Violence Counts in Property Cases: Wife Awarded 53% After 30-Year Marriage and “Serious Grade” Family Violence Findings

In Tedesco & Tedesco (No 2) [2026] FedCFamC2F 82 (Champion J, 2 February 2026), the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) determined a contested s 79 property settlement after a long (30-year) marriage. Key battlegrounds included (1) a sharp dispute over single expert valuation of the former matrimonial home, (2) allegations of non-disclosure and an alleged “financial resource” connected to the husband’s deceased brother’s estate, and (3) whether family violence materially affected the wife’s contributions. The Court accepted the later single expert valuation, rejected the “estate” non-disclosure case, found sustained family violence that made the wife’s contributions more onerous, and ultimately ordered a 53%/47% division in the wife’s favour, plus equalisation of superannuation. ([3]–[4], [126]–[142], [178]–[218])

🧩 Facts and Issues

Facts: The parties married in 1994 and separated in early 2024 after a 30-year marriage with three adult children. Their principal asset was the unencumbered former matrimonial home at B Street, Suburb C. A major dispute arose because an earlier single expert had valued the property at $1.265m (and was later discharged), whereas the replacement single expert valued it at $1.66m, a difference of about $400k. ([15]–[18], [23], [85]–[90])

The wife alleged the husband subjected her to sustained, recurrent family violence, and also alleged he failed to disclose documents and/or concealed benefits relating to his deceased brother’s estate, including an asserted expectancy/financial resource. The husband alleged, among other things, that the wife had “siphoned” about $50k through transfers to their adult son, and raised wastage concerns. ([19]–[21], [118]–[142], [178]–[214], [235]–[244])

Issues (practically):

1. Valuation: Should the Court accept the current single expert valuation of the home? ([85]–[95])
2. Disclosure / estate: Were estate documents in the husband’s “possession or control” such that non-disclosure was proved, and was any estate-related benefit a property item or “financial resource”? ([126]–[142], [229]–[234])
3. Contributions: Did family violence affect the wife’s ability to contribute under s 79(4)(ca) and, if so, how? ([178]–[218])
4. Future factors / wastage: Were “siphoning” and “fire sale” allegations made out, and did s 79(5) warrant any adjustment? ([235]–[279])
5. Outcome / mechanics: What orders best achieve a just and equitable result—cash adjustment with default sale, super split, and chattels arrangements? ([8]–[12], [284]–[292])

⚖️ Applicable Law – Legislation, Regulations, Rules

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

• s 79 (alteration of property interests; structured approach including identifying pool, contributions, s 79(5) factors, and final “just and equitable” outcome). ([28], [148])
• s 79(4)(ca) (effect of family violence on contributions). ([178], [212]–[218])
• s 79(5) (current and future circumstances, including financial resources, material wastage, and “any other factor”). ([220]–[279])
• s 81 (finality—referenced in the orders note). (Orders note)

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)

• ss 63, 136, 164 (hearsay/unavailability; limiting use of evidence; corroboration not required). ([89], [187])

Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic)

• s 9B (registration not conclusive evidence of title—raised in relation to a vehicle ownership dispute). ([112]–[115])

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)

• rr 6.01, 6.03 (full and frank disclosure; “possession or control”). ([122])
• r 7.08 (raised re adversarial witness point on expert evidence). ([89])
• r 8.02 (Notice to Admit consequences). ([109])

📌 Precedents Relied On

Some of the key authorities the Court applied or drew from include:

• Stanford v Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108 (threshold “just and equitable” requirement). ([148])
• Cole & Rudzik [2024] FedCFamC1A 103 (expert evidence influential only if not discounted for valid reasons). ([95])
• Commonwealth v Milledge (1953) 90 CLR 157; In the Marriage of Lenehan (1987) 11 Fam LR 615 (rejecting “split the difference” averaging without principle). ([93]–[94])
• Wei & Xia (No 5) [2023] FedCFamC1F 679; Mayhew & Fairweather (2022) 64 Fam LR 633 (non-disclosure consequences; inferences must be founded on established facts). ([123]–[124])
• Martell & Martell (2023) 66 Fam LR 650; Benson & Drury [2020] FamCAFC 303; Baranski v Baranski [2012] FamCAFC 18 (family violence in property cases—focus on effect on contributions; can infer impacts; post-separation violence can be relevant). ([212]–[214])
• Shinohara & Shinohara [2025] FedCFamC1A 126; Stubbs & Stubbs (No 3) [2025] FedCFamC1F 534 (treatment of part-property settlements and legal fees under s 79(5), avoiding deprecated add-backs). ([245]–[255])
• Trask v Westlake [2015] FamCAFC 160 (default sale structure preserving percentage division). ([10], [289])
• Khatri & Khatri [2024] FedCFamC1A 152 (“no perfect victim” concept in family violence context). ([209]–[210])

