In Kellen & Ida [2026] FedCFamC1A 195, Riethmuller J heard the de facto husband's appeal from Division 2 property settlement orders ([1]). Two first-instance judgments must be read together: the First Reasons on the substantive property issues dated 26 February 2026 (when orders were not made), and a second judgment on 1 May 2026 addressing the form of the orders ([1]). The appellant pressed five grounds ([2], [11]). All failed. The Application in an Appeal filed 20 August 2026 was dismissed ([10]; Order 3). The appeal was dismissed ([33]; Order 4). By consent, Orders 1, 2 and 8 of 1 May 2026 were varied under the slip rule ([31]–[32]). Written costs submissions were directed ([34]; Orde

In Gulshan & Gulshan (No 3) [2026] FedCFamC1F 667, Anderson J determined the mother’s application under s 65DAAA of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) to reconsider final consent parenting orders made on 11 November 2024 ([1], [4(a)]). The result: reconsideration was permitted; listed November 2024 parenting, time and changeover orders were discharged; interim sole parental responsibility and live-with to the mother; alternate-Saturday time of six hours via E Contact Centre changeovers; selected s 68B injunctions; overseas travel to Country B refused; ICL, Family Report, s 67ZBD information orders, final hearing listed 19 April 2027, and s 102NA applied (Orders; [53]–[54], [58]–[62], [67], [7

In Vanetti [2026] FedCFamC1A 185, McClelland DCJ, Schonell and Curran JJ determined an application for leave to commence appeal proceedings by a litigant in person who is subject to a harmful proceedings order ([1], [3], [8]). The result: leave was granted to appeal the 21 August 2026 leave-refusal orders, limited to Grounds 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6; time to file was extended seven days; and the application was otherwise dismissed, including leave to appeal orders of 14 March 2025 and a non-existent order dated 25 March 2025 (Orders 1–3; [9], [22]–[23], [55]). The important point is that a harmful proceedings order is a gateway, not a brick wall. On the s 102QAG test, leave can still be granted wher

In Bongiovani & Bongiovani (No 3) [2026] FedCFamC1F 650, Jarrett J determined a show-cause application about whether the applicant's litigation guardian should be removed, or the proceeding stayed until the applicant engaged legal representation ([1]–[2]). The Full Court had already held that a non-solicitor litigation guardian has no right of audience and must act by a solicitor ([16], citing Bongiovani & Bongiovani [2026] FedCFamC1A 123 at [2]–[6]). Jarrett J was not satisfied that Ms B Bongiovani could not fairly and competently conduct the proceeding once properly advised, so she was not removed ([19]–[20]). But she cannot act as the applicant's solicitor: she must engage a solic

In Boleno & Newcombe [2026] FedCFamC1A 191, Altobelli, Christie and Parker JJ heard the father's appeal from final parenting orders made on 29 May 2026 ([1]). The primary judge found that unsupervised time with the father posed an unacceptable risk of psychological harm to the child, and ordered professionally supervised time building to once per month until the child turns 10, then unsupervised monthly time ([15]–[16]). The father pressed four grounds. All failed ([38], [51], [69], [86]). The appeal was dismissed ([87]). The father was ordered to pay the mother's costs of $14,879.78 and the Independent Children's Lawyer's (ICL) costs of $5,662.80, which he had conceded if the appeal fai

In Rangel & Bird (No 2) [2026] FedCFamC1A 193, Campton J heard the mother's appeal against three of 43 final parenting orders made in Division 2. Those orders dealt with international travel, passports and the children's extra-curricular activities ([1]). The primary judge had barred the children from leaving Australia before age 18 without both parents' written consent, and had stopped either parent enrolling the children in, or continuing, any activity without the other's written consent. Neither parent nor the Independent Children's Lawyer (ICL) had asked for orders in those terms ([12], [18], [40]–[41]). The result: the appeal was allowed on two procedural fairness grounds, two other

In Gearalt & Gearalt [2026] FedCFamC1F 656, Simpson J dealt with interim parenting orders agreed between the parents and the Independent Children's Lawyer (ICL). Under those orders the three children would live with the father in the former family home, even though a final Apprehended Domestic Violence Order (ADVO) restrained him from going into any place where the mother or the children live ([1], [3], [7]). The result: the Court made the consent orders. It declared that they were inconsistent with the ADVO, and that the ADVO was invalid to the extent of that inconsistency, but only so far as it stopped the father attending or living at the former home. It also restrained the father fro

In Ziemann & Sallings [2026] FedCFamC2F 1583, Judge Hughes dealt with a father's application under s 65DAAA of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) for leave to start a third round of parenting proceedings, after final orders made in 2015 and 2018 ([1], [9]). The result: the application was dismissed, the mother was given leave to make an oral application for a harmful proceedings order, and the Court ordered under s 102QAC that the father cannot institute any further parenting proceedings without first obtaining leave. The mother is not to be notified of any leave application unless it succeeds (Orders 1–4; [42], [52]). The important point is that proving a significant change in circumstances

In Klimova & Klimova [2026] FedCFamC1A 190, Riethmuller J, sitting in the Court's appellate jurisdiction, dealt with a mother's appeal from final parenting orders made by a Magistrate of the Family Court of Western Australia (Klimova & Klimova [2026] FCWAM 88). The orders provided for the child to live with the father, spend three nights a fortnight with the mother, and travel internationally with the father without the mother's consent ([1]). The result: two Applications in an Appeal were dismissed, the appeal was dismissed, and the mother was ordered to pay the father's costs fixed at $25,000 (Orders 1–3; [66]–[67]). The important point is twofold. First, an interpreter does not ha

In Wilkerson & Croxford [2026] FedCFamC2F 1063, the Court dealt with a biological father's application to be introduced to, and spend time with, a four-year-old child who did not know him, where the mother said he was a "sperm donor" who had agreed to have no involvement in the child's life ([1]–[3]). The result: by consent, the mother has sole decision-making responsibility and the child lives with her. Over her opposition, the Court ordered twelve fortnightly sessions of professionally supervised time, followed by unsupervised daytime time that builds in stages, reaching alternate weekends from age seven, all in the area where the child lives. It also ordered that the father be added t

In Manzur & Danielle [2026] FedCFamC1F 600, the Court dealt with a high-conflict parenting dispute about three children, aged 11, 8 and 5. The mother sought sole decision-making and a limited increase in the father's time. The father sought joint decision-making and shared care if he lived close enough to the children ([1]–[2], [7]–[9]). The result: the parents have joint decision-making responsibility. The children live with the mother, and their time with the father increases from four to five nights a fortnight, then to week about, over 12 months. That pathway is suspended, and time drops back to four nights a fortnight, if the father moves more than 35 km from the children's schools

In Fierro & Bien (No 4) [2026] FedCFamC1A 186, the Full Court (Gill, Harper and Brasch JJ) dealt with a self-represented applicant's bid under r 10.13(1)(a) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) to set aside orders that had dismissed his appeal when he did not appear on 24 August 2026 ([1]–[3]). The result: the Application in an Appeal, as amended, was dismissed, leave to rely on a rewritten Notice of Appeal was refused, and there was no order as to costs (Orders 1–2; [69]–[70]). The important point is that the Court was prepared to accept the applicant had a reasonable excuse for not appearing ([29]), but that was only half the test. He also