The s 114Q Problem: A Real Publication Complaint Failed Because the Application Asked the Court to Treat an Offence Pathway as Protective Relief

In Ackerman & Barsamian [2026] FedCFamC1A 169, the respondent alleged that the other party had published family law material online, including documents from the proceedings and identifying information. The alleged conduct was serious: a webinar, online modules said to include filed court documents, social media videos, and identifying material connected to the family law proceedings.

But the application failed because it was formally brought under s 114Q of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), which creates an indictable offence for communicating an identifying account of family law proceedings to the public. Offence proceedings under s 114Q cannot be commenced without the written consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions under s 114T. No such consent had been obtained.

The important lesson is this:

The alleged publication problem may have been real, and protective powers may have existed, but the application was procedurally misframed. The Court dealt with the application formally before it — not the better application that could have been brought.

🧩 Facts and Issues

Facts:

Ms Ackerman filed an Application in a Proceeding on 2 February 2026 seeking relief under s 114Q of the Family Law Act. The order she sought was expressed broadly, asking the Court to make orders or directions it considered appropriate in relation to her allegation of a breach of s 114Q.

Her complaint was that Mr Barsamian had allegedly published a webinar on the internet which showed documents from the family law proceedings, identified her by name, and provided other identifying information. Educational modules were advertised for purchase and were said to include the parties’ own filed documents. She also alleged that Mr Barsamian posted videos on social media in which he referred to her as having “plundered 40% of his estate”, and that additional videos on other platforms contained identifying material.

When the matter came before the primary judge on 3 June 2026, both parties were self-represented. The primary judge identified that because the application was brought under s 114Q, s 114T required written consent from the Director of Public Prosecutions before offence proceedings could be commenced. It was not controversial that Ms Ackerman had not sought or obtained that consent. Her application was dismissed.

On appeal, Ms Ackerman argued that the primary judge should have understood that she was not seeking prosecution or punishment. She said she was seeking protective orders: takedown, suppression, restraint against further publication, preservation of records, disclosure of publication and sale records, safety orders and communication restraints.

Justice Christie accepted that Ms Ackerman’s written material made plain that she was not seeking prosecution and that the power to restrain publication “plainly existed”. However, the appeal was summarily dismissed because Ms Ackerman had not amended the actual Application in a Proceeding. The primary judge was required to determine the application formally before the Court, and it would not have been procedurally fair to require an unrepresented respondent to answer a different application without proper notice.

Issues:

1. What was the alleged breach of s 114Q?
2. Why did the primary judge dismiss the application?
3. Was Ms Ackerman really seeking prosecution, or protective orders?
4. Did the Court have power to make protective publication orders?
5. Why did the appeal fail despite the appellate judge accepting that protective powers existed?
6. What should have been done differently?

⚖️ Applicable Law – Legislation, Regulations, Rules

Section 114Q — indictable offence for communicating identifying accounts of family law proceedings

Section 114Q provides that a person commits an indictable offence if they communicate to the public an account of proceedings under the Family Law Act and the account identifies a party, witness, associated person, or another person concerned in the matter. The maximum penalty is one year imprisonment. The section also provides that identifying material may include a picture, recording, physical description, name, address, employment details, relationship to another identified person, beliefs, or property associated with the person. Federal Register of Legislation

Section 114T — DPP consent required

Section 114T provides that proceedings for an offence against s 114Q(1) or s 114R(1) must not be commenced without the written consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions. Federal Register of Legislation

Part XIA — suppression and non-publication orders

Part XIA gives the Court power to make suppression or non-publication orders. Section 102PE allows a court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to prohibit or restrict publication or disclosure of identifying information or information relating to the proceedings. Section 102PF permits such orders where, among other things, they are necessary to protect the safety of any person. Section 102PH permits interim orders pending determination of the application. Federal Register of Legislation

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth)

The Court may summarily dismiss appeals with no reasonable prospects of success. In this case, the appeal was summarily dismissed.

