In Manzur & Danielle [2026] FedCFamC1F 600, the Court dealt with a high-conflict parenting dispute about three children, aged 11, 8 and 5. The mother sought sole decision-making and a limited increase in the father's time. The father sought joint decision-making and shared care if he lived close enough to the children ([1]–[2], [7]–[9]). The result: the parents have joint decision-making responsibility. The children live with the mother, and their time with the father increases from four to five nights a fortnight, then to week about, over 12 months. That pathway is suspended, and time drops back to four nights a fortnight, if the father moves more than 35 km from the children's schools

In Fierro & Bien (No 4) [2026] FedCFamC1A 186, the Full Court (Gill, Harper and Brasch JJ) dealt with a self-represented applicant's bid under r 10.13(1)(a) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) to set aside orders that had dismissed his appeal when he did not appear on 24 August 2026 ([1]–[3]). The result: the Application in an Appeal, as amended, was dismissed, leave to rely on a rewritten Notice of Appeal was refused, and there was no order as to costs (Orders 1–2; [69]–[70]). The important point is that the Court was prepared to accept the applicant had a reasonable excuse for not appearing ([29]), but that was only half the test. He also

In Statham & Statham (No 2) [2026] FedCFamC1A 176, Riethmuller J dealt with a husband's appeal from Division 2 final property orders that transferred the only significant real property — by then vested in his trustee in bankruptcy — to the wife, leaving insufficient funds to meet the husband's debts, with each party retaining their superannuation ([1], [20]). The result: the appeal was allowed, the orders of 17 February 2026 were set aside, the proceedings were remitted for rehearing by a judge other than the primary judge, and there was no order as to costs (Orders 1–4; [42], [46]). The important point is that bare allegations and submissions are not evidence. A disputed property value

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In Nirmal & Daphne [2026] FedCFamC1A 175, Riethmuller J (exercising appellate jurisdiction) dealt with a father's appeal from Division 2 parenting orders that the children live with the mother, spend supervised then progressing time with him, and that she have sole parental responsibility ([1]). The result: the Amended Application in an Appeal was dismissed, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs fixed at $8,000, with no order as to the Independent Children's Lawyer's costs (Orders 1–3; [209]–[211]). The important point is twofold. First, managing cross-examination time is not only open to a trial judge; it is encouraged under the overarchin

In Bailey and Petersen [2026] FCWA 50, O'Brien J of the Family Court of Western Australia (Perth) dealt with how much witness evidence two represented parents should be allowed to put before the Court in a parenting trial where the real issues were narrow. The result: of 25 proposed witnesses, only the parties, the Single Expert Witness, the family therapist, four treating professionals (the two medical doctors and the two psychologists) and one lay witness for each parent were allowed. The affidavits of the other 16 proposed witnesses were not received into evidence ([91]–[92]). The important point is that admissibility is not the same as relevance or probative value ([12]). Lawyers have th

In Curtin & Bush (No 2) [2026] FedCFamC2F 1165, Judge O'Shannessy dealt, in ex tempore reasons given on 23 July 2026, with the return of an urgent ex parte injunction (an Airport Watch List Order) restraining a child's removal from Australia until 6 July 2027. The injunction had been made on 6 July 2026 without notice to the father ([2]–[3]; Order 1). The result: the injunction remains in force, the application to discharge it was dismissed, and a transcript of the hearing is to be made available to the parties and to the Court on the next occasion (Orders 1–2). The important point is that an interim risk assessment can keep a protective order in place while expressly deciding nothing ab

In Bernet & Alves [2026] FedCFamC2F 1152, Judge Murdoch dealt with a father's contravention application about final parenting orders made by consent on 17 March 2023. The mother admitted two counts, denied two, and said that all four were reasonably excused because of her child's resistance and distress ([1]–[4]). The result: all four pressed counts (counts 3, 5, 8 and 11) were found proved without reasonable excuse. The consequences were adjourned to 10 September 2026, and costs were reserved (Findings 1–4; Orders 5–7; [94]–[95]). The important point is that the test for reasonable excuse is objective, and a resident parent has a positive obligation to facilitate compliance, which inclu

In Liell & Nottingham [2026] FedCFamC1F 602, the Court dealt with whether a stepfather and mother should be given leave under s 60G(1) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) to start Queensland adoption proceedings for the mother's teenage child, where the biological father had not been heard from for years and did not take part ([2]–[3], [12]–[14]). The result: Jarrett J granted leave (Order 1; [26]–[27]). The important point is that leave is only a gateway. The question was not whether an adoption order should be made, but whether granting leave was in the child's best interests, and the answer turned on the real state of the child's family relationships and the child's own long-standing vie

In Dawid & Nilima (No 2) [2026] FedCFamC1F 599, the Court dealt with two requests by a wife in a property case with an overseas dimension: to be released from the implied (Harman) undertaking so that documents from the Australian proceedings could be used in the wife's overseas proceedings, and for orders for disclosure of eight overseas bank accounts said to be in the husband's name. The result: McNab J released the wife from the undertaking, limited to use in the overseas proceedings and by her legal advisers there, and did so nunc pro tunc (that is, taking effect from the earlier date, because the documents had already been used). But the Court dismissed the further disclosure applica

In Cowden & Walsman (No 2) [2026] FedCFamC1A 183, Campton J dealt with a mother's appeal from Division 2 parenting orders that gave the father sole decision-making responsibility for the children's education and health (and one child's extra-curricular activities), kept a week-about care arrangement, and had the father hold the children's passports ([1], [3]). The result: the appeal was dismissed and the mother was ordered to pay the father's costs fixed at $15,000 (Orders 1–2; [66], [70]–[71]). The important point is that a trial judge in child-related proceedings is expected to engage actively with the evidence. Questions from the bench are not unfair where they go to the identified is

In Trevose & Sarma [2026] FedCFamC1A 184, Schonell J dealt with a self-represented appellant's challenge to a final property order made after a trial that straddled the commencement of the Family Law Amendment Act 2024 (Cth). The primary judge had divided the property 82 per cent to the appellant and 18 per cent to the respondent, requiring her to pay him $87,672 ([1]–[2], [16]). The result: the appeal was dismissed, as were two Applications in an Appeal, including one to adduce further evidence (Orders 1–3). The important point is that the Court accepted the primary judge did apply the wrong statutory framework, because the final hearing had started before the amendments commenced, yet