When a “No Relationship” Position Backfires: Change of Residence Upheld After Mother Could Not Support Father–Child Relationship

In Beridze & Beridze [2026] FedCFamC1A 82, Riethmuller J dismissed a mother’s appeal from parenting orders changing the child’s residence from the mother to the father. The case is a strong appellate warning about binary parenting litigation: where a primary carer insists the other parent should have no relationship with the child, but the alleged risks are not proved, the Court may have to confront whether the child can safely remain with the parent who is obstructing the relationship. The appeal failed because the primary judge’s findings about enmeshment, gatekeeping, failed family therapy, poor school attendance, and unfounded fear of the father were open on the evidence.

🧩 Facts and Issues

Facts:

The parties separated in 2018 and had one child, X, who was 13 by the time of the appeal. After separation, the father initially spent limited time with the child, but the mother progressively restricted that time. Overnight time stopped in 2019 after allegations the primary judge later found to be groundless. Over time, the father’s time became irregular, then ceased entirely by April 2023.

The primary judge found the mother had controlled the father’s time by sending monthly calendars, refusing variations, stopping time, and limiting telephone contact. There were also concerns about the child’s poor school attendance, emotional immaturity, anxiety, and an enmeshed/codependent relationship with the mother. The mother relied heavily on a kinesiologist and other professionals whose views aligned with her own, while rejecting or resisting professionals who challenged her position.

The Family Report writer observed that, when separated from the mother, the child was warm and affectionate towards the father, which was inconsistent with the child’s stated fear of him. The primary judge rejected the claim that the father posed risk and found the child’s fear of him had no factual foundation.

Issues:

1. Did the primary judge wrongly apply the old “meaningful relationship” test under the previous version of s 60CC?
2. Was the Court allowed to consider the quality and benefit of the child’s relationship with the father?
3. Did the primary judge err by failing to consider alternative orders that left the child living with the mother but spending time with the father?
4. Were the findings that the mother had thwarted the father–child relationship and would continue doing so open on the evidence?
5. Was the change of residence to the father within the proper discretionary range?

⚖️ Applicable Law – Legislation, Regulations, Rules

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

• s 60CC(2)(e) — the benefit to the child of being able to have a relationship with the child’s parents and other significant people, where safe to do so.
• s 60CC(2)(f) — any other matter relevant to the child’s particular circumstances.

The case turned heavily on how the amended s 60CC should be applied after the removal of the old “meaningful relationship” language. The appeal court held that even though the word “meaningful” is no longer in the statutory text, the Court is still entitled to consider the nature, quality and benefit of the relationship.

📌 Precedents Relied On

• House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 — appellate restraint in discretionary decisions.
• U v U (2002) 211 CLR 238 — the Court is not required to conduct a roving inquiry outside the issues and proposals advanced by the parties.
• Arrighetti & Qodirova [2026] FedCFamC1A 1 — warning against presenting parenting/risk cases as binary where alternative outcomes should be reality-tested.

🧠 Analysis

Issue

Did the primary judge make appealable error by changing the child’s residence from the mother to the father, where the mother said the child should remain with her and have no relationship with the father, but the Court found the alleged risk was not established and the mother could not support the father–child relationship?

Rule

Parenting appeals from discretionary decisions are governed by House v The King principles. It is not enough that another judge may have reached a different outcome. The appellant must show error of principle, reliance on irrelevant matters, failure to consider material matters, factual findings not open on the evidence, or an outcome that is plainly unreasonable.

Under s 60CC(2)(e), the Court must consider the benefit to the child of being able to have a relationship with each parent where safe. That necessarily permits assessment of the quality, nature and likely benefit of that relationship. The Court is not restricted to asking whether the child can have any minimal or token relationship.

Application

1. The “meaningful relationship” argument failed

The mother argued the primary judge wrongly imported the old statutory concept of a “meaningful relationship” into the amended s 60CC. Riethmuller J rejected that argument. The primary judge had correctly identified the current version of the legislation. The mere use of the word “meaningful” in ordinary language did not mean the old statute had been applied.

