, and a loan application — met all criteria for admission:

• It was credible and created after the trial, hence unavailable earlier.
• It directly contradicted the husband’s sworn evidence of being on a pension.
• It was highly probative of the husband’s true financial circumstances and likely to affect the outcome on s 75(2) adjustment.

The Court described the husband’s admissions as “colliding violently” with his trial evidence (at [86]) and found that had the evidence been known earlier, the financial outcome would have differed materially.

2️⃣ Non-Disclosure and Section 75(2)

At trial, the husband’s alleged poverty limited the scope for any post-contribution adjustment. With the new material showing hidden income, the Court held the s 75(2) determination was now “vitiated” — particularly factors relating to income disparity, earning capacity, and future needs (at [88]–[89]).

Justice Austin emphasised that non-disclosure findings are means to an end, not punishment: what matters is whether the true financial position alters justice and equity under s 75(2).

3️⃣ No Primary Error, But New Injustice

Importantly, Justice Austin stressed that the primary judge committed no appealable error on the evidence before her (at [2]). The injustice only emerged due to new evidence unavailable at trial. Accordingly, the appeal succeeded not for legal error, but because the subsequent revelations fundamentally changed the factual matrix.

The husband’s “violent collision” of declarations warranted rehearing before a different judge (at [93]–[94]), preserving procedural fairness for both parties.

💬 Analysis of the Judgment

The appellate reasoning in Willis & Mulder highlights two vital principles:

1. Fresh Evidence Jurisprudence — Following CDJ v VAJ, the Court reaffirmed that appellate intervention may be justified even absent trial error, where newly discovered facts make the original decision unsafe.
2. Non-Disclosure and Forensic Balance — Echoing Weir & Weir and Gould & Gould, Austin J reiterated that not all non-disclosure is equal; its gravity depends on whether it conceals material wealth or merely delays proceedings.

The husband’s deliberate misrepresentation struck at the integrity of the property pool and the credibility of the evidence underpinning the judgment. Hence, justice required a rehearing, not just a recalculation.

🧠 Take-Home Lesson

“Truth told too late is still a lie — and in family property cases, lies cost judgments.”

Willis & Mulder reaffirms that:

• Full and frank disclosure is a continuing obligation under the Family Law Act.
• Post-trial evidence exposing dishonesty can reopen even a final judgment.
• Appellate courts will only disturb discretionary outcomes where new evidence is decisive, credible, and would likely change the result.

The wife’s diligence in obtaining the husband’s loan documents illustrates how forensic persistence can unearth concealed wealth — and overturn injustice.

In Barnabas & Phineus [2025] FedCFamC1A 215, Justice Campton of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1, Appellate Jurisdiction) dealt with a father’s appeal against supervised contact orders. The father alleged his trial counsel’s incompetence led to an unfair trial and that the primary judge gave insufficient weight to his medical evidence. The appellate court dismissed the appeal, holding that not every alleged forensic mistake by counsel amounts to a miscarriage of justice, and that appellate intervention is reserved for errors that materially affect the result. The judgment underscores the high threshold for appeals based on alleged incompetence of counsel and reaffirms the House v The King principles of appellate review in discretionary family law decisions.

📜 Facts and Issues

Facts

• The parents, Mr Barnabas and Ms Phineus, separated in 2022, with one child born in 2021.
• At trial, the mother was granted sole parental responsibility and relocation to Victoria, while the father was permitted supervised contact at a contact centre.
• The primary judge found the father posed an unacceptable risk due to his mental illness, drug use, and history of family violence.
• The father appealed, asserting that:

1. His trial counsel was incompetent, failing to rely on key affidavits from his mother and sister.
2. The judge gave insufficient weight to his treating doctors’ opinions (Dr G and Dr L).
3. Counsel failed to challenge the single expert psychiatrist’s report (Dr E).

• The Independent Children’s Lawyer (ICL) and the mother opposed the appeal.

Issues

1. Did the alleged incompetence of trial counsel cause the father to be denied a fair trial or produce a miscarriage of justice?
2. Did the primary judge err by giving insufficient or improper weight to the father’s treating medical evidence?
3. Should the Court have admitted new evidence on appeal that was excluded at trial?

⚖️ Law

Statutory Framework

• Family Law Act 1975 (Cth): ss 60CC, 60CG – safety and best interests principles.
• Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth): r 13.23 (appeal procedure).
• Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth): s 35 – discretion to admit new evidence on appeal.

Key Precedents

• House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 — appellate error categories.
• OP v TP & The Child Representative (2002) 30 Fam LR 281 — incompetence of counsel test.
• CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172 — scope of admitting new evidence on appeal.
• Kellerman & Kellerman [2024] FedCFamC1A 126 — discretion and weight of evidence in parenting orders.
• Maddax & Danner [2016] FamCAFC 176 — miscarriage from counsel’s conduct.

🔍 Application

1️⃣ Alleged Incompetence of Counsel

The father claimed trial counsel ignored instructions to rely on affidavits from his mother and sister. Justice Campton found no evidence supporting that claim — the affidavits were not critical to the outcome and, in fact, would not have altered the result.

Citing OP v TP and TKWJ v R, the Court reaffirmed that mere dissatisfaction with counsel’s conduct does not establish a miscarriage unless the conduct deprived the party of a fair trial or likely changed the result.

“The father has failed to establish that the forensic decision, howsoever made, not to rely on the affidavits… affected the decision in the judgment” (at [Ground 1(a)]).

2️⃣ Weight Given to Expert Evidence

The father argued that the primary judge undervalued the opinions of his treating clinicians (Dr G and Dr L) and over-relied on the single expert (Dr E).

Justice Campton noted that weight is quintessentially for the trial judge (Kellerman & Kellerman; Gronow v Gronow). Dr E’s evidence was found admissible despite his retirement, as it met s 63 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) and formed part of the single expert process.

The appellate judge confirmed that the trial judge had critically evaluated each expert’s evidence, finding Dr E’s opinions well-supported and the treating doctors’ opinions overly reliant on the father’s self-reporting.

3️⃣ Admission of New Evidence

The father sought to introduce emails and affidavits on appeal. Justice Campton allowed some procedural evidence but refused late oral applications, citing prejudice to the mother and ICL and the need for orderly appellate procedure under r 13.23(4).

💬 Analysis of the Judgment

Justice Campton’s reasoning reflects a strong emphasis on finality, procedural fairness, and evidentiary integrity.

• The decision clarifies that strategic choices by counsel—even if misguided—do not amount to incompetence unless they fundamentally compromise fairness.
• The Court distinguished between forensic discretion and legal error, warning that relitigating tactical decisions on appeal undermines the integrity of the trial process.
• The Court also reinforced that in appeals from discretionary judgments, weight complaints rarely succeed unless the result is plainly unreasonable (House v The King; Hedlund & Hedlund [2021]).

By dismissing the appeal, Justice Campton upheld the primacy of child safety and judicial discretion in parenting determinations.

🧠 Take-Home Lesson

“Dissatisfaction with one’s lawyer does not equal injustice — only errors that change the result can.”

