From the Wife’s Perspective: “I Complied, He Delayed, and the Court Still Pushed My Trial Back”From the wife’s perspective, this was a frustrating procedural setback in a long-running financial case. She had commenced Pt VIII financial proceedings in 2022, the matter was listed for trial in April 2026, and shortly before trial the husband sought to vacate it. Although she eventually agreed the April trial could not proceed, she felt wronged because the case was pushed back to October 2026, disclosure orders did not go as far back as she wanted, she was required to prepare a fresh standalone trial affidavit despite having already filed material, and her response application was dismissed. She

In Caldwell & Caldwell [2026] FedCFamC1A 81, the Full Court allowed the wife’s appeal and declared that three family trusts — the B Trust, C Trust and D Trust, and/or their assets — were property of the husband for the purposes of s 79 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). The decision is significant because the majority held that the primary judge wrongly mixed up two separate questions: first, whether the trusts were property of a party to the marriage; and second, whether it would later be just and equitable to adjust those trust assets in favour of the wife. Those are not the same question.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The husband’s father established three family trusts connected with a long-

In Driesen & Klerk [2026] FedCFamC1A 74, Schonell J allowed a property appeal because the primary judge materially misstated the mortgage on the wife’s initial property as $509,000 instead of $509. That error was not a harmless clerical slip: it radically understated the wife’s initial financial contribution and infected the equal-contributions assessment. The appellate court re-exercised discretion under the amended s 79 framework, assessed contributions 60/40 in the wife’s favour, dismissed the husband’s cross-appeal, and reduced the wife’s payment obligation from about $730,369.50 to $323,795.20.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The parties married in 2009, separated under one roof in late 2020

In Zakariya & Rana [2026] FedCFamC1A 75, the Full Court (Riethmuller J) reinforced a critical principle in parenting litigation: lawful use of medicinal cannabis does not immunise a parent from scrutiny regarding its impact on parenting capacity. The decision confirms that courts may impose protective conditions (such as drug testing) even in the absence of direct evidence of impairment, where broader risk factors justify caution.🧩 FactsThe parties had three children (aged 14, 12, and 9) who had lived with the mother since separation in 2018.Key background:The father had a significant criminal history, including drug supply and weapons offencesHe had previously engaged in family violence

In Bartos & Smagulova [2026] FedCFamC1A 70, the Full Court (Harper, Riethmuller & Behrens JJ) delivered an important appellate decision clarifying a recurring misconception in parenting litigation: a trial judge is not required to determine every disputed allegation of family violence, particularly where those allegations are not central to the issues the Court must decide. The case reinforces that parenting proceedings are not a forum for resolving all factual disputes or moral grievances, but are instead tightly focused on the child’s best interests.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The case concerned a five-year-old child who had always lived with the mother. The primary judge ordered:The c

In Fierro & Bien (No 2) [2026] FedCFamC1A 65, the Full Court (Gill, Howard & Christie JJ) delivered a highly instructive appellate decision demonstrating how procedural fairness, jurisdictional limits, and statutory cost prohibitions operate independently. The appeal was allowed in part only, with the Court carefully isolating where error mattered—and where it did not.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The appellant (a self-represented litigant and the child’s older half-sibling) brought an appeal against orders which:Dismissed parenting proceedings for want of prosecutionDismissed three interlocutory applications (contempt, costs, translation)Ordered the appellant to pay ICL costs (~$6,961)The

In Fierro & Bien (No 2) [2026] FedCFamC1A 65, the Full Court (Gill, Howard & Christie JJ) delivered a highly instructive appellate decision demonstrating how procedural fairness, jurisdictional limits, and statutory cost prohibitions operate independently. The appeal was allowed in part only, with the Court carefully isolating where error mattered—and where it did not.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The appellant (a self-represented litigant and the child’s older half-sibling) brought an appeal against orders which:Dismissed parenting proceedings for want of prosecutionDismissed three interlocutory applications (contempt, costs, translation)Ordered the appellant to pay ICL costs (~$6,961)The

In Dayan & Shaul [2026] FedCFamC1F 242, Parker J delivered a powerful and sobering decision on unacceptable risk, confirming that serious non-physical family violence, coercive control, mental health factors, and lack of insight can justify a complete severance of parental contact. The Court ultimately ordered no time, no communication, and strict injunctions, prioritising the child’s safety over any theoretical benefit of a relationship.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The case concerned a five-year-old child who had lived exclusively with the mother since birth. The father had no meaningful relationship with the child, having last seen her as an infant.The mother alleged serious family violence

In Ashdown & Markin (No 2) [2026] FedCFamC1F 164 (Wilson J, 16 March 2026), the Court delivered a highly practical ruling explaining when and why four medical experts should give evidence concurrently (“in the hot tub”) in a parenting trial involving serious family violence allegations and disputed psychological risk evidence. Although the final orders were made by consent, the reasons function as an unusually clear procedural guide for practitioners: the Court grounded the “hot tub” decision in (i) expert duties to the Court, (ii) the Evidence Act admissibility principles for expert opinion, (iii) the Family Law Act’s case-management duties and relaxed evidence regime in parenting matte

In Sauter & Holt (No 2) [2026] FedCFamC1F 153 (Carew J, 12 March 2026), the Court delivered a highly instructive property decision where a husband transferred control of multiple businesses to a third party lender after separation, purportedly to satisfy loans. The Court set aside the share transfers under s 106B, ordered the sale of the businesses and multiple properties, repaid the third party’s loans with interest only up to the transfer date, and divided the net property 65/35 in the wife’s favour, including a significant uplift due to family violence impacts and future factors. The judgment is also notable for its extraordinary referrals: documents were directed to the Attorney-Gene

🚨 Major wake-up call for AI users 🚨A federal court has ruled in United States v. Heppner (Feb 2026): Your chats with public generative AI (ChatGPT, etc.) are NOT protected by attorney-client privilege.Why? You're sharing with a third party → no confidentiality. AI is not your lawyer. The reasoning is straightforward. Privilege depends on confidentiality, and using a public Al tool involves sharing information with a third party.👀🤔This position is consistent with the Australian position, that AI-Chats are even potentially breaching s 114Q of the Family Law Act (Cth) which is a prohibition on publishing Court information.In a recent Australian Case (unpublished) a Judge held :"The conduct of t

In Koroma & Ishak [2026] FedCFamC1A 18 (Aldridge, Jarrett & Schonell JJ, 4 March 2026), the Full Court dismissed a property appeal that tried to weaponise Shinohara & Shinohara to undo an orthodox “add-back” approach taken under the pre–Family Law Amendment Act 2024 regime. The decision is significant as precedent because it draws a clear transitional line: Shinohara’s post-amendment s 79 reasoning about notional property has no application to cases governed by the earlier legislative framework, and the long-standing add-back authorities remain binding unless and until properly overruled. The Court also gave a practical evidentiary warning: post-separation ATO liabilities won’t b