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In Parashara & Dipaka [2026] FedCFamC1F 699, Riethmuller J dealt with a husband's application for a declaration that his marriage was void. His case was that his wife's consent to their arranged marriage was not a "real consent" because it was "obtained by fraud and misrepresentation". The alleged fraud was his own: he said he had not told her about a number of matters in his history and circumstances before the wedding ([1], [4], [12]). The wife filed a Submitting Notice ([1]). The result: the application was dismissed on the papers (Order 1; [15]). The important point is that non-disclosure or misrepresentation about a spouse's personal qualities, history or circumstances does not make
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In Baum & Gunson (No 2) [2026] FedCFamC2F 1593, Judge A. Humphreys dealt with a father's application to summarily dismiss a mother's new Initiating Application. She was seeking fresh final parenting and property orders about two years after final orders were made following an undefended hearing she did not attend ([1], [3]). The result: the mother's application was summarily dismissed under s 102QAB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). Taking her case at its highest, she had no reasonable prospect of setting the orders aside under r 10.13(1)(a), of getting the parenting orders reconsidered under s 65DAAA, or of varying the property orders under s 79A ([80]–[81]; Order 1). She was ordered to
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In Velery & Velery [2026] FedCFamC1A 205, the Full Court (Williams, Kari & McNab JJ) dismissed a wife's appeal from property orders made by a judge of the Family Court of Western Australia in Velery and Velery [2026] FCWA 119 ([1], [6], [104]). She argued that the reasons were inadequate, that her tax debt and a $303,000 loan from her mother were not brought to account, and that the husband's 2017 inheritance could not justify a 55/45 contribution finding in his favour ([42], [60], [71], [88]). Every ground failed. The husband's Notice of Contention, which showed that the primary judge had overlooked a second tranche of the wife's cryptocurrency worth $100,962, "enjoys merit", and th
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In Cannon & Moore [2026] FedCFamC1A 206, a five-judge Full Court (Alstergren CJ, Christie, Schonell, Strum & Curran JJ) allowed a self-represented father's appeal from final parenting orders. Those orders gave the mother sole decision-making responsibility and limited the father to supervised time indefinitely ([1], [8], [13], [17]). The appeal succeeded on Grounds 1 and 5 taken together ([14]). The primary judge had set out the mother's allegations of family violence in detail but never said which were proved and which were not, while relying on a "history of family violence" to justify supervision ([24], [37], [70]). The Court also used the appeal to correct the law. Statements in
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In JVL v AGL [2026] WADC 103, Jeyamohan DCJ dealt with a defamation claim by a Perth grandfather, JVL, against AGL, his daughter-in-law, over five publications made between 1 July 2021 and 19 January 2022: two Facebook posts and a comment, a family email, and oral statements ([1], [5]). The publications conveyed imputations that JVL was a child abuser and a paedophile, that he posed a risk to his young grandchildren, and, in later publications, that he had abducted them ([236]–[238]). The result: judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $34,797, being $30,000 damages for non-economic loss (including aggravated damages) plus $4,797 interest ([315], [324]–[325]). A permanent injunction was ref
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In Christinsen & Nykvist [2026] FedCFamC1F 653, Anderson J dealt with a mother's interim application after the father allegedly took the parties' 11-year-old daughter to Country B in February 2026 without her knowledge or consent ([1]–[2]). Country B is not a party to the 1996 Child Protection Convention ([20]). The result: the Court held it had jurisdiction under s 111CD(1)(e) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) because the child is an Australian citizen and remains habitually resident in Australia ([23], [25], [27]). It ordered the father to return the child to the Sydney metropolitan area by 4.00 pm on 30 October 2026 ([3], [36]; Order 1). But it refused, at that stage, to place the chil
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In Merckx & Merckx [2026] FedCFamC1F 693, Jarrett J refused a husband's application to register a "final award" made in March 2025 after three rounds of arbitration of the parties' property dispute ([2]–[3], [55]). When the Court asked for the parties' arbitration agreement, the answer, "remarkably", was that there wasn't one ([39]). The arbitrator also never gave the written notice the Regulations require when there is no agreement ([44]). Because neither of the two prescribed paths was followed, the process was not "family law arbitration" under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), and the document could not be registered under s 13H ([45]–[47]). The earlier "interim awards" were not true aw
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In Musaev & Musaev [2026] FedCFamC1F 641, Jarrett J decided a separate question in property proceedings that a wife had started against her husband, who died before the case was finished ([1], [5]). His will said it forgave and released any loans his trusts owed him at his death. A family trust's accounts recorded $2,412,344 as owing to him ([4], [13]). If that debt had been wiped out, the parties accepted, the estate would not have enough left to support the property adjustment she was seeking ([4]). The Court held that the clause did not forgive or discharge the debt. At most, it operated as a legacy to the trust. The debt vested in the estate, and her continuing claim under s 79AA(8)
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In Panza & Adriaansen [2026] FedCFamC1A 192, McClelland DCJ, sitting in the appellate jurisdiction, heard a man's appeal against de facto property orders that gave his former partner 35 per cent of the net property: 33 per cent for contributions and a further 2 per cent under s 90SM(5) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ([1], [24], [35]–[36]). Six of his seven grounds failed. One sub-ground succeeded. The primary judge had said he would weigh a $100,000 interim property payment to the respondent under s 90SM(5), but the reasons never showed how he did it ([166]). On re-exercising that limited discretion, the Court decided there should be no s 90SM(5) adjustment at all. The payment to the r
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In Bray & Poole [2026] FedCFamC1A 194, the Full Court (Williams, Jarrett and Behrens JJ) dealt with a husband's appeal against orders that set aside the parties' binding financial agreement and divided their net non-superannuation property 65 per cent to the wife and 35 per cent to the husband ([1]–[2]). The result was split. The order setting aside the agreement stands, because the hardship finding under s 90K(1)(d) was open, even though the primary judge had not made the reliance finding needed for the s 90K(1)(b) misrepresentation basis ([44], [49]–[50]). But the property orders (Orders 2–21) were set aside and the property application was remitted to a different judge. The primary ju
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In Massen & Massen [2026] FedCFamC1A 200, the Full Court (Williams, Kari and Parker JJ) allowed a husband's appeal against one order within a suite of final property orders. The target was the primary judge's finding that a $23,000,000 gift from the husband's mother, held through a discretionary trust, was a contribution by both parties ([4], [21], [25]). The result: the appeal was allowed, Order 22(a) was set aside, the wife's Notice of Contention was dismissed, the competing s 79 applications were remitted to a different judge, and there was no order as to costs (Orders 1–5; [49]). The important point is practical: when a judge makes a finding on a critical issue that sits uneasily wit
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In Kellen & Ida [2026] FedCFamC1A 195, Riethmuller J heard the de facto husband's appeal from Division 2 property settlement orders ([1]). Two first-instance judgments must be read together: the First Reasons on the substantive property issues dated 26 February 2026 (when orders were not made), and a second judgment on 1 May 2026 addressing the form of the orders ([1]). The appellant pressed five grounds ([2], [11]). All failed. The Application in an Appeal filed 20 August 2026 was dismissed ([10]; Order 3). The appeal was dismissed ([33]; Order 4). By consent, Orders 1, 2 and 8 of 1 May 2026 were varied under the slip rule ([31]–[32]). Written costs submissions were directed ([34]; Orde
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