This case teaches family law practitioners and litigants that:

• The threshold for appellate interference is high; forensic or tactical missteps are insufficient unless they cause real prejudice.
• Parties must ensure clear instructions and contemporaneous records if alleging counsel error.
• Parenting decisions rest on broad discretion — appellate courts will not reweigh evidence simply because another conclusion was possible.

In Mayfield & Mayfield [2025] FedCFamC2F 1227, Judge Turnbull of the Federal Circuit and Family Court (Division 2, Hobart) reaffirmed the strict operation of section 60I of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) — the rule that parties must first attempt Family Dispute Resolution (FDR) or obtain an appropriate section 60I certificate before filing parenting proceedings. The applicant mother argued her case should proceed because the father’s refusal to attend mediation made FDR impossible. However, the Court held that even in such situations, the proper process is to obtain a practitioner’s certificate reflecting that refusal — not to bypass the system entirely. The decision reinforces that procedural compliance under section 60I is a jurisdictional gatekeeper to filing parenting applications.

📜 Facts and Issues

Facts

• Ms Mayfield sought to file an Initiating Application for parenting orders.
• The Deputy Registrar rejected her application because she did not file a Family Dispute Resolution (FDR) certificate under section 60I(7) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
• Ms Mayfield argued an exemption applied under s 60I(9)(e) (“unable to participate effectively”), because the father had refused to attend FDR.
• Her solicitor’s affidavit showed repeated written invitations (16 January and 5 February 2025) to participate in mediation, both declined by the father’s solicitor.
• The Deputy Registrar found no valid exemption applied and refused filing; Ms Mayfield applied to review that decision under rule 14.05 of the FCFCOA (Family Law) Rules 2021.

Issues

1. Was the Deputy Registrar correct to reject the application for lack of a section 60I certificate?
2. Did the applicant qualify for an exemption under section 60I(9)(e) — “unable to participate effectively”?
3. Was the father’s refusal to attend FDR enough to bypass the certification requirement?

⚖️ Law

Key legislative provisions:

• s 60I(7) – The court must not accept an application for a Part VII parenting order unless a valid certificate accompanies it or an exemption applies.
• s 60I(8) – Sets out the types of certificates an FDR practitioner may issue, including where the other party refused or failed to attend.
• s 60I(9) – Lists limited exemptions (consent orders, abuse, family violence, urgency, inability to participate, etc.).
• Rules 14.05–14.07 – Allow review of a Registrar’s exercise of power, but such reviews are “original hearings” that reconsider the matter afresh.

Relevant precedents:

• Tomaras & Tomaras [2018] FamCA 446 – Reaffirmed the mandatory nature of FDR prior to filing parenting applications.
• Brett & Brett [2021] FedCFamC1F 87 – Clarified that refusal by one party requires certification by a practitioner, not self-assessment.
• Amos & Amos [2023] FedCFamC2F 217 – Held that misusing the “inability to participate” exemption undermines the legislative intent of encouraging mediation.

🔍 Application

1️⃣ Requirement to File a Certificate

The Court confirmed that under s 60I(7), no parenting application can be filed without a certificate or exemption. Judge Turnbull emphasised that the Registrar was bound by statute to reject the filing when no certificate was provided.

2️⃣ Exemption Under s 60I(9)(e)

Ms Mayfield relied on the “unable to participate effectively” exemption. The Court found her reliance misplaced: there was no evidence of incapacity, remoteness, or other reason preventing participation — the father’s mere refusal was not the same as inability.

3️⃣ Appropriate Process

Judge Turnbull held that Ms Mayfield should have booked an FDR appointment with a registered practitioner and, upon the father’s refusal, obtained a certificate under s 60I(8)(a), (aa) or (c). This would have demonstrated compliance with the Act and allowed her application to be filed.

4️⃣ Decision

Since none of the s 60I(9) exemptions applied, the Deputy Registrar was correct to reject the application. The Court therefore dismissed the review application.

💬 Analysis of the Judgment

Judge Turnbull’s reasoning illustrates the strict jurisdictional role of section 60I. The Court cannot waive or overlook the certificate requirement — even when the non-filing party has acted unreasonably. The judgment reinforces that:

• The FDR system is designed to promote early resolution and filter disputes before litigation.
• Only recognised FDR practitioners can certify a refusal, ensuring an objective verification of non-attendance.
• Courts cannot accept a “DIY” affidavit in place of a formal certificate.
• Turnbull J noted that had the applicant followed the proper step of arranging FDR, she would likely have received a certificate confirming the respondent’s refusal, satisfying the Act’s pre-condition for filing.

🧠 Take-Home Lesson

“A refusal to mediate is not an excuse to skip the process — it’s a reason to get the certificate.”

The Mayfield decision serves as a cautionary reminder:

• Section 60I certificates are gatekeeping documents — the Court lacks jurisdiction without one.
• Practitioners must advise clients to book FDR formally, document refusals, and secure a certificate of refusal.
• Self-declared exemptions should be avoided unless clear evidence fits the narrow statutory categories under s 60I(9).

In Villa & Villa [2025] FedCFamC1A 214, Justice Austin of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1, Appellate) dismissed the husband’s urgent application to expedite an appeal concerning his failed bid to force his former wife to swear an affidavit about her alleged access to his privileged communications. The husband claimed his legal professional privilege had been breached, fearing the wife might use undisclosed documents in the ongoing financial proceedings. Justice Austin found there was no factual basis for the husband’s suspicions, no urgent need for appeal, and that the issue could be addressed in the ordinary course of the part-heard trial or in a future appeal from final judgment.

📜 Facts and Issues

Facts

• The parties were engaged in complex financial proceedings under Parts VIIIA and VIII of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
• During the part-heard trial, the wife’s former lawyers inadvertently accessed an email that might have been privileged.
• The wife consented to injunctions preventing her and her lawyers from using or disclosing the document (¶5–6).
• The husband then sought an order requiring the wife to swear an affidavit confirming she held no other privileged communications and explaining how she obtained the original email (¶6–7).
• The primary judge dismissed that application, calling it “extraordinary” and unnecessary given the wife’s compliance (¶10–11).
• The husband immediately appealed and applied for expedition, arguing the appeal should be heard before the trial resumed in December 2025 (¶13–16).

Issues

1. Did the primary judge err in refusing to compel the wife to swear an affidavit regarding privileged material?
2. Did the husband demonstrate sufficient urgency to justify expedition of the appeal?
3. Was the refusal to expedite an appeal against an interlocutory procedural order consistent with established principles?

⚖️ Law

The Court applied several key principles:

• Expedition Principles: Gallea & Gallea [2020] FamCAFC 322 at [6] — expedition is exceptional and must be justified by genuine urgency, absence of delay, lack of prejudice to the respondent, and public interest in priority.
• Interlocutory Appeals: Only granted if the order has final or substantive effect; procedural or evidentiary rulings rarely justify immediate appeal (Yule v Junek (1978) 139 CLR 1; Commonwealth v Mullane (1961) 106 CLR 166).
• Judicial Discretion: Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172 and House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 — appellate courts will not interfere unless clear legal error, misapplication of principle, or unreasonable exercise of discretion is shown.
• Abuse of Process and Protective Powers: Tomlinson v Ramsay Food Processing Pty Ltd (2015) 256 CLR 507; Michael Wilson & Partners v Nicholls (2011) 244 CLR 427 — courts may make protective orders but must stay within express powers under the Family Law Rules.

