Two Parents, One Home: Court Orders No Time With Mother After Finding Family Violence and Ongoing Emotional Harm

In Abramsson & Abramsson (No 8) [2025] FedCFamC1F 919 (Carew J, 17 December 2025), the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1) determined final parenting arrangements on a rehearing after a successful appeal. It was common ground that it was not in the children’s best interests to have a relationship with both parents, so the case turned into a stark “which home is safest” decision. The Court ordered the children live with the father, with the mother to have no time and no communication (absent written agreement), aside from limited gifts/cards and information-sharing. ([23], [334], [352]–[353])

🧩 Facts and Issues

Facts: The parties have two young children. The reasons describe repeated exposure to intense parental conflict and traumatic incidents, including an event where the children witnessed the mother drive off a cliff, and another where a child was drawn into a parental argument in a way the Court described as particularly egregious. ([2]–[4], [7]) The children ultimately came to live with the father from September 2024 (with a later interruption), and after a 2025 recovery order they have had essentially no contact with the mother. ([21]–[26])

Key procedural history (why this was “No 8” and a rehearing):

• Interim change of care to father: September 2024. ([21])
• Final parenting order: December 2024 (then appealed). ([22]–[23])
• Appeal allowed and matter remitted for rehearing: April 2025. ([23])
• Mother withheld children for a period; recovery order made; no-contact restraint followed. ([25]–[26])

Issues (as agreed by the parties):

1. Does the father pose a risk to the safety of the children and/or the mother?
2. Does the mother pose a risk to the safety of the children and/or the father?
3. Is it in the children’s best interests to have a relationship with both parents? ([86])

⚖️ Applicable Law – Legislation, Regulations, Rules

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (Pt VII):

• Paramount consideration: best interests (s 60CA). ([70])
• Best interests factors: s 60CC (including safety, family violence history, and whether relationships are beneficial where safe). ([71])
• Unacceptable risk / safeguards: s 60CG. ([72])
• Objects: s 60B (including safety and welfare). ([69])
• Parenting orders content: s 64B; power to make parenting orders: s 65D. ([68])
• Definition of family violence: s 4AB. ([73])
• Consultation duties where joint decision-making applies: s 61DAA. ([85])

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth):

• Civil standard (balance of probabilities): s 140 (noted in the judgment’s legislative list).

Rules:

• Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) rr 7.08, 7.14 (noted in the judgment’s list).

📌 Precedents Relied On

The judgment listed (among others):

• Pickford and Pickford (2024) FLC 94-230 (guidance on coercive/control-type family violence; focus on behaviour and impact, not necessarily intent). ([74])
• M v M (1988) 166 CLR 69 (unacceptable risk principle in parenting contexts).
• Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 (adverse inference principles where evidence isn’t called).
• Banks & Banks (2015) FLC 93-637 (best interests / approach to discretion).
• Baghti & Baghti [2015] FamCAFC 71; Lim & Zong [2021] FamCAFC 165; Johnson & Page (2007) FLC 93-344; N and S and the Separate Representative (1996) FLC 92-655; Eastley & Eastley (2022) FLC 94-094; Isles and Nelissen (2022) FLC 94-092 (each listed as cited authorities in the reasons’ front matter).

🧠 Analysis

Issue

Given it was accepted the children should not have relationships with both parents, the Court had to determine:

• whether either parent posed an unacceptable risk, and
• which arrangement best protected the children’s safety and stability, including whether any time/communication with the other parent could safely occur. ([86], [334], [352])

Rule

• The Court must treat the children’s best interests as paramount (s 60CA) and assess best interests using s 60CC, with a strong emphasis on safety and family violence history. ([70]–[71])
• The Court must not make orders that expose a child (or a person) to an unacceptable risk of family violence (s 60CG). ([72])
• Family violence includes behaviour that coerces/controls or causes fear (s 4AB) and can include repeated derogatory taunts and psychologically harmful conduct. ([73])
• In coercive/control allegations, the focus is on behaviour and impact, not necessarily proving intent (Pickford). ([74])

Application

1) Father-risk finding

The Court rejected the mother’s allegations that the father perpetrated family violence, while acknowledging the father could be provocative/insensitive and that his conduct at times was concerning—particularly where he focused on recording events rather than protecting the children. ([6], [216], [223])

However, the Court ultimately found it was not persuaded the father posed an unacceptable risk, pointing to observations of the father presenting as calm and attentive with the children and evidence suggesting stability and support structures. ([213]–[215], [221]–[223])

2) Mother-risk finding

The Court found the mother perpetrated family violence and that the children were repeatedly exposed to her emotional dysregulation, verbal abuse, threats, and dynamics where the children took on inappropriate responsibility for her wellbeing. ([6]–[7], [326]–[328])

A central problem for the Court was the mother’s lack of insight and refusal to accept responsibility, combined with a strong impression she sought vindication as a “victim” and attempted to control processes—features the Court linked to ongoing risk. ([329]–[332])

3) Relationship-with-both-parents / best interests outcome

The Court noted it was common ground that the children should not have a relationship with both parents. ([334]) From there, the decisive question became: which placement best preserves stability and safety, given the history of conflict and disruption.

Key findings driving the outcome:

• The Court found the mother had long opposed the children having a relationship with the father and had taken extreme steps consistent with removing him from their lives. ([340])
• The mother’s conduct around transitions and the period of withholding (with resulting school/daycare disruption) reinforced the Court’s view that, if the children were with the mother (or spending time), there was no real prospect she would facilitate return to the father. ([25], [346]–[347])
• Independent observations supported the children’s functioning and settling in the father’s care, despite grief and loss about separation from the mother. ([349]–[351])
• The Court held that reintroducing the mother in the foreseeable future would undermine stability and pose an unacceptable risk to safety. ([352])

Resulting orders reflected that logic: the children live with the father; father has sole decision-making on major long-term issues; the mother spends no time and has no communication absent written agreement (with limited gifts/cards and some information-sharing safeguards). ([8], [335], [352]–[353])

Conclusion

Because the Court found the father did not present an unacceptable risk, but the mother’s behaviour and lack of insight created ongoing psychological/emotional risk—and because any “shared relationship” model was agreed to be contrary to best interests—the Court concluded the safest and most stable outcome was exclusive care with the father and no contact with the mother (subject to tightly limited indirect connection and information). ([223], [329]–[332], [334], [352]–[353])

🧠 Take-Home Lesson

Where a parent repeatedly exposes children to conflict, involves them in adult disputes, and shows no insight into emotional harm—especially alongside demonstrated incapacity to facilitate the other parent—the Court may make the most drastic parenting outcome: live-with one parent and no time/communication with the other, even when the children clearly love that parent. ([7]–[8], [346]–[347], [352])