High Conflict, Split Decisions: When Shared Parenting Meets Parental Chaos — Court Upholds ‘Dual Responsibility’ Orders

In Van Wyk & Van Wyk [2025] FedCFamC1A 209, the Federal Circuit and Family Court (Division 1) grappled with one of family law’s hardest dilemmas — how to protect children from the corrosive effects of chronic parental conflict while respecting the importance of both parents in their lives. The father’s appeal challenged final parenting orders that allocated the mother sole parental responsibility for most decisions, while granting him limited authority over the younger child’s psychological and educational care. Deputy Chief Justice McClelland dismissed the appeal, reaffirming that judicial discretion will rarely be disturbed where the trial judge has reasonably balanced risk, evidence, and the paramountcy of the child’s best interests.

📜 Facts and Issues

Facts

• The parents, separated since 2018, share two children (aged 14 and 11).
• Both children have ADHD and complex emotional needs.
• The family dynamic was described by the family report writer as the most severe conflict she had seen in 20 years.
• Despite mutual allegations of family violence, both children wished to maintain a week-about shared care arrangement.
• The trial judge gave the mother sole parental responsibility for most long-term decisions but allowed the father decision-making power for the younger child’s schooling and therapy — areas he had managed effectively.

Issues

1. Whether the trial judge erred by assigning the mother sole parental responsibility despite her alleged non-compliance and instability.
2. Whether the judge failed to properly consider risks posed by the mother and her partner.
3. Whether allocating split parental responsibilities was inconsistent or illogical.
4. Whether the trial judge gave excessive weight to expert and ICL evidence.

⚖️ Law

The Court reiterated established appellate principles from House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499, requiring an appellant to demonstrate error of law, misapplication of principle, or unreasonableness.

Under Part VII of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), particularly ss 60CA and 60CC, the best interests of the child remain paramount.

The Court also referred to:

• Gronow v Gronow (1979) 144 CLR 513 — appellate restraint on weight of evidence;
• Goode & Goode (2006) FLC 93-286 — interim vs final decision-making;
• Robinson Helicopter Co v McDermott (2016) 331 ALR 550 — factual findings can only be overturned if “glaringly improbable.”

🔍 Application

The Full Court found that:

• The primary judge had considered all relevant evidence, including the medico-legal report and psychological assessments.
• The father’s claim that the mother’s psychiatric issues and prior non-compliance warranted removing her responsibility was unsupported by the expert evidence (¶43–44).
• The judge’s reliance on the family report writer’s opinion — that conflict, not parental capacity, was the greatest risk — was justified (¶52–54).
• The father’s own behaviour (rigidity, undermining professionals, denigrating the mother before the children) materially contributed to the conflict (¶55–58).
• Allocating dual responsibilities was not inconsistent; rather, it pragmatically recognised the father’s strength in managing the younger child’s therapies while minimising the risk of renewed disputes (¶82–86).

Thus, the appeal was dismissed — the orders balanced the competing harms of parental conflict and instability.

💡 Analysis of the Judgment

Justice McClelland reaffirmed judicial deference to trial-level discretion. The judgment underscores that where parental conflict itself constitutes the primary harm, the Court’s goal is not to reward the “better” parent, but to reduce exposure to chaos.

The father’s case faltered because:

• His alleged “errors” were disagreements over weight, not principle;
• His own conduct mirrored the conflict he blamed on the mother;
• The trial judge had logically compartmentalised decision-making to limit friction — an approach consistent with modern child-focused jurisprudence (Pantoja & Pantoja [2025], Arendse & Pilkvist [2025]).

The appellate court emphasised (¶59, ¶86) that stability for the children outweighed parental equality, and that the trial judge’s nuanced “split responsibility” model was consistent with the evidence and the statutory framework.

🧭 Take-Home Lesson

“Intractable conflict makes no parent ‘win’ — it merely shifts the lines of responsibility to protect the children.”

• Courts will not revisit factual disputes absent clear error.
• Parental responsibility may now be divided functionally, not shared in principle — a model that privileges stability and expertise over ideology.
• Demonstrating insight and flexibility is often more persuasive than asserting rights to authority.