🔍 Application

Justice Austin accepted that the husband acted promptly but found no sufficient reason for expedition:

• The husband’s fear that his privilege would be compromised was speculative, not based on evidence (¶24, ¶33).
• The Court found the wife had already confirmed by letter that she held no other privileged documents (¶27).
• The affidavit order sought went beyond discovery powers under Parts 6.1–6.3 of the Family Law Rules 2021 (Cth), and the husband could have simply sought interrogatories or cross-examination at trial (¶28).
• Even if power existed to compel such an affidavit, the issue would become moot if the primary judge later allowed the husband to reopen cross-examination at trial (¶29–30).
• Justice Austin observed that the husband could still raise his privilege concerns in a future appeal from the final judgment, under s 36(5) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) (¶31).

Thus, expedition was refused because the husband’s complaint was procedural, not substantive, and the Full Court should not be “mobilised with such urgency” (¶36).

💬 Analysis of the Judgment

Justice Austin’s reasoning underscores three principles:

1. Speculation is not urgency. The husband’s “bare fear” of undisclosed breaches could not justify invoking appellate jurisdiction mid-trial (¶24, ¶33).
2. Procedural fairness is contextual. The wife’s voluntary compliance and existing injunctions eliminated the need for further verification.
3. Judicial economy prevails. Appeals from interlocutory orders risk fragmenting proceedings and wasting resources; expedition is reserved for genuine, irreversible prejudice (Faldyn & Badenoch [2022] FedCFamC1A 170).

Austin J noted that even if the husband’s privilege concern had merit, it could be rectified later through appeal or rehearing (Allesch v Maunz at [30]–[31]). Hence, the procedural ruling was properly deferred to final judgment review.

🧠 Take-Home Lesson

“Urgency in family law appeals is not measured by anxiety — it must rest on demonstrable prejudice.”

• Appeals from interlocutory or procedural rulings will rarely be expedited unless immediate injustice would occur.
• Courts distinguish between factual suspicion and legal necessity — the former does not justify appellate intervention.
• Practitioners must rely on trial mechanisms (cross-examination, interrogatories) rather than seeking premature appellate relief.

In Nootkamp & Brulja (No 4) [2025] FedCFamC1A 210, the Full Court of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1) dismissed a husband’s fourth attempt to overturn enforcement orders made to implement final property settlement orders from 2024. The self-represented appellant alleged judicial bias, procedural unfairness, and discretionary error, but the Full Court (Austin, Sutherland & Riethmuller JJ) found that he was simply re-litigating issues already determined and had been given ample opportunity to comply with the original orders. The Court reinforced the narrow grounds for alleging bias and the high threshold for obtaining leave to appeal interlocutory property orders.

📜 Facts and Issues

Facts

• Final property orders were made in October 2024 dividing the parties’ assets, including two properties (“Suburb E” to the wife and “Suburb J” to the husband).
• The husband was to pay the wife $128,469, and if he failed, his property (Suburb J) would be sold to satisfy the debt.
• He failed to comply and instead filed multiple enforcement and appeal applications, including to the High Court, all of which were dismissed.
• In August 2025, the Family Court made enforcement orders giving the wife possession of Suburb J to sell it if the husband did not pay the required sum.
• The husband appealed again, alleging bias, denial of procedural fairness, and factual error in the judge’s assessment of evidence.

Issues

1. Was there judicial bias, actual or apprehended, by the primary judge?
2. Was procedural fairness denied during the enforcement proceedings (e.g. refusal of adjournment, amendment or cross-examination)?
3. Did the trial judge err in exercising discretion in enforcing the final property orders?
4. Was there any legal error in applying repealed cost provisions?

⚖️ Law

The Court applied well-established appellate and procedural principles:

• Leave to Appeal (Interlocutory) – Medlow & Medlow (2016) FLC 93-692 at [44]–[57]: leave requires doubt about the correctness of the order and risk of substantial injustice.
• Judicial Bias – Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; Vakauta v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR 568: actual bias requires proof the judge was not impartial.
• Procedural Fairness – Parties must have a reasonable opportunity to be heard, but procedural rules must be obeyed (Family Court Rules 2021 (WA) rr 85, 180).
• Costs Transition – Repeal of s 117 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) and introduction of s 114UB under the Family Law Amendment Act 2024 (Cth).

⚖️ Immaterial Legal Error – Use of Repealed Costs Provision

At paragraph [53], the Full Court acknowledged that the primary judge technically erred by referring to section 117 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) — a provision repealed under the Family Law Amendment Act 2024 (Cth) — when determining costs, rather than the current section 114UB.

The error arose because the judgment below was delivered after the commencement of the 2024 amendments, which relocated the costs framework to Part XVIA of the Act. However, the Full Court held that this mistake was immaterial, since the substantive test under both provisions is identical: each requires the Court to consider whether a party should bear costs “having regard to the conduct of the parties and the circumstances of the case.”

There was no difference in the discretion conferred, the considerations applied, or the reasoning used. In short, the citation of the repealed section did not alter the outcome — the judge applied the correct legal principle, albeit under the old section number. Consequently, the appeal could not succeed on this ground, because appellate correction is only warranted where an error is material, meaning it affected the result (House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504–505).

🔍 Application

1️⃣ Judicial Bias

The husband’s claims of bias were based on previous adverse comments, alleged preferential treatment of the wife, and repetition of arguments rejected in earlier appeals.

The Court found these entirely without merit, noting that:

• The same allegations had been dismissed in Nootkamp & Brulja (No 3) [2025] FedCFamC1A 116.
• Dissatisfaction with the result does not establish bias (Feldman v Nationwide News (2020) 103 NSWLR 307 at [43]).
• The judge’s comments were contextual and did not show prejudgment.

Result: No actual or apprehended bias was found.

2️⃣ Procedural Fairness

The husband raised five procedural complaints — late amendment, refused adjournment, combined hearing of costs and enforcement, refusal to entertain late amendment, and no cross-examination.

The Court held all five were unsustainable:

• The wife’s amendment was permissible under r 180(1)(b) and caused no prejudice.
• The adjournment refusal was proper — the husband had ample time and resources to obtain advice.
• The combined hearing of costs and enforcement was efficient and fair.
• Late amendment after judgment was reserved was impermissible.
• Cross-examination was barred by s 102NA (self-represented party cannot cross-examine the other party where family violence risk exists).

Result: No procedural unfairness occurred.

3️⃣ Discretion and Evidence

The Court upheld the enforcement orders as a sound exercise of discretion:

• The husband’s application contradicted the final orders and was “ill-conceived”.
• The judge’s factual findings matched the wife’s evidence; the husband failed to specify errors per r 13.23(3).
• Any minor factual dispute was immaterial — he was given time to pay and did so within 28 days.

4️⃣ Immaterial Legal Error

Although the trial judge referenced repealed s 117 instead of new s 114UB, the Full Court ruled this was immaterial because both provisions were substantively identical.