📌 Precedents Relied On

This was a short appellate judgment and did not turn on a list of decided authorities. The key “authorities” were the statutory provisions:

• Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 114Q — offence for communicating identifying accounts of proceedings to the public.
• Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 114T — DPP consent required before offence proceedings can commence.
• Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), Part XIA — suppression and non-publication powers.
• Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth), ss 7 and 46 — summary dismissal of appeals with no reasonable prospects.

🧠 Analysis

Issue

Did the Court err by dismissing Ms Ackerman’s application when she alleged that Mr Barsamian had publicly published family law documents and identifying material, but she had not obtained DPP consent under s 114T?

Rule

The rule turns on the distinction between criminal offence enforcement and protective publication relief.

A s 114Q offence application is not simply a general takedown application. It is directed to an indictable offence: communicating to the public an account of family law proceedings that identifies parties or other protected persons. Federal Register of Legislation

Because it is an offence pathway, s 114T is mandatory. Proceedings for an offence against s 114Q cannot be commenced without written consent from the Director of Public Prosecutions. Federal Register of Legislation

By contrast, a party seeking urgent publication protection, takedown, restraint, suppression, non-publication, preservation or disclosure orders should generally frame the application under the Court’s protective powers, including Part XIA, rather than as an offence proceeding under s 114Q. Part XIA permits suppression and non-publication orders, including interim orders, and includes safety as one of the grounds for relief. Federal Register of Legislation

Application

1. What was the alleged breach?

The alleged breach was that Mr Barsamian had allegedly communicated identifying information about the family law proceedings to the public.

The alleged conduct had several parts:

1. A webinar published on the internet
2. Ms Ackerman alleged that Mr Barsamian published a webinar which showed documents from the family law proceedings. Those documents allegedly identified her by name and contained other identifying information.
3. Educational modules advertised for purchase
4. The educational modules were said to be available for purchase and allegedly included the parties’ own filed court documents.
5. Social media videos
6. Ms Ackerman alleged that Mr Barsamian had posted videos on social media in which he referred to her as having “plundered 40% of his estate”.
7. Additional videos containing identifying material
8. Further videos on other social media platforms were also alleged to contain identifying material connected with the proceedings.

Put simply, the alleged s 114Q breach was:

The public communication of an account of family law proceedings, including court material and identifying information about a party, through webinars, paid modules and social media videos.

That type of allegation, if proved and if not covered by an exception or court approval, falls within the territory s 114Q is aimed at: publication of identifying accounts of family law proceedings to the public. Federal Register of Legislation

2. Why did the primary judge dismiss the application?

The application was formally brought under s 114Q. The primary judge treated it as an application invoking the offence provision. Once the matter was framed that way, s 114T became the threshold problem.

The primary judge asked whether Ms Ackerman had approached the Director of Public Prosecutions for written consent. Ms Ackerman accepted she had not. The primary judge then said that without that consent, she could not proceed with the application.

That is why the application was dismissed: not because the alleged publication was necessarily acceptable, and not because the Court found there was no identifying publication, but because the application was procedurally defective as an offence pathway.

3. Ms Ackerman’s real objective was protective, not punitive

By the time the application was argued, Ms Ackerman was trying to say:

“I am not asking the Court to prosecute, convict, punish or sentence him. I am asking for protection.”

Her affidavit referred to interim protective orders, removal, restraint against further publication, preservation of records, disclosure of publication and sale records, and a proper referral pathway.

Her Case Outline expressly stated that the application was an interim protective application seeking urgent publication, removal, preservation, disclosure, safety and communication-restraint orders. It also expressly said:

“The present application is not an offence proceeding.”

Her submissions also identified two streams of protective relief:

1. a Part XIA publication stream, directed to suppression, non-publication, takedown, preservation, affidavit disclosure and controlled provision of material; and
2. a family violence, safety and communication-restraint stream, directed to threatening, fear-causing, intimidating or derogatory publication-connected conduct.

So the appellate judge accepted that she had, in substance, pivoted from offence enforcement to protective relief.

4. Why did the Court still fail to act on the protective complaint?

The appeal failed because Ms Ackerman never amended the actual Application in a Proceeding.

