De Facto Farmhand Fights Back: Appeal Court Says ‘All or Nothing’ Was the Wrong Approach in $17 Million Property Battle

In Voight & Zunino [2025] FedCFamC1A 201, the Full Court (Austin, Schonell & Curran JJ) delivered a crucial ruling that reshapes how just and equitable determinations are approached in de facto property settlements.

The decision underscores that family law judges cannot treat financial claims as “all or nothing” disputes. Even if a party’s proposal is excessive, the Court must still assess whether some adjustment is fair — especially where there’s evidence of genuine contribution.

This appeal arose from a farming partnership gone sour, where the trial judge had dismissed the woman’s claim outright. The Full Court found that reasoning legally flawed, re-exercised discretion, and ordered the respondent to pay $131,113.

⚖️ Facts and Issues

Facts

• Ms Voight and Mr Zunino were in a de facto relationship from 2013–2020, living and working together on Mr Zunino’s $17 million farming enterprise ([3]–[4], [11]).
• After separation, Ms Voight filed two proceedings: one under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) for unpaid wages, and another under Pt VIIIAB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) seeking property adjustment ([5]–[6]).
• An interim consent order in June 2023 required Mr Zunino to pay her $300,000 “to be characterised by the trial judge” ([8], [31]).
• In June 2025, the primary judge dismissed her entire property claim, finding it was not “just and equitable” to alter property interests ([10], [85]).

Issues

1. Did the trial judge misconceive the justiciable issue by treating the case as a binary choice between granting Ms Voight’s claim or dismissing it?
2. Was the $300,000 interim order valid or capable of later “re-characterisation”?
3. Should any property adjustment have been made, and if so, how much?

📜 Law

Key statutory provisions:

• Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)
• s 90SM(1)–(5) – Property adjustment in de facto cases
• s 90SM(2) – “Just and equitable” threshold
• Pt VIIIAB – Property and financial matters for de facto relationships
• Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth), s 36(5) – Power to vary or discharge invalid orders
• Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth), ss 6 & 9 – Costs certificates

Key authorities:

• Stanford v Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108 – Two-step “just and equitable” test ([18]–[21]).
• Harris v Caladine (1991) 172 CLR 84 – Limits on judicial power and consent orders ([35]).
• Strahan & Strahan (Interim Property Orders) (2011) FLC 93-466 – Characterisation of interim payments ([34]–[38]).
• Marchant & Marchant (2012) FLC 93-520 – Limits of retrospective re-classification ([43]).
• U v U (2002) 211 CLR 238 – Court’s discretion not confined to parties’ proposals ([25]).

🔍 Application of Law to Facts

1️⃣ Misconceived “All or Nothing” Reasoning

The Full Court found the primary judge conflated the two enquiries mandated by Stanford:

• Whether it was just and equitable to make any order at all; and
• What kind of order should be made ([18]–[21]).

Instead of assessing a range of possible just outcomes, the trial judge framed the decision as a stark choice between granting the appellant’s $3 million claim or giving her nothing ([22]–[23]).

“His Honour wrongly conceptualised the decision as being a choice between only two alternatives... and failed to consider whether a more modest adjustment outcome... would be just and equitable.” — [23]

This was a fundamental error of law because the Family Law Act requires consideration of all the circumstances — not just the parties’ competing proposals ([25]).

2️⃣ Invalid Interim Payment Order

The earlier consent order for $300,000 was not validly made because it failed to identify any head of power — whether property, maintenance, or injunction ([34]–[37]).

The Full Court held that consent cannot confer jurisdiction the statute does not permit:

“The Court must operate within the limit of its power, which cannot be expanded by the parties’ consent.” — [35]; citing Harris v Caladine.

Furthermore, the trial judge’s later “re-characterisation” of the payment as a “gift” or “sunk costs” was speculative and not open on the evidence ([53]):

“It was just idle conjecture that the payment could have been one of two incompatible things... The payment could not possibly have been a ‘gift’ when it was paid under the compulsion of a Court order.” — [53]

3️⃣ Re-Exercise of Discretion

Rather than remitting, the Full Court re-exercised discretion under Pt VIIIAB ([57]–[58]).

Key findings:

• Relationship duration: 7 years; both worked the farm ([66]).
• Contributions: respondent’s capital dominated, but appellant contributed unpaid and underpaid labour ([70]–[73]).
• Adjustment: appellant’s contributions warranted 3% of net assets ($565,890), less $268,894 already received, totalling $131,113 payable to her ([74]–[80]).

“The appellant’s entitlement should instead be measured at three per cent.” — [74]

“Given the appellant retains property worth $165,883, she is due to be paid another $131,113.” — [80]

🧠 Judgment and Reasoning

The Full Court held:

• The primary judge erred in law by limiting the decision to two extremes ([22]–[23]).
• The $300,000 order was invalid, as it cited no statutory source ([34]–[37]).
• The appellant’s work and domestic contributions warranted modest recognition ([70]–[74]).
• The just and equitable outcome required an order for $131,113 to the appellant ([81]).

Both parties received costs certificates under the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 ([86]).

📚 Precedents and Citations

• Stanford v Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108 – separation of steps in “just and equitable” analysis ([18]–[21]).
• U v U (2002) 211 CLR 238 – discretion not confined to litigants’ proposals ([25]).
• Strahan & Strahan (2011) and Marchant & Marchant (2012) – validity and treatment of interim orders ([34]–[44]).
• Harris v Caladine (1991) – limits on consent jurisdiction ([35]).
• Waters v Jurek (1995) – monetary adjustments acceptable alternative to percentage orders ([78]).

💬 Take-Home Lesson

Family law isn’t a poker game.

A judge cannot simply “fold” because one party overplays their hand. Even if a proposed outcome is excessive, the Court must still assess whether some adjustment is fair, given the contributions made.

This case reinforces that justice and equity require flexibility, nuance, and independence from the parties’ pleadings.

For lawyers, Voight & Zunino is a cautionary tale: always ensure interim orders have a clear head of power — and that “just and equitable” doesn’t mean “all or nothing.”