💬 Analysis of Judgment

The Full Court reaffirmed key appellate principles:

• Re-litigation of prior complaints (bias, delay, enforcement) will not succeed.
• The Ebner test requires a reasonable apprehension of bias, not mere dissatisfaction.
• Procedural fairness is about opportunity to be heard, not unlimited procedural indulgence.
• Minor legal missteps are not appealable without material impact (House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499).

The judges emphasized that self-representation does not exempt a party from procedural compliance or from the consequences of delay and obstruction. The appeal lacked merit, and costs of $15,000 were ordered against the husband.

🧭 Take-Home Lesson

“Persistence is not a substitute for merit — appellate courts will not rescue a party from the consequences of their own non-compliance.”

• Repeated appeals on bias or fairness grounds will fail without clear, demonstrable error.
• The 2024 Family Law reforms modernised costs provisions but didn’t change the substance of fairness tests.
• Courts expect finality — once property orders are made, enforcement is a matter of compliance, not negotiation.

In Van Wyk & Van Wyk [2025] FedCFamC1A 209, the Federal Circuit and Family Court (Division 1) grappled with one of family law’s hardest dilemmas — how to protect children from the corrosive effects of chronic parental conflict while respecting the importance of both parents in their lives. The father’s appeal challenged final parenting orders that allocated the mother sole parental responsibility for most decisions, while granting him limited authority over the younger child’s psychological and educational care. Deputy Chief Justice McClelland dismissed the appeal, reaffirming that judicial discretion will rarely be disturbed where the trial judge has reasonably balanced risk, evidence, and the paramountcy of the child’s best interests.

📜 Facts and Issues

Facts

• The parents, separated since 2018, share two children (aged 14 and 11).
• Both children have ADHD and complex emotional needs.
• The family dynamic was described by the family report writer as the most severe conflict she had seen in 20 years.
• Despite mutual allegations of family violence, both children wished to maintain a week-about shared care arrangement.
• The trial judge gave the mother sole parental responsibility for most long-term decisions but allowed the father decision-making power for the younger child’s schooling and therapy — areas he had managed effectively.

Issues

1. Whether the trial judge erred by assigning the mother sole parental responsibility despite her alleged non-compliance and instability.
2. Whether the judge failed to properly consider risks posed by the mother and her partner.
3. Whether allocating split parental responsibilities was inconsistent or illogical.
4. Whether the trial judge gave excessive weight to expert and ICL evidence.

⚖️ Law

The Court reiterated established appellate principles from House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499, requiring an appellant to demonstrate error of law, misapplication of principle, or unreasonableness.

Under Part VII of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), particularly ss 60CA and 60CC, the best interests of the child remain paramount.

The Court also referred to:

• Gronow v Gronow (1979) 144 CLR 513 — appellate restraint on weight of evidence;
• Goode & Goode (2006) FLC 93-286 — interim vs final decision-making;
• Robinson Helicopter Co v McDermott (2016) 331 ALR 550 — factual findings can only be overturned if “glaringly improbable.”

🔍 Application

The Full Court found that:

• The primary judge had considered all relevant evidence, including the medico-legal report and psychological assessments.
• The father’s claim that the mother’s psychiatric issues and prior non-compliance warranted removing her responsibility was unsupported by the expert evidence (¶43–44).
• The judge’s reliance on the family report writer’s opinion — that conflict, not parental capacity, was the greatest risk — was justified (¶52–54).
• The father’s own behaviour (rigidity, undermining professionals, denigrating the mother before the children) materially contributed to the conflict (¶55–58).
• Allocating dual responsibilities was not inconsistent; rather, it pragmatically recognised the father’s strength in managing the younger child’s therapies while minimising the risk of renewed disputes (¶82–86).

Thus, the appeal was dismissed — the orders balanced the competing harms of parental conflict and instability.

💡 Analysis of the Judgment

Justice McClelland reaffirmed judicial deference to trial-level discretion. The judgment underscores that where parental conflict itself constitutes the primary harm, the Court’s goal is not to reward the “better” parent, but to reduce exposure to chaos.

The father’s case faltered because:

• His alleged “errors” were disagreements over weight, not principle;
• His own conduct mirrored the conflict he blamed on the mother;
• The trial judge had logically compartmentalised decision-making to limit friction — an approach consistent with modern child-focused jurisprudence (Pantoja & Pantoja [2025], Arendse & Pilkvist [2025]).

The appellate court emphasised (¶59, ¶86) that stability for the children outweighed parental equality, and that the trial judge’s nuanced “split responsibility” model was consistent with the evidence and the statutory framework.

🧭 Take-Home Lesson

“Intractable conflict makes no parent ‘win’ — it merely shifts the lines of responsibility to protect the children.”

• Courts will not revisit factual disputes absent clear error.
• Parental responsibility may now be divided functionally, not shared in principle — a model that privileges stability and expertise over ideology.
• Demonstrating insight and flexibility is often more persuasive than asserting rights to authority.

In Ramirus & Hendrika [2025] FedCFamC1A 204, Justice Strum of the Federal Circuit and Family Court (Division 1) delivered a strong rebuke to judicial conduct that compromised procedural fairness. The case involved a self-represented father who was excluded from the courtroom while the trial judge held private discussions with the mother’s counsel and the Independent Children’s Lawyer (ICL) — conversations that included adverse commentary about the father’s mental health and personality. The Full Court ruled this was a clear denial of procedural fairness, rendering the trial invalid. The parenting orders preventing the father from seeing his children were set aside and the matter remitted for retrial before a different judge.

🧾 Facts and Issues

• The father, Mr Ramirus, was self-represented at trial after his lawyers withdrew ([15]).
• The mother, Ms Hendrika, sought orders that the children have no time or communication with the father, supported by the ICL ([4]).
• During the trial, after the father’s cross-examination, the primary judge excluded him from the courtroom for a “discussion with practitioners” ([19]).
• In the father’s absence, the judge speculated about his “narcissistic” and “personality disorder” traits, questioned his mental health, and discussed ordering a psychiatric assessment ([19], transcript p.223–p.232).
• These comments and procedural plans were never disclosed to the father until he obtained the transcript later.
• The judge subsequently made final orders denying the father any time or communication with his children ([5]).

The father appealed, alleging a denial of procedural fairness, including:

1. Being excluded from the courtroom while substantive discussions occurred.
2. The judge forming adverse views about his mental health without evidence.
3. The judge discussing potential future orders in his absence.

⚖️ Issues

1. Did the trial judge’s private discussions with counsel in the father’s absence amount to a denial of procedural fairness?
2. Did these ex parte communications cause a miscarriage of justice requiring the orders to be set aside?
3. Should the matter be remitted for a new trial, and what remedies should follow?

