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Father Opposes Final Parenting Orders & Injunction

Hedlund & Hedlund [2021] FedCFamC1A 84 (15 December 2021)

The primary judge made orders providing for the mother solely to exercise parental responsibility for the children.  Orders that the children will spend no time with the father are buttressed by injunctions that prevent him from approaching or contacting the children or the mother, subject to the mother providing her consent otherwise in writing. 

The appellant father asks that the parenting orders be set aside and that the proceedings be remitted for rehearing.  The Court, in adjudicating this dispute, assessed whether the injunction under s 68B of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) is affected by error of law.  

Facts:

Mr Hedlund (“the father”) and Ms Hedlund (“the mother”) commenced living together in April 2007 and married in November 2008.  They have two children.  Their oldest child, X, was born in 2011 and their youngest, Y, in 2013.  The parties separated in April 2017. 

Y has been diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder, but with lower needs and without behavioural disorders.  X has exhibited major behavioural problems in the care of the mother.  X has assaulted the mother and has repeatedly absconded from her under circumstances that place him in danger.  Each of the parties asserted at trial that the other had been the perpetrator of family violence upon the other.  The father asserted that the mother suffers from mental health issues that compromise her capacity as a parent.

Orders were made by a judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (as the Court was then known) on 14 September 2020 providing for the mother solely to exercise parental responsibility for the children, for the children to live with her and for the father to spend no time with the children, that the children will spend no time with the father are buttressed by injunctions that prevent him, in general terms, from approaching or contacting the children or the mother, subject to the mother providing her consent otherwise in writing. 

By Further Amended Notice of Appeal filed 30 June 2021 the appellant father asks that these parenting orders be set aside and that the proceedings be remitted for rehearing.  The property orders which provided for a 75/25 split of the property and superannuation interests of the parties in favour of the mother are not challenged by the father unless the parenting proceedings are remitted for rehearing, in which circumstance the father seeks that the property proceedings also be remitted.  By Amended Notice of Cross-Appeal filed 9 July 2021, the respondent mother seeks that orders compelling the sale of a property to satisfy the judgment payment to the father be set aside and, in the re-exercise of discretion, that alternate orders be made providing for the payment to be made to the father. 

The orders are such that the father will receive a cash payment of about $5,000.  They mandate the sale of an investment property held in the name of the mother in order to make this payment.  It is the sale of the investment property as the primary mechanism of payment that the mother seeks to avoid by her cross-appeal. The father has applied for further evidence to be received on the appeal, with the mother filing evidence responsive to such.  

The central aspects of the father’s evidence are that it shows that the elder child has previously run away and is presently in the care of the State welfare authority as a result of the escalation of his behaviour following the making of the orders.

Issue:

I. Whether or not the primary judge took into account irrelevant considerations

II. Whether or not the primary judge made a mistake as to the facts.

III. Whether or not the injunction under s 68B of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) is affected by error of law.

IV. Whether or not the effect of the orders is manifestly unjust or unreasonable

Applicable law:

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 140 - provides that without limiting the matters that the court may take into account in deciding whether it is so satisfied, it is to take into account:
 
(a)  the nature of the cause of action or defence; 
(b)  the nature of the subject-matter of the proceeding; and,
(c)  the gravity of the matters alleged.
 
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 60CC - relied upon in asserting that the primary judge took irrelevant matters into account by considering the assertions of violence perpetrated by the father and his encouragement of X to abscond from the mother and act violently towards her. 
 
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) ss 263536 - pursuant to which in the absence of submissions as to the merits or significance of the contravention proceedings, in the context of the powers granted the court on hearing an appeal, there is good reason to affirm the dismissal. 
 
Anderson v Hassett [2007] NSWSC 1310 - Brereton J, in considering the obligations imposed by orders, observed that it is permissible to resort to its context, for example any reasons for judgment ... and in particular the other orders made at the same time.
 
Bennett v Bennett (2001) FLC 93-088[2001] FamCA 462 - Ellis, Finn and Guest JJ drew a distinction between the power to grant a s 68B injunction and the power to make a parenting order. 
 
Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571[2013] HCA 37 - pointed at most to a circumstance which, taken with other circumstances, might be indicative of error in the second category [“in the totality of the circumstances was unreasonable or plainly unjust”. 
 
CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172 at 246; [1998] HCA 67 - set out the principles regarding admitting further evidence on appeal. 
 
EJK v TSL (2006) FLC 93-287[2006] FamCA 730 - Holden, Coleman and Boland JJ observed that under the present legislation, in contrast to the Act prior to the introduction of the Family Law Reform Act 1995 (Cth) (“the Reform Act”), not all orders made under Part VII are subject to the “best interests” test, for example, the power to make orders in respect of child maintenance and/or injunctions concerning a child.
 
Flanagan and Handcock (2001) FLC 93-074[2000] FamCA 150 - Kay and Holden JJ identified that the primary judge’s indication that the paramountcy principle applied to s 68B was incorrect, although the issue was not expressly subject to a ground of appeal in the case.
 
Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118[2003] HCA 22 - described that the nature of an appeal by rehearing obliges the court to “conduct a real review of the trial” and that in doing so “[a]ppellate courts are not excused from the task of ‘weighing conflicting evidence and drawing [their] own inferences and conclusions’”.
 
Gerlach v Clifton Bricks Pty Ltd (2002) 209 CLR 478[2002] HCA 22 - the High Court dealt with the role of an appeal court in dealing with interlocutory orders made in the context of the trial the subject of appeal.
 
Lee v Lee (2019) 266 CLR 129[2019] HCA 28 - provides that where the advantage enjoyed by the primary judge relied upon “impressions about the credibility and reliability of witnesses”, which are likely to have been affected by seeing or hearing the witnesses give evidence, then an appeal court will not interfere with the factual conclusion unless the findings are “glaringly improbable” or “contrary to compelling inferences”. 
 
McClintock & Levier (2009) FLC 93-401[2009] FamCAFC 62 - observed that the purpose of contravention proceedings is to cause compliance with orders affecting children.  
 
Rice and Asplund (1979) FLC 90-725[1978] FamCA 84 - the capacity to make applications pursuant to the principles herein means that there is an appropriate mechanism for the amendment of the injunctions in the event that the circumstances warrant it, whether or not such a mechanism is built into the orders.
 
Royal Guardian Mortgage Management Pty Ltd v Nguyen and Anor (2016) 332 ALR 128; [2016] NSWCA 88 - provides that challenges to a judgment based on bias or other procedural fairness issues are to be dealt with prior to other grounds as they are matters that go to the validity of the trial. 
 
Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531[1979] HCA 9 - provided that the appellate court is obliged to “give respect and weight to the conclusion of the trial judge but, once having reached its own conclusion, will not shrink from giving effect to it”.
 
Wende v Horwath (NSW) Pty Ltd (2014) 86 NSWLR 674[2014] NSWCA 170 - provided that in order to construe an order, a court should:
(a) identify the statutory power under which the order was made (to avoid a construction leading to invalidity);
(b) address the language used, to identify a plain meaning if one is available;
(c) if latent ambiguity is alleged, refer to the reasons for judgment and the application to which the order responded;
(d) in the event of ambiguity (or other uncertainty), not resolved by reference to the reasons for judgment and the terms of the application, look to the submissions and (possibly) other material before the judicial officer on the application.

Analysis:

I. Whether or not the primary judge took into account irrelevant considerations

II. Whether or not the primary judge made a mistake as to the facts.

III. Whether or not the injunction under s 68B of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) is affected by error of law.

IV. Whether or not the effect of the orders is manifestly unjust or unreasonable

What preceded the calling of Dr L was the father’s tender in the proceedings of three earlier reports prepared by Dr L which he had annexed to his affidavit filed 24 July 2019.  While the father may not have anticipated the calling of Dr L until the hearing commenced, the evidence and relevance of Dr L was a live matter at the proceedings at the instigation of the father.  The father was afforded notice within the proceedings of the opportunity to cross-examine Dr L. Dr L did not give evidence until the second day of the trial.  This ameliorated the effect of the granting of permission to call Dr L as a witness at the commencement of the hearing, as it provided some opportunity to the father to prepare any cross-examination.

The father argued that both the injunctions and the PPO are beyond power, falling outside s 68B of the Act by virtue of their indefinite length, extending them into the children’s adulthood, and by the lack of a mechanism for discharge.   Despite the description in the notes, the PPO does not reflect the various injunctions imposed at Orders 9–10 as it incorporates additional restraints upon the father.  Hence, whatever the PPO might be, it does not meet the description contained in the notations, and is not a document evidencing the terms of the injunctions. 

In terms of specific complaint about Dr L, the father, in his Summary of Argument, submitted that as opinion evidence it was required that there be adequate disclosure of how Dr L had reached various conclusions.  It was asserted that there was a lack of clarity that would bear upon the admissibility of Dr L’s evidence.  The weight assigned to a consideration arising out of the evidence is not a recognised basis for appeal.  Even if these challenges, questioning how Dr L came to various conclusions, are taken as going to the relevance of Dr L’s evidence rather than the weight attributed to it, they are not ultimately matters that render the evidence irrelevant.

Conclusion:

The Court dismissed the appellant’s Application to Adduce Further Evidence filed 16 June 2021.  The document entitled “Final Personal Protection Order” which is annexed to and referred to in Notation A of the orders made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 14 September 2020 is set aside ab initio.  An error of law in relation to the Personal Protection Order was established.  Order 24 of the orders of 14 September 2020 is discharged.  The balance of the appeal contained in the Further Amended Notice of Appeal filed 30 June 2021 is dismissed.  The cross-appellant’s cross-appeal contained in the Amended Notice of Cross-Appeal filed 9 July 2021 is allowed.  Orders 17, 18 and 19 of the orders of 14 September 2020 are discharged. 

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