The appeal court made an important clarification: the phrase “a relationship” in s 60CC(2)(e) does not require the Court to ignore the quality of that relationship. The Court must assess the benefit of the relationship, and that cannot be done without considering whether the relationship is close, distant, damaged, repairable, meaningful, superficial, or beneficial.

2. The Court was entitled to consider how the relationship could be restored

The mother argued the primary judge approached the case as though the goal was to create a relationship with the father at all costs. Riethmuller J rejected that too.

The primary judge first found the father did not pose an unacceptable risk. Once that finding was made, the Court had to consider whether the child would benefit from a restored relationship with him and how that might realistically occur. That was not a departure from the statutory task; it was part of weighing the child’s best interests.

The primary judge also weighed the detriments of changing residence. The appeal court held that this was a classic discretionary balancing exercise: short-term distress from a change of residence had to be weighed against the long-term harm of the child losing her father entirely.

3. The mother ran the trial as a binary case

A crucial reason the appeal failed was that the mother did not put realistic alternative orders at trial. Her case was that the child should live with her and have no relationship with the father. She did not propose fallback orders for the child to remain with her but spend structured or therapeutic time with the father if her risk allegations failed.

Riethmuller J relied on the principle that, although a parenting judge can make orders different from those sought, the Court is not required to conduct a roving inquiry into every hypothetical arrangement. The parties were represented, the ICL did not propose the alternative now suggested, and the findings strongly undermined the mother’s ability to facilitate any relationship.

This is one of the most practical lessons from the case: if a parent runs “no time” and loses on risk, they may be left with no safe fallback position.

4. Findings of obstruction and enmeshment were open

The mother challenged the finding that she had deliberately thwarted the father’s relationship with the child. That challenge failed. The evidence included:

• the mother dictating the father’s time through calendars;
• refusing variations or additional time;
• ceasing overnight time without proper basis;
• stopping time altogether in April 2023;
• stopping phone calls for months;
• failing to support family therapy;
• relying on professionals aligned with her position; and
• fostering the child’s belief that the father was someone to fear.

The appeal court held that the father’s failure to start proceedings earlier did not make the restrictions reasonable. A parent may tolerate restrictions in the hope things improve; that does not mean the restrictions were justified.

5. Family therapy evidence was damaging to the mother’s appeal

The mother had consented to family therapy, but the evidence showed she was not genuinely open to the process. One therapist reported that the mother was strongly opposed to therapy and appeared unlikely ever to be satisfied that the father had done enough for the child to spend time with him. Another therapist observed that the mother struggled to stay in the present, focused on past wrongs, and shut down attempts at repair.

The primary judge found the mother had done little more than pay lip service to therapy orders and had no capacity to promote the relationship. Riethmuller J held those findings were open on the evidence.

6. The child’s presentation supported the primary judge’s concerns

A particularly powerful part of the evidence was the child’s contrasting presentation. The Family Report writer observed that the child arrived with what sounded like a rehearsed list of complaints about the father, but when reassured she did not have to see him, she shifted and ultimately chose to see him. When she did, she ran to him and interacted positively.

The concern was that the child was not emotionally free to hold positive feelings about the father in the mother’s home. The Family Report writer described this as creating cognitive dissonance and psychological stress.

Conclusion

The appeal was dismissed. Riethmuller J held that the primary judge did not wrongly apply the old “meaningful relationship” test, did not err by failing to consider unargued alternative orders, and did not make findings about the mother’s obstruction that were demonstrably wrong or glaringly improbable. The mother was ordered to pay the father’s appeal costs fixed at $19,600.

🧠 Take-Home Lesson

This decision is a strong warning to primary carers in high-conflict parenting cases: if alleged risk is not proved, the Court will then examine whether that parent can genuinely support the child’s relationship with the other parent. Where the evidence shows enmeshment, gatekeeping, reliance on aligned professionals, failed therapy, and a child who is not free to enjoy the other parent, a change of residence may be upheld even after a long period of estrangement.

It also clarifies that under the amended s 60CC, courts can still consider the quality of a parent–child relationship. The word “meaningful” may have disappeared from the statute, but the Court is not required to treat all relationships as equal regardless of their depth, benefit, or prospects of repair.