⚖️ Law

Legislation

• Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) Pt VII (parenting orders)
• Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth) ss 6, 8, 9 (costs certificates)
• Legal Profession Uniform Conduct (Barristers) Rules 2015 r 54 (prohibition on ex parte communication)

Key Authorities

• House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 – standard of appellate intervention ([6])
• Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 – right to a fair hearing
• Kanda v Government of Malaya [1962] AC 322 – duty to hear both sides
• Re Refugee Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82 – denial of procedural fairness = jurisdictional error
• Re JRL; Ex parte CJL (1986) 161 CLR 342 – judges must avoid private discussions with one party
• Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 577 – integrity of the judicial process
• Krupin & Krupin [2022] FedCFamC1A 136 – procedural fairness for self-represented litigants

🔍 Application of Law to Facts

Justice Strum found multiple procedural failures:

1️⃣ Exclusion of the Father

The transcript clearly showed the father was asked to leave the courtroom at 12.56 pm on 30 October 2024 while the judge held an extensive discussion with counsel about his mental state, the need for psychiatric assessment, and potential procedural steps ([19]).

This occurred without his knowledge or consent, breaching the core principle that “each party must be given an adequate opportunity to be heard” (Kioa v West, 159 CLR at 582).

2️⃣ Improper Judicial Discussion

During the ex parte meeting, the judge expressed views that the father showed “narcissistic issues and personality disorders” and suggested he was a danger to the mother ([19]).

Justice Strum held this was not “merely administrative” but involved substantive prejudgment of evidence. Such conduct was contrary to Re JRL; Ex parte CJL (1986) 161 CLR 342, which condemns any communication that may give an appearance of bias or partiality.

3️⃣ Consequential Unfairness

When the trial resumed, the judge only briefly told the father that procedural matters had been discussed but did not disclose the substance of those conversations ([20]).

The Court held this was a serious breach of natural justice, as the father was deprived of the opportunity to respond to adverse impressions and procedural proposals made in his absence.

4️⃣ Impact on the Outcome

Justice Strum ruled that because the integrity of the trial process had been compromised, it was unnecessary to examine whether the outcome would have been different:

“A failure to afford procedural fairness is a jurisdictional error… it strikes at the heart of judicial impartiality and the appearance of justice” (at [55]).

Accordingly, the appeal succeeded.

🧮 Judgment and Reasoning

Orders (summarised):

• Appeal allowed.
• Parenting orders set aside ([Orders 1–2]).
• Matter remitted for retrial before a different judge ([Order 2]).
• Costs certificates granted to both parties under ss 6, 8, and 9 of the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth) ([Orders 3–6]).

Judicial Reasoning

Justice Strum observed:

“The exclusion of a self-represented party from the courtroom while the judge engages in discussions with counsel for the other parties strikes at the very foundation of procedural fairness and the open administration of justice” ([58]).

He cited Re Refugee Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82, confirming that a denial of procedural fairness itself constitutes jurisdictional error requiring the orders to be set aside ([60]).

Justice Strum also referenced Re F: Litigants in Person Guidelines [2001] FamCA 348, emphasising that courts owe a heightened duty of clarity and fairness when dealing with self-represented litigants ([15], [61]).

💡 Take-Home Lessons

1. Never exclude a self-represented party from any discussion that might affect the outcome — even procedural.
2. Judicial impartiality must not only exist but appear to exist.
3. Procedural fairness errors automatically vitiate judgments, regardless of outcome.
4. Counsel have a professional duty (r 54, Barristers Rules) not to engage in or permit ex parte communication.
5. Retrials are costly and traumatic — fairness at first instance avoids unnecessary appeals.

In Partington & Partington [2025] FedCFamC1A 208, Justice Christie of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1) dismissed a self-represented father’s bid to have the Court fund transcripts for his appeal — an appeal that related to an event already past. The father argued that earlier transcripts were essential to prove judicial bias, including claims that the trial judge mocked his faith, belittled his ADHD, and “tag-teamed” with opposing counsel. The Court, however, found no utility in the request, reiterating that litigants must bear the cost of their own appeals, and that transcripts are only funded in exceptional circumstances.

🧾 Facts and Issues

• On 27 August 2025, the primary judge made interim parenting and case management orders ([1]).
• The father (appellant) subsequently applied for that judge to recuse himself, alleging bias ([2], [9]–[10]).
• On 29 August 2025, he filed a Notice of Appeal, challenging an interlocutory order that restrained him from attending his child’s First Holy Communion ([3], [12]).
• On 3 September 2025, he filed an Application in an Appeal, seeking that the Court provide transcripts of hearings from February, May, and August 2025 at its own expense, citing financial hardship ([4], [5], [10]).
• The appellant alleged that earlier transcripts would prove the judge had:
• “Gaslit” and insulted him;
• Mocked his religion;
• Discriminated based on ADHD;
• Colluded (“tag-teamed”) with opposing counsel ([10]).
• The respondent and the ICL opposed, noting that the transcript of the appealed hearing (27 August) was already provided ([6]).
• The appeal concerned an event that had already occurred — the Communion — and thus arguably had no practical utility ([12], [25]).

Issues:

1. Was the Court obliged to provide transcripts at its own expense under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) or the FCCA (Family Law) Rules 2021?
2. Did the interests of justice require the Court to fund transcripts to allow the appellant to pursue a bias claim?
3. Should the Court entertain an appeal about an event that had already passed?

⚖️ Law

Legislation

• Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)
• Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) — rr 13.19–13.22 (appeal books and transcript requirements).
• Rule 13.19(4): The appellant is responsible for obtaining any relevant transcript.
• Rule 13.22: Failure to file transcript may result in appeal being deemed abandoned.

Authorities Cited

• Smits & Jansen [2025] FedCFamC1A 164 — The Court is funded to decide litigation, not to fund it ([20]).
• Sampson & Hartnett (Provision of Transcript) (2013) FLC 93-542 — set out factors for transcript funding discretion ([23]).
• Reece & Reece [2011] FamCAFC 24 — no utility in hearing appeals where the issue has passed ([25]).
• Naparus & Frankham [2018] FamCAFC 190; Naparus & Frankham (No 2) [2020] FamCAFC 238 — futility principle confirmed ([25]).
• Pitman & Hynes (No 3) [2021] FamCAFC 82 — same principle applied.
• Forbes & Bream (2008) 222 FLR 96 — transcript provision by the Court only in exceptional cases ([20]).

🔍 Application of Law to Facts

Justice Christie applied a clear two-step test ([18]):

1. Are the transcripts necessary to prosecute the appeal?

• No. The Court found the existing transcript (27 August 2025) already covered the subject of appeal — the Communion order ([6], [22]).
• Earlier transcripts were irrelevant to whether the restraining order was valid, especially as the event had passed ([25]).

1. Do the circumstances justify Court-funded transcripts?

• No. Although the appellant’s financial hardship was accepted ([19]), this alone did not justify Court expenditure.
• Justice Christie reiterated Smits & Jansen — the Court does not fund litigation, even for impecunious parties ([20]).

The appellant’s allegations of bias (mockery, discrimination, religious bigotry) were acknowledged but not tested at this stage. The Court held that any apprehended bias claim could be argued later by reference to existing transcripts, once the recusal application and substantive appeal were heard ([27]–[29]).

As the Communion had already occurred, the appeal lacked practical utility. Consistent with Reece & Reece and Naparus & Frankham, the Court would not spend public funds on a futile appeal ([25]–[26]).

