In Demelza & Arlie [2026] FedCFamC2F 1175, the Court dealt with a wife’s application to join her former husband’s parents to her property case, so that she could seek a declaration under s 78 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) that the husband held a beneficial interest in the home registered in the parents’ names, by way of a constructive trust or, alternatively, a resulting trust. The result: the joinder application was dismissed, the wife’s points of claim were struck out, the husband’s application for security for costs was formally dismissed, and the costs of the joinder application will be decided on written submissions (Orders 1–6; [81], [83]–[84]). The important point is that joini

In Kotsas & Balleas [2026] FedCFamC2F 1180, the Court dealt with an oral application by the respondent, made on the first day of a final property hearing, to adjourn the trial because his solicitor had been ill and because he said the applicant had not disclosed documents, including bank statements and a trust deed. The result: the application was dismissed (Order 1; [11]), the trial went ahead, and the case settled on the second day ([13]). The important point is that an adjournment is weighed against the interests of justice as a whole, including the other party’s right to have the case heard and the direction in s 81 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) to finally determine the parties’ f

In Cannon & Cannon [2026] FedCFamC1F 615, the Court dealt with a self-represented mother's application, in long-running parenting proceedings, for an order that the protections in s 102NA(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) apply at the final hearing, so that neither parent personally cross-examines the other and any cross-examination is done by a lawyer ([1]–[3]). The result: deciding the application on the papers, Jarrett J ordered under s 102NA(1)(c)(iv) that the requirements of s 102NA(2) apply to the cross-examination of each party (Order 1; [6], [26]). The important point is that, even where none of the circumstances that trigger the ban automatically is present, the Court has a di

In Lyric & Lyric [2026] FedCFamC1F 623, the Court dealt with a husband's oral application, made as he began his evidence on the first day of a five-day property trial, for leave to rely on an affidavit he had filed at 10.32am that morning about alleged structural defects in a Queensland property he bought in late 2022 ([2]–[3], [6], [9]). The result: Anderson J dismissed the application in ex tempore reasons delivered the next day (Order 1; [1], [24]). The important point is that the husband had known about the alleged defects since 2024 and early 2025, had filed two trial affidavits and had been before the Court many times without raising them, so the material "could have with reasonabl

In Shumakov & Ankudinova [2026] FedCFamC1A 174, Christie J dealt with a self-represented father’s appeal from Division 2 orders made on a Review of interim parenting (and related) orders of a senior judicial registrar. The result: the appeal was allowed, the Application for Review and the father’s Application in a Proceeding were remitted for rehearing before a different judge, and the father received a costs certificate under s 9 of the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth) capped at $1,969.44 (Orders 1–3; [46], [49]–[50]). The important point is that procedural fairness is about the fairness of the hearing, not the fairness of the outcome ([32]). Where a represented party files a

In Okorie & Myska (No 4) [2026] FedCFamC1A 173, Campton J dealt with an Application in an Appeal by a self-represented applicant who sought to adjourn a listed Full Court appeal so she could obtain a transcript, gather further overseas evidence and pursue alleged fraud complaints. The result: the adjournment was refused, the Application in an Appeal was dismissed, but a short extension was granted to file the digital transcript (and, if it is not filed, the transcript obligation is dispensed with so the appeal is not deemed abandoned), with consequential extensions for Summaries of Argument (Orders 1–6; [31], [33]). The important point is that an appeal fixture will not be put off so a p

In Burgess & Burgess (No 2) [2026] FedCFamC1F 649, the Court dealt with whether a wife could keep relying on a recording she had secretly made of a conversation with her husband, after the High Court's decision in Potter (A Pseudonym) v The King [2026] HCA 25 changed the legal ground under an earlier ruling that had let it in. The result: the earlier order admitting the recording was discharged, Parker J recused herself, the part-heard property trial was aborted and sent for reallocation to another judge, and the husband was granted a costs certificate (Orders 1–6; [48], [59]–[60], [63]). The important point is that, under the South Australian legislation applied here, even a recording m

In Assies & Assies (No 2) [2026] FedCFamC1F 640, the Court dealt with a mother’s application to stay a final parenting order. That order let the father relocate their five-year-old daughter, Y, to “Country C” while the mother’s appeal was pending. The result: the stay was refused, and the interim restraint on removing Y from Australia was discharged ([120]–[121]; Orders 1–2). The important point is that a stay is not automatic just because an appeal has been filed. The applicant has to show a proper basis. Here, Bennett J’s preliminary view was that every ground of appeal was weak, not arguable or misconceived ([71], [85], [89], [103], [105]). The judge also found the mother’s bona fides

In Kozlowska & Maiella [2026] FedCFamC1A 170, the mother appealed final parenting orders made by the Magistrates Court of Western Australia. Those orders placed the 13-year-old child, X, in the father’s sole care and conferred sole parental responsibility on him. The appeal was dismissed, the application to adduce further evidence was dismissed, and the mother was ordered to pay the father’s costs fixed at $13,000. 170All paragraph references below are to the judgment paragraphs in Kozlowska & Maiella [2026] FedCFamC1A 170.The central point is this:The mother’s procedural fairness appeal failed because the Court found she had been given a real opportunity to participate. She left Co

In Verissimus & Polycarpe [2026] FedCFamC1A 166, the Full Court allowed the appeal in part. The mother succeeded on the property and spousal maintenance issues, but failed on the parenting appeal. The financial orders were partly set aside and remitted for rehearing, while the parenting orders changing the residence of the younger two children to the father remained in place. All paragraph references below are to the Full Court’s reasons in case 166. 166The core distinction is simple:The property appeal succeeded because the primary judge failed to make necessary findings. The parenting appeal failed because the primary judge had made clear findings of unacceptable risk, lack of insight

In Sullivan & Warren [2026] FedCFamC1F 550, the Court changed the child’s residence from the mother to the father after years of allegations that the father had physically and sexually abused the child. The mother ultimately abandoned those allegations in written submissions, accepting that there could be no finding that the father had physically or sexually abused the child and no finding that he posed an unacceptable risk of harm. 550But that did not end the case. The real issue became whether the mother’s long-running abuse narrative, repeated reports to police and child safety, disengagement from therapists, unilateral suspension of court-ordered time, and planting of ideas in the c

In Dorji & Marije [2026] FedCFamC1F 446 and Dorji & Marije (No 3) [2026] FedCFamC1F 582, the Court was dealing with an escalating parenting dispute involving two children: X, aged 11–12, and Y, aged 9–10. The most serious feature of the case was X’s attempted overdose, suicidal ideation and self-harm in late 2025. 446The first decision, delivered on 3 July 2026, recorded the immediate factual allegations and reports available before the updated single expert report. The second decision, delivered on 28 August 2026, incorporated the later expert evidence of Mr G, who described X’s suicide attempt as genuine and said the seriousness of her presentation could not be overstated. 582The