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Wife Opposes Enforcement of Financial Agreement
Beckstead & Beckstead [2021] FedCFamC2F 136 (6 October 2021)
The parties entered into a financial agreement stating that if both parties acquire an asset jointly then both parties have agreed to either liquidate the asset or offer each other the option to buy out the other party. However, the wife seeks a declaration that such agreement is not binding as she did not receive requisite legal advice. The husband seeks a declaration that the agreement is a binding financial agreement. The Court, in ruling on whether or not the agreement is binding, assessed whether it would be unjust and inequitable if the agreement were not declared binding.
Facts:
The parties met in June 2000, shortly following the establishment of F Pty Ltd, where the husband is the sole director of. The wife purchased the Suburb I property in approximately December 2000.
The parties commenced cohabitation in mid-2001 and were married in 2006. The parties separated in May 2017 and there were no children of the marriage. Both parties have adult children from their previous marriage. The parties divorced in January 2019.
On 17 July 2019, the husband filed an initiating application seeking a declaration that the financial agreement the parties entered into on 24 June 2006 is a binding financial agreement (“BFA”).
The wife seeks a declaration that the financial agreement is not binding. The husband unsuccessfully sought to join Ms B, the wife’s former lawyer, to the proceedings prior to the preliminary hearing to determine whether or not the financial agreement should be declared binding or not. On 26 June 2002 with the husband’s business partner, Ms B, as the witness, the parties signed a cohabitation agreement, for the purpose of agreeing to not make a claim against the other party’s pre-existing assets, which includes the husband’s business, if they were to separate.
The agreement states that all income derived by either party shall remain the income of the person who earns the income and that both parties as agreed shall pay day to day living expenses incurred collectively by the parties.
In the event both parties acquire an asset jointly then both parties have agreed to either liquidate the asset or offer each other the option to buy out the other party. The BFA provides for each of the parties to retain property they owned individually prior to the marriage. The wife seeks to set aside the agreement asserting that she did not receive the requisite independent legal advice, that the agreement contains several errors, and that it is void. She claims that it should be set aside due to fraud and unconscionable conduct by the husband.
The husband argues that the financial agreement is binding. He says they both received independent legal advice as evidenced by the certificates. The BFA is not vague and uncertain and the errors can be rectified. He further argues that in the event the Court is satisfied that s 90G(1)(b) has not been complied with, the Court should find that it would be unjust and inequitable if the agreement were not binding and relies on s 90G(1A). He argues that both parties acted consistently with the terms of the BFA.
Issues:
I. Whether or not the wife received the requisite legal advice.
II. Whether or not the financial agreement signed by the husband and the wife on or about 24 June 2006 is binding.
Applicable law:
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 131
Analysis:
The evidence does not support the wife’s contention that the dynamic of the relationship between the husband and wife was such that she was meek and mild and the husband was a dominant, sophisticated businessman. Ms Fisken says the husband is familiar with family law processes as a result of his separation from his former wife and his business background. In this regard and in her closing submissions, Counsel properly conceded that the evidence did not support a case for unconscionability.
Ms Fisken indicated that whilst it is Ms B’s signature on the certificate of independent legal advice on behalf of the wife, the evidence suggests that the husband had the initial meeting with Ms B and that his own evidence suggests he believed she was acting on his behalf. However, the fact that the husband paid Ms B’s bill, arranged the first appointment and took the wife to the second appointment, in and of itself, does not raise the concern about Ms B not being independent. The covering letter is addressed to both the husband and wife and refers to work completed with respect to a binding financial agreement, wills and power of attorney. Ms B obtained instructions for the wills during the initial appointment with both parties present.
At times Ms B was mindful of the wife being her client but other times was treating them as joint clients at best. A solicitor cannot rely on client perceptions and assume that the client is in a position to be aware of the existence or the prospect of conflict. The case is not the situation where the clients have given informed consent for the solicitor to act for both of them in spite of this conflict.
Acting for both parties with respect to their wills and power of attorney, whilst at the same time acting for one of them with respect to the BFA is highly problematic because with respect to something like a financial agreement the parties’ interests differ.
Conclusion:
The Court is satisfied that the wife did not receive independent legal advice. The Court declared the financial agreement signed by the husband and the wife on or about 24 June 2006 not binding within the meaning of s 90G of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). The proceeding is adjourned for Directions Hearing on 16 November 2021 at 9.45AM.