🧮 Judgment and Reasoning

Decision:

• The Application in an Appeal dismissed ([Order, 1]).
• No order for Court-funded transcripts.
• The Court reaffirmed that it would only provide transcripts at its own expense in exceptional cases.
• The father retained the right to argue bias or futility before a different judge later ([28]–[30]).

Reasoning:

Justice Christie concluded that:

“This is not a case in which I could be satisfied that it is incumbent on the Court in the interests of justice to provide transcripts.” ([27])

He emphasised that:

• The appeal concerned a past event — therefore, even if successful, no practical remedy existed ([25]).
• The Court’s limited funding and the principles in Smits & Jansen prevent it from underwriting private litigation ([20]).
• While the appellant’s allegations were noted, they did not create an “exceptional case” under Sampson & Hartnett ([23], [27]).

💡 Take-Home Lessons

1. Litigants must fund their own appeals. Courts are not required to supply transcripts — even for self-represented or financially disadvantaged parties.
2. Exceptional circumstances are rare. Free transcripts are only ordered where necessary for justice, such as where the appeal cannot proceed otherwise.
3. Futility ends appeals. If the subject event has passed, courts will not continue appeals merely to make a point.
4. Bias claims must be substantiated, not speculated. Allegations of judicial misconduct require precise reference to transcripts, not broad accusations.
5. Procedural fairness ≠ public funding. Access to justice does not entitle a party to taxpayer-funded litigation.

In Warszawski & Warszawski (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1A 203, Justice Christie of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1) handed down a clear message about the consequences of unreasonable litigation conduct and rejected settlement offers. The Court awarded costs against the wife after finding she was wholly unsuccessful on her cross-appeal and had refused settlement offers that would have left her financially better off. The judgment underscores the discretionary yet principled approach to costs in family law appeals, particularly under s 114UB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), which permits cost orders when “justifying circumstances” exist.

🧾 Facts and Issues

• The husband appealed orders made in Warszawski & Warszawski [2025] FedCFamC2F 536, while the wife cross-appealed ([1]).
• The wife was wholly unsuccessful in her cross-appeal ([7]).
• Prior to the appeal, the husband made two settlement offers, one of which—had the wife accepted—would have left her in a stronger financial position than the ultimate outcome ([12]–[13]).
• The wife rejected both offers, disputing the correction of an $803,270 omission from her company account in the property pool ([8]–[11]).
• The husband sought a costs order of $22,446 for the appeal and $10,000 for the costs application ([17]–[18]).
• The issue before the Court was whether these circumstances justified a departure from the usual “each party bears own costs” rule under s 114UB of the Family Law Act.

Issues

1. Did the wife’s refusal of reasonable offers of settlement justify an order for costs under s 114UB?
2. How did the wife’s unsuccessful cross-appeal and stronger financial position influence the quantum of the costs award?
3. Should the husband’s procedural missteps—abandoning a ground of appeal late and not applying under the slip rule—reduce the costs payable?

⚖️ Law

Statutory Framework

• Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 114UB(1)–(3) – Courts may make costs orders where “justifying circumstances” exist, considering:
• Financial circumstances of the parties;
• Conduct of the proceedings;
• Failure to comply with rules or court orders;
• Whether a party was wholly unsuccessful.
• Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth), r 10.13 – permits correction or variation of orders under the slip rule.

Authorities Cited

• Warszawski & Warszawski [2025] FedCFamC1A 165 – prior appeal on substantive property division.
• Penfold v Penfold (No 2) (2020) FLC 93-989 – principle that rejecting a more favourable offer can justify costs.
• Rogers & Rogers (No 2) [2023] FedCFamC1A 91 – costs discretion exercised where one party’s conduct prolonged litigation.
• s 117(2A) (predecessor principle) – “justifying circumstances” include financial disparity and unreasonable conduct.

🔍 Application of Law to Facts

Justice Christie applied the multi-factor discretion under s 114UB(3):

1️⃣ Financial Circumstances

The wife’s financial circumstances were stronger than the husband’s ([6]).

This weighed in favour of a costs order, as she was better positioned to bear litigation expenses.

2️⃣ Success and Conduct

The wife’s cross-appeal was wholly unsuccessful, requiring the husband to respond to unmeritorious claims ([7]).

The Court found this sufficient to constitute a “justifying circumstance” ([3], [5]).

3️⃣ Settlement Offers

The husband made two reasonable settlement offers ([8]–[13]):

• On 22 May 2025, he proposed to accept $1,002,147—less than the eventual amount awarded after re-exercise.
• The wife’s rejection of the offer, despite acknowledging the $803,270 omission, demonstrated unreasonable conduct ([10]–[13]).
• Justice Christie held this directly justified a costs order.

4️⃣ Husband’s Conduct

Two mitigating factors reduced the quantum ([15]):

• He failed to use the slip rule to correct the original error before appealing.
• He abandoned one ground of appeal only during oral submissions.
• Although not fatal, these matters warranted a 50% reduction in recoverable costs ([16]–[17]).

🧮 Judgment and Reasoning

• Costs of Appeal: The Court ordered the wife to pay $11,223—half of the husband’s total claimed costs ([17]).
• Costs of Costs Application: The Court further ordered $2,500, noting insufficient evidence to justify the full $10,000 ([19]).

Justice Christie reasoned that:

“The wife would have been financially better off had she accepted the husband’s offer… these offers of settlement are relevant justifying circumstances.” ([13]–[14])

The partial reduction was explained as balancing fairness with efficiency:

“Neither of the husband’s procedural oversights persuade me against making a costs order, but they are relevant to my assessment of quantum.” ([16])

💡 Take-Home Lessons

1. Refusing reasonable offers can be costly. Courts may penalise a party who prolongs litigation by rejecting a financially better settlement.
2. Costs discretion is calibrated by conduct. Even a successful party’s procedural lapses can reduce the quantum.
3. Financial capacity matters. Wealthier parties are expected to absorb more litigation risk.
4. Fairness is two-way. The Court balances equity with efficiency — rewarding reasonableness and penalising obstinacy.
5. Use the slip rule early. Technical corrections should be sought before appealing to avoid unnecessary costs.

The Full Court of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1) in Dever & Serano [2025] FedCFamC1A 202 overturned a decision that had transferred a 12-year-old child’s residence from the mother to the father after a 17-month judgment delay. The Court held that such delay caused procedural unfairness, as the primary judge based orders on materially outdated evidence that ignored the child’s evolving maturity, circumstances, and right to be heard. The case is now a leading reminder that timeliness is integral to fairness in family law.

🧾 Facts and Issues

• The parents separated in 2018 and had one child, X, born 2013 ([7]).
• After consent orders in 2019 for shared parental responsibility, conflict arose; all contact between X and the father ceased in 2021 ([9]–[10]).
• The mother alleged abuse, but no charges were laid. Experts described her as having “entrenched but unfounded beliefs” ([13]–[15]).
• In April 2025, nearly 19 months after trial, the judge ordered X to move to live with the father, granting him sole parental responsibility ([1]–[4]).
• At that time, X had not seen her father in four years and was approaching 12 years old ([53]–[55]).
• The mother appealed, arguing that the delay denied procedural fairness and that the orders were based on stale evidence, failing to consider X’s current views and welfare ([21], [46]).