Justice Christie accepted that her written material made plain she was not seeking prosecution and that she was seeking “protection”. The judgment also accepted that the power to make orders restraining publication “plainly existed”.

But the problem was procedural:

The formal application before the primary judge still sought relief under s 114Q.

The Court held that the primary judge was not in error for dismissing the application that was formally before her.

That is the key distinction. The Court was not saying that protective orders were impossible. It was saying that the primary judge did not commit appealable error by refusing to convert an unamended s 114Q offence application into a different protective application.

5. Procedural fairness to the unrepresented respondent mattered

Both parties were self-represented. That mattered because if the Court had treated Ms Ackerman’s application as a broad protective Part XIA application, Mr Barsamian would have been required to answer a different case from the one formally filed.

Justice Christie held that although Ms Ackerman had pivoted from her original application, it would not have been procedurally fair for the unrepresented respondent to meet a different application without proper notice.

That is why the appeal had no reasonable prospect of success.

The Court’s reasoning was not:

“There is no power to restrain publication.”

The reasoning was:

“The power may exist, but this was not the properly pleaded application before the primary judge.”

6. The primary judge’s statement that criminal punishment was the only protection was too narrow — but not enough to save the appeal

The transcript shows the primary judge told Ms Ackerman that if she had not followed s 114T, the Court had “no power to do anything in this matter”, and that the only thing available under “this legislation” was to consider criminal liability and punishment.

On one view, that was too narrow because the appellate judgment later acknowledged that publication-restraining powers plainly existed.

But the appeal still failed because appellate review depends on error in relation to the application actually before the Court. The formal application had not been amended. The primary judge was entitled to dispose of the s 114Q application for want of s 114T consent.

So the practical result was harsh but legally orthodox:

The applicant had the wrong procedural vehicle. The Court was not required to rebuild the application for her on appeal.

7. The appeal could not be used to get orders never formally sought below

Justice Christie stated that the proposed grounds of appeal all complained that the primary judge failed to make orders which Ms Ackerman had not formally sought. Parties cannot use appellate litigation to secure an outcome unless they show they exhausted first-instance remedies and that the judicial officer made an error. 169

That is a major self-represented litigant lesson. If the relief changes, the application must change.

It is not enough to say in submissions:

“I actually want protective orders.”

The initiating document must be amended so the other party knows the case they must meet and the Court knows the jurisdiction being invoked.

How Could a Self-Represented Litigant Possibly Obtain s 114T DPP Consent?

A self-represented litigant needs to understand that s 114T is not just a court filing step. It is a criminal-prosecution gateway. Section 114T says that proceedings for an offence against s 114Q(1) or s 114R(1) must not be commenced without the written consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions. Federal Register of Legislation

In practical terms, that means a party should not simply file an Application in a Proceeding in the family law matter asking the Court to “deal with” an alleged s 114Q breach. If the party wants the criminal offence pathway, they need to build a proper referral capable of being assessed by prosecuting authorities.

The Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions explains that it does not investigate crimes. Alleged Commonwealth offences should be reported to the Australian Federal Police, state or territory police, or the nearest police station. The CDPP generally prosecutes matters after investigation and referral of a brief of evidence from an investigative agency. CDPP

So the practical pathway for a self-represented litigant would likely be:

1. Preserve the evidence immediately
2. Save URLs, screenshots, screen recordings, timestamps, usernames, platform details, webinar pages, sales pages, purchase pages, emails, metadata if available, and copies of the published material. If the publication shows court documents, pleadings, affidavits, addresses, names, children’s details or other identifying information, preserve exactly what was visible.
3. Prepare a short evidence brief
4. The brief should identify:

• what was published;
• where it was published;
• when it was published;
• who published it;
• how it identifies a party, child, witness or associated person;
• whether it was available to the public or sold to purchasers;
• why the publication appears connected to family law proceedings;
• whether any court approval or statutory exception is known;
• what harm, safety risk or intimidation has resulted.