🧠 Analysis

Issue

How should the Court determine a just and equitable property outcome where:

• the main asset valuation is fiercely disputed,
• one party alleges hidden estate benefits / disclosure breaches, and
• serious family violence is alleged to have made contributions more arduous? ([3]–[5], [85]–[95], [118]–[142], [178]–[218])

Rule

• The Court applies the structured s 79 approach: identify property interests/liabilities, assess contributions (s 79(4) including s 79(4)(ca) family violence effects), consider s 79(5) current/future factors (including financial resources and wastage), then stand back to ensure the result is just and equitable. ([28], [148], [280]–[281])
• Expert valuation evidence is accepted unless there is a valid reason to discount it; the Court should not adopt arbitrary mid-points or averaging without principle. ([90]–[95])
• Disclosure duties extend to documents in a party’s possession or control; non-disclosure findings and inferences must be based on established facts, and the duty does not require a party to “garner” documents by any means. ([122]–[124], [141]–[142])
• In property matters, family violence is relevant only for its effect on contributions and (separately) on current/future circumstances—corroboration isn’t mandatory, and the Court can infer impacts from lay evidence where appropriate. ([187], [209]–[214])

Application

1) Valuation: the $1.66m figure was accepted

The Court accepted the replacement single expert’s valuation of $1,660,000 because his qualifications, methodology, comparator selection, and reliance on more recent market data were not materially impeached. The earlier valuer’s report was only admitted for a limited cross-examination purpose and could not be used as standalone opinion evidence in the absence of cross-examination and “availability” foundations. The Court rejected proposals to “split the difference” or pick a number $50k–$100k above the earlier valuation as lacking principle. ([85]–[95])

2) Estate disclosure / “financial resource”: not proved, and not relevant in any event

Although the brother’s estate raised “unanswered questions” about disbursements, the husband was not an executor and not a beneficiary, and the wife did not prove the estate documents were in his possession/control for disclosure purposes. The Court also held the alleged expectancy did not reach the level of entitlement/control/relative certainty required for a financial resource. Accordingly, no amount was added to the pool for the estate. ([126]–[142], [229]–[234])

3) Contributions: family violence materially affected the wife’s contributions

The Court made strong findings that the husband subjected the wife to recurrent, sustained family violence of a serious grade, rejecting the husband’s denials as unreliable and pointing to video and other evidence that undermined his credibility. The Court emphasised the focus is the effect of violence on contributions, inferred that the wife’s contributions were more onerous, and gave this factor significant weight—leading to a contributions assessment of 53%/47% in the wife’s favour. ([178]–[218])

4) Wastage and other s 79(5) factors: largely cancelled out overall

• The husband’s claim that the wife “siphoned” ~$50k to the adult son was not proved; the wife’s explanation (cash reimbursements connected to renovation payments, occasional gifts) was accepted and no Jones v Dunkel inference was drawn for not calling the son. ([235]–[240])
• The husband’s “fire sale” of a vehicle was treated as some support for wastage, but the extent was indeterminate without valuation evidence. ([241]–[244])
• A range of other s 79(5) matters were identified on both sides (business earning capacity, sole occupation of the home, share sale proceeds, legal fees funding, a personal loan, etc), but the Court ultimately concluded these factors were of approximately equal weight and did not warrant any additional s 79(5) adjustment. ([263]–[279])

Conclusion

The Court ordered:

• Net assets divided 53%/47% in the wife’s favour (net assets found $1,780,603). ([8]–[9], [281])
• A cash adjustment payment of $861,817 from husband to wife within 60 days, with a default sale mechanism and formula to preserve the percentage outcome if the home sells above/below valuation. ([9]–[10], [284]–[289])
• Superannuation equalised by a base amount split of $175,286 from the husband to the wife. ([11], [147])
• Chattels divided by a “pick about” process. ([290])

🧠 Take-Home Lesson

Even in a long marriage where breadwinner/homemaker roles might otherwise point to equality, serious, sustained family violence can tip contributions under s 79(4)(ca)—but estate “expectancies” and disclosure allegations will fail unless the applicant proves possession/control and the “financial resource” threshold of entitlement/control/relative certainty. ([137]–[142], [212]–[218], [229]–[234])