In Sozu & Sozu [2026] FedCFamC2F 1392, the Court declared that a financial agreement signed after a marriage of more than 40 years was not a binding financial agreement under s 90G of the Family Law Act 1975. The agreement appeared valid on its face. It was signed by both parties, contained solicitor certificates of independent legal advice, had been partly performed, and was relied on by the husband as binding. But the Court found the wife had not received the legal advice required by the Act, and the husband’s conduct — including a fraudulently altered valuation and understated superannuation figure — weighed heavily against using the statutory “fallback” power to save the agreement.Th

In Billings & Clowes (No 2) [2026] FedCFamC2F 1367, Judge Murdoch made one of the most serious parenting orders available: an immediate change of residence for an 11-year-old child, supported by an ex parte recovery order, a three-month moratorium on time and communication with the mother, supervised maternal time after that period, and the father having sole decision-making responsibility.The Court accepted that moving the child from the mother, his primary attachment figure, would cause serious short-term distress. But the Court found the greater long-term risk was that, if the child remained with the mother, his relationship with the father and paternal family would probably be perman

In Morris & Lissa [2026] FedCFamC1A 163, the appellant grandmother appealed interim parenting orders that changed the child’s living arrangements after the respondents retained the child and raised allegations of abuse and risk in the appellant’s care. The primary judge ordered that the child live with the second respondent, spend time with the first respondent under the second respondent’s supervision, and spend time with the appellant only under professional supervision. The appeal was dismissed because the appellant’s grounds did not identify appealable error; they largely asked the appeal court to re-weigh contested evidence in a discretionary interim parenting decision.The result wa

In Helias & Tadeu [2026] FedCFamC1A 161, the paternal grandfather and step-grandmother appealed after the primary judge refused to make orders for a four-year-old child to spend time with them. The appeal was dismissed. The Full Court made the central point clearly: the absence of an unacceptable risk of harm does not create a presumption that time must be ordered. Parenting orders are not made because contact is “safe enough”; they are made only if the order is in the child’s best interests.The case is important because the grandparents had never met the child, the father had taken no part in the final hearing, and the mother’s capacity to parent was accepted as likely to be detrimental

Victoria has now passed the Justice Legislation Amendment (Family Violence, Coercive Control, Good Character, Risk Assessment and Other Matters) Bill 2026 through both Houses. The reforms create a standalone coercive control offence, remove reliance on “good character” to reduce sentence, make family-violence discrimination unlawful, strengthen FVIO/PSIO protections, expand fines relief for victim-survivors, void certain old imprisonment warrants for unpaid fines, and decriminalise begging. (t.co)The central shift is this: family violence law is moving away from incident-only thinking and toward pattern, risk, control, autonomy and victim-survivor safety.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The reforms w

In AF Lawyers & Pirani [2026] FedCFamC1A 155, the Full Court dismissed an appeal by a law practice that had intervened in family law property proceedings to recover unpaid legal fees from its former client. The law firm tried to rely on its costs agreement, charging clauses over real property, and an asserted fruits of litigation lien. The appeal failed because the firm did not provide compliant costs disclosure and a costs agreement “as soon as practicable” after receiving instructions. The consequence was severe: the costs agreement was void under the Legal Profession Uniform Law 2014 (NSW), the charging clause could not be relied upon, there was no fruits of litigation lien, and the l

In Falvo & Melita (No 3) [2026] FedCFamC1A 154, the Full Court dismissed the appellant’s appeal from a declaration that she and the respondent had been in a de facto relationship from July 2018 to April 2023. The critical feature of the appeal was not simply that she lost. It was that her written material used complex legal language, constitutional language, procedural fairness language, bias language and appellate terminology without demonstrating legal error. Her oral submissions then revealed she did not understand or could not properly engage with the legal concepts she had deployed in writing. The Court observed that the submissions may well have been generated with the aid of artif

In Alloway & Longo [2026] FedCFamC1A 152, Campton J allowed the appellant’s appeal from orders declaring that the parties’ de facto relationship ended in October 2021, refusing leave under s 44(6) to bring a de facto property and maintenance claim out of time, and dismissing the appellant’s Pt VIIIAB claims. The appeal succeeded because the primary judge’s reasoning relied heavily on broad adverse credibility findings against the appellant and favourable credibility findings for the respondent, without adequately reconciling those findings with objective evidence, concessions, post-separation sexual relations, holidays, events, co-parenting, tax evidence, property occupation issues and t

In Pensak & Department of Families, Seniors, Disability Services and Child Safety (No 2) [2026] FedCFamC1A 147, the Full Court dismissed the father’s appeal from Hague return orders requiring the children to be returned to Japan. The irony is obvious: the Court accepted that there was enough concern about the father’s former solicitor’s conduct to admit further evidence and refer the solicitor to the Legal Services Commission, Queensland. But the appeal still failed because the father could not prove that the solicitor’s conduct made the trial procedurally unfair, caused a miscarriage of justice, or would realistically have produced a different result. The Court’s message was blunt: prof

In Rahman & Rahman (No 2) [2026] FedCFamC2F 998, Judge Murdoch dismissed the husband’s application for the trial judge to recuse herself from property proceedings. The husband argued apprehended bias based on two matters: first, the refusal of his adjournment application and the possibility the trial might proceed in his absence; second, the judge’s treatment of his solicitor, including referral of that solicitor to the Office of the Legal Services Commissioner. The judgment refers to the OLSC, not the Legal Services Board. The recusal application failed because the referral concerned the solicitor’s courtroom conduct and did not decide, or logically affect, the parties’ substantive prop

In Gaddy & Gaddy (No 3) [2026] FedCFamC2F 1245, Judge Suthers dismissed the mother’s application to reconsider final parenting orders. The Court found there had been no significant change in circumstances since the final parenting orders were made. Instead, the later events showed a continuation of the same concerns that had justified the original protective orders: serious mental health issues, lack of insight, ongoing persecutory beliefs, repeated ADVO breaches, bail breaches, police intervention, and litigation conduct that exposed the father to psychological harm and oppression. The Court also made a harmful proceedings order restraining the mother from instituting further proceeding

In Cadel & Galea [2026] FedCFamC1A 142, the mother appealed final parenting orders limiting her time with two very young children. Her central argument was that the primary judge wrongly characterised conduct arising from her mental health crisis — including self-harm, overdosing and suicidal ideation — as family violence. Schonell J rejected that argument. The appeal was dismissed, subject only to a slip-rule correction changing one word in the parenting orders. The case is important because it draws a hard line: a parent’s mental illness may explain context, but it does not automatically prevent self-harm-related conduct from being family violence if it causes another family member to