Issues:

1. Did the 17-month delay cause procedural unfairness to the mother and child?
2. Were the best-interest considerations under s 60CC of the Family Law Act 1975 properly applied given the outdated evidence?
3. Should the appellate court set aside the parenting orders under the House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 standard for discretionary error?

⚖️ Law

Key Statutory Provisions

• Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 60CA, 60CC, 65AA, 65D (best interests, parental orders).
• Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth) ss 8–9 (costs certificates).
• UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) — right of a child to be heard ([40]–[42]).

Leading Authorities Cited

• House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 — appellate intervention for discretionary error ([24]).
• Fowles & Fowles (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC1A 115 — excessive delay can itself cause procedural unfairness ([47]).
• MZAPC v Minister for Immigration (2021) 95 ALJR 441 — defines “practical injustice” ([49]).
• RCB v Justice Forrest (2012) 247 CLR 304 — obligation to afford children procedural fairness ([95]).
• Artan & Shaheen [2023] FedCFamC1A 221 — reaffirming the child’s right to be heard ([40]).
• Simmons & Simmons (2023) FLC 94-137 — caution when ordering change of residence ([34]).

🔍 Application of Law to Facts

The Full Court found that the primary judge’s 19-month delay meant the orders were based on outdated expert and child evidence, breaching the requirements of s 60CC to consider the child’s current best interests and evolving maturity ([54]–[60]).

• By the time judgment was delivered, X had aged from 10 to nearly 12, entering adolescence, and had not been consulted since 2022 ([53], [59]).
• The Court stressed that children’s views must be re-evaluated as they mature, citing Artan & Shaheen and the UN Convention ([40]–[43]).
• Because of the delay, X was denied the opportunity to express current wishes or adapt to changed emotional needs — a denial of procedural fairness both to the mother and to the child ([48]–[50], [103]).
• The delay also distorted the risk assessment: while the trial judge deemed the mother emotionally harmful and the father safe, those conclusions were made without up-to-date psychological insight ([67]–[70]).

Applying House v The King, the Full Court held that the primary judge failed to take into account material considerations, rendering the exercise of discretion erroneous ([70]).

🧮 Judgment and Reasoning

Decision:

• Appeal allowed.
• Orders of 17 April 2025 set aside.
• Matter remitted for rehearing before a different judge ([6], [72]).
• Costs certificates granted to both parties ([73], [112]).

Reasoning:

1. Delay caused procedural unfairness.
2. The 19-month gap meant the judge relied on stale reports, denying the mother a chance to present new evidence ([54]–[56]).
3. Child deprived of procedural fairness.
4. X’s right to have her views considered in light of her increased maturity was infringed ([59], [103]–[107]).
5. Breach of s 60CC best-interests framework.
6. The court failed to assess the likely effect of separating X from her primary attachment figure and to weigh her current emotional and developmental needs ([62]–[69]).
7. Material injustice.
8. The appellate court found “practical injustice” per MZAPC (2021) because the outdated evidence could have affected the outcome ([49], [109]).

💡 Take-Home Lessons

1. Delay can itself be injustice.
2. In family law, excessive judicial delay may breach procedural fairness and invalidate orders.
3. Children’s voices evolve.
4. Courts must update and reassess a child’s views as their maturity and insight develop.
5. Best interests are dynamic.
6. Evidence must reflect the child’s current psychological, emotional, and relational realities.
7. Judicial timeliness is welfare protection.
8. Justice delayed in parenting cases risks harm equal to substantive error.

In Kotaro & Hersch [2025] FedCFamC2F 1442, Judge O’Shannessy of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) was asked to determine interim parenting orders for a young child, X, aged three. The case tested how far a court may go in altering living arrangements before trial — particularly when expert evidence suggests a child’s psychological and developmental needs outweigh the stability of the status quo. Central to the decision was whether the court should follow a family report recommending a gradual move toward shared care, despite the mother’s objections that the recommendation was premature, unsafe, and unrealistic for such a young child.

🧾 Facts and Issues

• The parents, Ms Kotaro (mother) and Mr Hersch (father), separated under one roof in 2023 when their child, X, was an infant ([2]–[4]).
• The maternal grandmother has lived with the child since before the separation and plays a significant caregiving role ([5]).
• The father sought to increase time and eventually move to an equal-time arrangement based on expert evidence of attachment disruption and developmental trauma ([98], [111]–[114]).
• The mother, supported by her counsel, argued that X’s young age (under three) and the short duration of overnight contact made any rapid change developmentally harmful ([46]–[51]).
• Allegations of coercive control were raised — including claims the father installed cameras and allegedly sought to have the grandmother deported — but these were untested and the court declined to make findings on them ([57]–[61]).

Core Legal Issue:

Should the court follow expert recommendations for an increased and more balanced time arrangement with the father on an interim basis, or preserve the mother’s primary care pending final hearing?

⚖️ Law

Statutory Provisions

• Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 60CA (child’s best interests paramount) and 60CC (how the court determines best interests) ([72]–[74]).

Key Authorities

• Goode & Goode [2006] FamCA 1346 — established interim hearing procedure ([81]–[82]).
• Eaby & Speelman (2015) FLC 93-654 — court must weigh probabilities of competing claims even when evidence is untested ([18]–[19]).
• Marvel & Marvel [2010] FamCAFC 101 — findings at interim hearings must be made with “great circumspection”.
• SS & AH [2010] FamCAFC 13 — intuition may guide interim decisions where facts remain contested.
• Huisman & Simonds [2025] FedCFamC1F 489 — reaffirmed Goode & Goode’s continued application post-2024 legislative amendments.

🔍 Application of Law to Facts

Judge O’Shannessy accepted that the expert report by Dr D provided substantial guidance on the child’s psychological needs and attachment dynamics ([110]–[124]).

Dr D concluded that X was insecurely attached to both parents and the grandmother, had experienced developmental trauma, and urgently needed stabilisation through consistent care from both parents ([111]–[115]).

While acknowledging the mother’s criticisms — particularly that rapid change could harm X due to his young age — the Court found that maintaining the limited regime (one overnight per week) risked entrenching attachment anxiety and emotional instability ([133], [146]).

In balancing the risk of too-rapid change versus the risk of ongoing emotional harm, the Court applied the reasoning in Eaby & Speelman — that in interim matters, judges must weigh “the probabilities of competing claims” and act to protect the child’s immediate welfare even without fully tested evidence ([74]).

The Court noted this was not a “risk case” — there was no finding that X was unsafe with either parent — but a developmental needs case. The child’s “primary developmental priority” was his attachment relationships, which required both parents’ active involvement ([133]).

Therefore, the Judge accepted the essence of the expert recommendations, implementing a graduated move to shared care, while modifying details such as changeover locations and transition timing for practicality ([25], [31]).

🧮 Judgment and Reasoning

Judge O’Shannessy ordered that X would gradually move from the mother’s primary care to an equal time arrangement with both parents over several months ([Order 1(a)-(c)]).

The Court also:

• Preserved the child’s current childcare placement ([“Court Notes” section]).
• Allowed flexibility for parents to adjust arrangements by written agreement.
• Maintained joint parental responsibility ([Order 2]).