1. Report the alleged Commonwealth offence to police
2. Because the CDPP does not investigate, the first practical step is to report the alleged s 114Q publication to the AFP or relevant police and ask that it be investigated as a possible Commonwealth offence under Part XIVB of the Family Law Act. The report should expressly mention that s 114T requires written DPP consent before offence proceedings are commenced.
3. Ask that the matter be referred to the CDPP for consideration
4. If police or another investigative agency considers that an offence may have been committed, the ordinary practice is that a brief of evidence may be forwarded to the CDPP to assess whether a prosecution should be instituted and, if so, on what charge or charges. The Prosecution Policy states that investigations are carried out by the AFP or another investigative agency, and that where an offence appears to have been committed, the established practice is for a brief of evidence to be forwarded to the DPP. CDPP
5. Understand the prosecution test
6. DPP consent is not automatic. The CDPP applies the Prosecution Policy. That policy requires a two-stage test: there must be sufficient evidence to prosecute, and it must be in the public interest to prosecute. The CDPP must be satisfied there is prima facie evidence of the elements of the offence and that there is a reasonable prospect of conviction. CDPP
7. If contacting the CDPP directly, do it carefully
8. A self-represented litigant may make a respectful written enquiry to the CDPP asking how a s 114T consent request should be directed, but should understand that the CDPP says it cannot assist with matters that have not been investigated or referred. For general enquiries, the CDPP publishes an enquiries email, but its contact page makes clear that crimes should not be reported directly to the CDPP. CDPP

The important practical distinction is this:

A litigant can gather evidence and report the alleged offence, but the DPP consent process is not a substitute for a properly framed family law protective application.

If the immediate goal is takedown, suppression, restraint, preservation of records, or safety protection, the better court pathway is usually a properly pleaded Part XIA suppression / non-publication / interim protective application, not a s 114Q offence application. The s 114Q/s 114T pathway is about criminal liability. The protective pathway is about stopping or controlling publication now.

A self-represented litigant therefore needs to decide which pathway they are actually seeking:

If they want prosecution: preserve evidence, report to police/AFP, seek investigation, and ask for referral to the CDPP for s 114T consent consideration.

If they want protection: file or amend the family law application so the orders expressly seek suppression, non-publication, takedown, preservation, disclosure and restraint under the correct protective provisions.

Conclusion

The alleged breach was that Mr Barsamian had allegedly published family law material online, including court documents and identifying information about Ms Ackerman, through a webinar, paid educational modules and social media videos.

The application failed because it was formally brought under s 114Q, which is an offence provision. Under s 114T, offence proceedings under s 114Q cannot be commenced without written DPP consent. Ms Ackerman had not obtained that consent.

Although Ms Ackerman later made clear she wanted protective orders, not prosecution, she did not amend the actual Application in a Proceeding. The appellate judge accepted that publication-restraining powers existed, but held that the primary judge was required to determine the application actually before her. Because the respondent was unrepresented, it would not have been procedurally fair to require him to meet a different application without proper notice.

The Amended Notice of Appeal was therefore summarily dismissed, and the costs application was also dismissed.

🧠 Take-Home Lesson

This case is a procedural warning.

The alleged publication problem was serious. The judgment accepts that Ms Ackerman’s material made clear she wanted protective relief, and that the Court had power to restrain publication. But the relief was buried under the wrong procedural label.

The sharp FLAST lesson is:

Do not use s 114Q as a takedown application unless you are actually commencing an offence pathway with DPP consent.

If the goal is protection, the application should be framed as protection:

• suppression order;
• non-publication order;
• interim takedown order;
• restraint against further publication;
• preservation of publication records;
• affidavit disclosure of where material has been published or sold;
• controlled referral to proper authorities;
• communication restraints if the publication conduct is being used as intimidation, harassment or systems abuse.

The practical drafting lesson is:

The orders sought, the legal basis, and the evidence must all match.

A party can say “I am not seeking prosecution” in submissions, but if the filed application still invokes an offence provision, the Court may deal with it as the application actually filed.

The brutal lesson is this:

The Court may have the power to help, but if the application is framed under the wrong section and not amended, the Court may not reach the merits at all.