In Cadel & Galea [2026] FedCFamC1A 142, the mother appealed final parenting orders limiting her time with two very young children. Her central argument was that the primary judge wrongly characterised conduct arising from her mental health crisis — including self-harm, overdosing and suicidal ideation — as family violence. Schonell J rejected that argument. The appeal was dismissed, subject only to a slip-rule correction changing one word in the parenting orders. The case is important because it draws a hard line: a parent’s mental illness may explain context, but it does not automatically prevent self-harm-related conduct from being family violence if it causes another family member to

In Massey & Carmichael [2026] FedCFamC1A 139, Campton J allowed the appellant’s property appeal because the primary judge’s reasons did not adequately explain the separate 75/25 contribution assessment applied to the respondent’s superannuation pool. The appellant failed on procedural fairness, failed to prove that a two-pool approach was legally unavailable, and failed on the valuation challenge to the respondent’s C Street property. But she succeeded because the reasoning pathway from the evidence to the superannuation percentage was missing. That defective reasoning affected the overall property division, so Orders 1 to 7 were set aside. On re-exercise, the Court adopted a single-pool

In Tyrell & Tyrell [2026] FedCFamC1A 137, Schonell J dismissed the mother’s Application in an Appeal after her Notice of Appeal had been summarily dismissed. The central problem was that most of the parenting orders she sought to challenge were made by consent at trial, after she had been represented by both solicitor and counsel. She later argued that her consent was not truly voluntary, informed or procedurally fair, and that she had been pressured by the circumstances of trial, perceived prejudgment, possible costs consequences, and the risk that existing parenting arrangements would remain in place. The Court rejected that argument. The mother’s regret, even if genuine, was not enoug

In Kunkle & Suss (No 2) [2026] FedCFamC1F 346, Stewart J admitted a series of audio recordings made by the mother for use in parenting proceedings. The father did not expressly consent to being recorded, and the Court was not satisfied that his apparent awareness of some recordings amounted to implied consent. However, the Court accepted, on a prima facie basis, that the recordings were reasonably necessary for the mother’s protection in the context of alleged family violence. The recordings were therefore admitted under the exception in the Surveillance Devices Act 2016 (SA), and Stewart J added that, even if that conclusion were wrong, the recordings would have been admitted under s 13

In Bekker & Lantosca [2026] FedCFamC1F 344, Parker J determined parenting, property and de facto spousal maintenance issues after a short de facto relationship involving a young child, X, with significant special needs. The mother sought to exclude the father from X’s life. The Court rejected that position, finding that the father did not pose an unacceptable risk and that the evidence did not support the mother’s claim that X’s dysregulation was caused by time with the father. However, the Court also recognised X’s autism, sensory sensitivities, dysregulation and reliance on the mother as coregulator. The result was a cautious reintroduction regime: X lives with the mother in Adelaide,

In Potter (A Pseudonym) v The King [2026] HCA 25, the High Court unanimously dismissed an appeal concerning the admissibility of a covert audio recording made by a wife of a private conversation with her husband. In that recording, the husband admitted he had previously sexually assaulted her while she was asleep. The High Court held the recording was not unlawful because it was reasonably necessary for the protection of the complainant’s lawful interests, namely her right to bodily autonomy and integrity. This is a major authority for domestic and family violence contexts because it recognises that a victim-survivor may make a secret recording not merely to gather evidence, but to protect h

In Cowden & Walsman [2026] FedCFamC1A 129, Campton J dealt with a late Application in an Appeal filed by the mother shortly before the substantive parenting appeal was due to be heard. The mother sought to fundamentally recast her appeal grounds, rely on amended appeal documents, and adduce further evidence. The father opposed the application, arguing prejudice and delay. The Court accepted that the amended grounds changed the nature of the appeal and that the father was prejudiced, but held that the interests of justice required the appeal to be determined on its “true merits”. Leave was granted in part, the appeal was adjourned to 29 September 2026, and the mother was required to pay t

In Suss & Kunkle [2026] FedCFamC1A 127, the Full Court dismissed the father’s parenting appeal. The father argued he was denied procedural fairness because audio recordings were admitted despite late disclosure, and because he was forced to continue with a solicitor appointed shortly before trial under the legal aid scheme connected with s 102NA. The Court rejected both arguments. The decisive point was that the father had been given a reasonable opportunity to arrange representation well before trial, but his lack of preparation resulted from his own choices, repeated changes of solicitors and late legal aid arrangements — not from any denial of procedural fairness. The father was order

In Tiang & Pen [2026] FedCFamC1A 121, Schonell J allowed the mother’s appeal from final de facto property orders. The primary judge had assessed contributions at 98% to the father and only 2% to the mother, despite finding that the mother had been the children’s primary carer throughout their lives and had undertaken the substantial majority of parenting over approximately 13 years. The appeal succeeded because that assessment gave the mother’s parenting contributions only token weight. On re-exercise, the Court assessed contributions at 16.5% to the mother, added an 8.5% adjustment under s 90SM(5), and varied the orders to produce an overall division of 25% to the mother and 75% to the

In Pensak & Department of Families, Seniors, Disability Services and Child Safety [2026] FedCFamC1A 117, Campton J dealt with an urgent Application in an Appeal arising from Hague Child Abduction Convention return orders requiring two children to be returned to Japan. The substantive appeal was listed one week later, on 3 July 2026. The applicant father was permitted to file an Amended Amended Notice of Appeal, an Amended Summary of Argument, and an Amended List of Authorities, narrowing the appeal to a procedural fairness ground. The request to adduce further evidence was deferred to the Full Court hearing, while the proposed subpoena to the father’s former solicitors was withdrawn on t

In Tschida & Tschida [2026] FedCFamC1A 114, the Full Court dismissed almost all of the husband’s property appeal. The husband tried to rely on fresh valuation evidence, complained about delay, addbacks, gambling findings, the wife retaining the former matrimonial home, treatment of alleged third-party funds, and capital gains tax protections. Nearly all grounds failed because the husband was trying to escape forensic positions he had taken at trial. The only successful point was a narrow correction under the slip rule: the primary judge had used $925,000 for the former matrimonial home when the parties had agreed on $975,000. That correction reduced the amount payable to the wife by $22,

In Charis & Charis [2026] FedCFamC1A 92, the Full Court dismissed the husband’s property appeal and upheld an equal division of a property pool exceeding $127 million. The major asset was the husband’s shares and options in D Company, a valuable United States technology company he co-founded. The husband argued that the company’s dramatic post-separation increase in value was attributable to his post-separation work and should have produced a 70/30 division in his favour. The Full Court rejected that argument, holding that the primary judge was entitled to assess contributions holistically over the whole relationship and was not required to quarantine the D Company interests into a separ