Decorum Isn’t Bias: Property Appeal Fails After “Unfair Trial” Claims Collapse

In Dalal & Bunha [2026] FedCFamC1A 13, the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1, Appellate Jurisdiction) dismissed a property appeal where the self-represented appellant alleged procedural unfairness, lack of transparency, bias/recusal error, erroneous fact-finding, and inadequate reasons . Deputy Chief Justice McClelland held the primary hearing was conducted fairly, the challenged rulings were within discretion, the bias allegations were unfounded, and the key findings (including foreign-asset ownership) were reasonably open on the evidence .

🧩 Facts and Issues

Key facts

• The appellant filed an Amended Notice of Appeal (15 August 2025) challenging property and ancillary orders made in Bunha & Dalal (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC2F 683, raising 12 grounds (procedural fairness, evidence, reasons, bias, discretion).
• The parties married in 1988 in Country B, migrated to Australia in 1995, and have two adult children.
• In the rehearing, the primary judge found the appellant’s disclosure was inadequate and found he owned six properties in Country B, relying on title searches and valuation evidence; his denials were found deliberately false and credibility was damaged .
• The final hearing ran 10, 11 and 15 October 2024; the appellant was subject to a s 102NA ban on personally cross-examining (family violence context) .
• The primary judge refused an adjournment sought on 10 October 2024; on appeal, the Court emphasised timeliness and that the appellant had time to arrange representation .
• The appeal was dismissed, with party/party costs of $14,416.12 payable within 28 days .

Issues (on appeal)

1. Procedural fairness / trial conduct: Did refusal of adjournment, case management, or courtroom management deny a fair hearing?
2. Bias / recusal: Was there actual or apprehended bias (including committee role and a tense exchange), requiring recusal?
3. Facts / evidence: Were findings (including foreign assets) not reasonably open, or based on wrong evidentiary rulings?
4. Reasons: Were reasons inadequate so as to warrant appellate intervention?

⚖️ Law

Appellate restraint in discretionary property cases

• The primary judge exercised a broad discretion in making property orders; appeal requires identifying House v The King error (principle, material fact error, or “plainly unjust/unreasonable”) .

Procedural fairness and case management

• Family law procedure must be conducted “quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible” (overarching purpose), supporting firm trial management .
• No automatic entitlement to an adjournment; scheduled hearings should not be moved without cogent reason .
• To succeed on procedural fairness, an appellant must show the alleged unfairness deprived them of the possibility of a successful outcome (Stead) .

Bias / recusal

• Apprehended bias applies the Ebner “double might” test and requires a logical connection between the identified matter and feared departure from merits decision-making .
• Courts should not accept flimsy recusal applications; otherwise litigants could effectively select judges .

The appellant’s bias case relied on two concrete “hooks”: first, that the primary judge chaired the Court’s internal Family Violence Committee, which he claimed meant the judge would be predisposed to favour the respondent because family violence allegations had been raised. The appeal judgment rejected that as untenable, explaining the committee role is a general administrative function and does not involve adjudicating individual disputes or accessing extraneous information that could rationally undermine neutrality. Second, the appellant pointed to a tense exchange at a procedural mention where the judge misspoke about who sought an earlier adjournment, was corrected, and the appellant then accused the judge of lying in open court—later arguing this created personal animosity. The appeal judgment treated that incident (and the appellant’s outburst) as incapable of grounding disqualification: the transcript recorded the judge stating it would not affect impartiality, and reiterated that a litigant cannot manufacture recusal by insulting a judge.

🔍 Application of Law to Facts

1) Procedural fairness / trial conduct

• The Court held refusal of adjournment was a proper exercise of discretion consistent with the overarching purpose , noting the appellant’s predicament largely arose from his own delays in arranging representation .
• Critically, the appellant failed to show prejudice: counsel cross-examined key witnesses and made comprehensive submissions, and the appellant was even allowed to address the Court directly for over an hour .
• The “thrown out of court / intimidated counsel” claim was rejected as a mischaracterisation: the judge’s directions were basic courtroom control, and the Court even accommodated the appellant by providing a laptop feed to view the remote witness .

2) Bias / recusal

• The Court found no evidentiary basis for actual bias, and apprehended bias failed under the objective Ebner framework .
• The judge’s Family Violence Committee role was an administrative function and did not logically support a reasonable apprehension of bias .
• A litigant cannot manufacture disqualification by insulting a judge; robust judicial management and adverse findings do not equal partiality .
• The Court summarised that a fair-minded observer would not apprehend lack of impartiality; grounds 7 and 11 failed .

3) Facts / evidence and adequacy of reasons

• The appellant’s factual attacks were largely disagreement; he did not identify specific overlooked evidence, despite rule requirements for specificity .
• Findings about foreign assets were supported by substantial documentation (titles, transfers, translations, attorney evidence), making the conclusions reasonably open .
• On reasons, the Court held the primary judge’s reasoning was clear and thorough; dissatisfaction with the outcome is not the test .

🧠 Analysis of the Judgment & Judicial Reasoning

What makes Dalal & Bunha useful is how it draws a sharp line between:

• Real unfairness (which can vitiate a hearing), and
• Firm, efficient trial management (which courts are obliged to do).

The Court’s method was pragmatic: it first prioritised integrity-type complaints (procedural fairness/bias) , then tested them against prejudice (Stead) and objective bias doctrine (Ebner) . Once those collapsed, the remaining grounds were treated for what they were: attempts to re-run factual contests without pinpointing appellable error .

📚 Precedents relied on (key ones)

• House v The King (appellate intervention for discretion)
• Stead v SGIC (must show possibility of different outcome)
• Ebner (apprehended bias framework; caution on recusal)
• Aon Risk / Dahdah / Gabrielle v Abood (No 2) (adjournments, efficiency, hearing dates)
• Edwards v Noble (findings “reasonably open” on evidence)

🎓 Take-home lesson learned

• Adjournment refusal ≠ unfair trial unless you can show concrete prejudice and a lost opportunity that could have changed the result .
• Courtroom control ≠ bias: enforcing decorum and keeping a trial on track is part of judging, not proof of partiality .
• Bias claims must map to Ebner: identify the disqualifying matter and articulate the logical connection—“committee role” or “tense exchange” alone won’t do it .
• If you run an appeal as “I disagree with the outcome” without pinpointing appellable error, you risk costs—as occurred here ($14,416.12) .