Reasoning:

• The best interests of X required urgent attention to attachment stability, not delay until trial ([146]).
• The expert’s observations (not just her recommendations) were given “great weight” as they revealed significant emotional developmental needs ([110]–[114]).
• The mother’s proposal risked prolonging emotional dysregulation and dependence on the grandmother’s care.
• While the father’s past conduct (cameras, alleged deportation plan) was troubling, these issues could not be determinatively resolved on an interim basis ([61], [65]).

Ultimately, the Court applied Goode & Goode principles: it could not wait for perfect evidence when the child’s welfare required immediate action.

💡 Take-Home Lessons

1. Interim orders must prioritise developmental safety over procedural caution.
2. Even without full evidence, the Court must act if delay risks emotional harm.
3. Expert observations outweigh recommendations.
4. Judges rely on the factual insights of family reports, even when their proposed timelines are adjusted.
5. Attachment issues are child safety issues.
6. Emotional security and stability are integral to the “best interests” test under s 60CC.
7. High-conflict does not equal high-risk.
8. Courts distinguish between relationship hostility and danger to the child.
9. Practicality and flexibility matter.
10. Orders must accommodate both parents’ work schedules and logistical realities.

In Voight & Zunino [2025] FedCFamC1A 201, the Full Court (Austin, Schonell & Curran JJ) delivered a crucial ruling that reshapes how just and equitable determinations are approached in de facto property settlements.

The decision underscores that family law judges cannot treat financial claims as “all or nothing” disputes. Even if a party’s proposal is excessive, the Court must still assess whether some adjustment is fair — especially where there’s evidence of genuine contribution.

This appeal arose from a farming partnership gone sour, where the trial judge had dismissed the woman’s claim outright. The Full Court found that reasoning legally flawed, re-exercised discretion, and ordered the respondent to pay $131,113.

⚖️ Facts and Issues

Facts

• Ms Voight and Mr Zunino were in a de facto relationship from 2013–2020, living and working together on Mr Zunino’s $17 million farming enterprise ([3]–[4], [11]).
• After separation, Ms Voight filed two proceedings: one under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) for unpaid wages, and another under Pt VIIIAB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) seeking property adjustment ([5]–[6]).
• An interim consent order in June 2023 required Mr Zunino to pay her $300,000 “to be characterised by the trial judge” ([8], [31]).
• In June 2025, the primary judge dismissed her entire property claim, finding it was not “just and equitable” to alter property interests ([10], [85]).

Issues

1. Did the trial judge misconceive the justiciable issue by treating the case as a binary choice between granting Ms Voight’s claim or dismissing it?
2. Was the $300,000 interim order valid or capable of later “re-characterisation”?
3. Should any property adjustment have been made, and if so, how much?

📜 Law

Key statutory provisions:

• Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)
• s 90SM(1)–(5) – Property adjustment in de facto cases
• s 90SM(2) – “Just and equitable” threshold
• Pt VIIIAB – Property and financial matters for de facto relationships
• Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth), s 36(5) – Power to vary or discharge invalid orders
• Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth), ss 6 & 9 – Costs certificates

Key authorities:

• Stanford v Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108 – Two-step “just and equitable” test ([18]–[21]).
• Harris v Caladine (1991) 172 CLR 84 – Limits on judicial power and consent orders ([35]).
• Strahan & Strahan (Interim Property Orders) (2011) FLC 93-466 – Characterisation of interim payments ([34]–[38]).
• Marchant & Marchant (2012) FLC 93-520 – Limits of retrospective re-classification ([43]).
• U v U (2002) 211 CLR 238 – Court’s discretion not confined to parties’ proposals ([25]).

🔍 Application of Law to Facts

1️⃣ Misconceived “All or Nothing” Reasoning

The Full Court found the primary judge conflated the two enquiries mandated by Stanford:

• Whether it was just and equitable to make any order at all; and
• What kind of order should be made ([18]–[21]).

Instead of assessing a range of possible just outcomes, the trial judge framed the decision as a stark choice between granting the appellant’s $3 million claim or giving her nothing ([22]–[23]).

“His Honour wrongly conceptualised the decision as being a choice between only two alternatives... and failed to consider whether a more modest adjustment outcome... would be just and equitable.” — [23]

This was a fundamental error of law because the Family Law Act requires consideration of all the circumstances — not just the parties’ competing proposals ([25]).

2️⃣ Invalid Interim Payment Order

The earlier consent order for $300,000 was not validly made because it failed to identify any head of power — whether property, maintenance, or injunction ([34]–[37]).

The Full Court held that consent cannot confer jurisdiction the statute does not permit:

“The Court must operate within the limit of its power, which cannot be expanded by the parties’ consent.” — [35]; citing Harris v Caladine.

Furthermore, the trial judge’s later “re-characterisation” of the payment as a “gift” or “sunk costs” was speculative and not open on the evidence ([53]):

“It was just idle conjecture that the payment could have been one of two incompatible things... The payment could not possibly have been a ‘gift’ when it was paid under the compulsion of a Court order.” — [53]

3️⃣ Re-Exercise of Discretion

Rather than remitting, the Full Court re-exercised discretion under Pt VIIIAB ([57]–[58]).

Key findings:

• Relationship duration: 7 years; both worked the farm ([66]).
• Contributions: respondent’s capital dominated, but appellant contributed unpaid and underpaid labour ([70]–[73]).
• Adjustment: appellant’s contributions warranted 3% of net assets ($565,890), less $268,894 already received, totalling $131,113 payable to her ([74]–[80]).

“The appellant’s entitlement should instead be measured at three per cent.” — [74]

“Given the appellant retains property worth $165,883, she is due to be paid another $131,113.” — [80]

🧠 Judgment and Reasoning

The Full Court held:

• The primary judge erred in law by limiting the decision to two extremes ([22]–[23]).
• The $300,000 order was invalid, as it cited no statutory source ([34]–[37]).
• The appellant’s work and domestic contributions warranted modest recognition ([70]–[74]).
• The just and equitable outcome required an order for $131,113 to the appellant ([81]).

Both parties received costs certificates under the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 ([86]).

📚 Precedents and Citations

• Stanford v Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108 – separation of steps in “just and equitable” analysis ([18]–[21]).
• U v U (2002) 211 CLR 238 – discretion not confined to litigants’ proposals ([25]).
• Strahan & Strahan (2011) and Marchant & Marchant (2012) – validity and treatment of interim orders ([34]–[44]).
• Harris v Caladine (1991) – limits on consent jurisdiction ([35]).
• Waters v Jurek (1995) – monetary adjustments acceptable alternative to percentage orders ([78]).

💬 Take-Home Lesson

Family law isn’t a poker game.

A judge cannot simply “fold” because one party overplays their hand. Even if a proposed outcome is excessive, the Court must still assess whether some adjustment is fair, given the contributions made.

This case reinforces that justice and equity require flexibility, nuance, and independence from the parties’ pleadings.

For lawyers, Voight & Zunino is a cautionary tale: always ensure interim orders have a clear head of power — and that “just and equitable” doesn’t mean “all or nothing.”