Leave to Begin a Stepparent Adoption Granted: Why a Lost Parent-Child Bond and the Child's Own Wishes Carried the Day

In Liell & Nottingham [2026] FedCFamC1F 602, the Court dealt with whether a stepfather and mother should be given leave under s 60G(1) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) to start Queensland adoption proceedings for the mother's teenage child, where the biological father had not been heard from for years and did not take part ([2]–[3], [12]–[14]). The result: Jarrett J granted leave (Order 1; [26]–[27]). The important point is that leave is only a gateway. The question was not whether an adoption order should be made, but whether granting leave was in the child's best interests, and the answer turned on the real state of the child's family relationships and the child's own long-standing views ([20]–[23], [27]). All paragraph references below are to the judgment.

Why it matters: Stepparent adoption is a big step because, if it is ultimately ordered, it ends the legal parent-child relationship with the other biological parent. Under the Family Law Act, a stepparent cannot even begin the Queensland process without first getting leave from this Court. This short judgment shows how the Court approaches that gateway question when the other parent has been absent and has not participated, and why it still treats the consequences as significant ([1], [18], [26]).

🧩 Facts and Issues

The parties and the application

The application was brought by a stepfather (the first applicant) and the child's mother (the second applicant), who are married. The respondent is the child's biological father ([2]).
The proceedings began in November 2025 and also concerned an older sibling. That sibling has since turned 18, so the amended application of 18 August 2026 concerns only the one child ([2]–[3]).
The respondent did not take part ([3]).
The judgment is published under a pseudonym with approval under s 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act (cover notes). The child is referred to only as X.

The background the Court accepted

The mother has had no contact with the respondent since March 2019. In February 2022 she obtained final parenting orders in this Court giving her sole parental responsibility ([5]).
The stepfather has lived with the mother and the children as a family unit since early 2019 and has been closely involved in the children's upbringing ([6]–[7]).
The Court accepted the applicants' evidence, which was "internally consistent", matched the objective history of the family and was not contradicted by any other evidence ([8]).
The child has not seen or communicated with the respondent since March 2019, and the respondent has made no attempt to maintain a relationship in that time ([9]).
The applicants' evidence was that the child has consistently expressed a wish to be adopted by the stepfather and to bear his surname ([10]).

Service on the respondent

Extensive attempts were made over a long period to locate and notify the respondent, including correspondence, service of the originating process, sending later documents and searches for his whereabouts. None succeeded ([12]).
On 10 February 2026 a Judicial Registrar dispensed with further personal service under r 2.34 of the Family Law Rules, on condition that documents were emailed to his last known email address. The applicants complied ([13]).
Jarrett J was satisfied the respondent had been given every reasonable opportunity to find out about and take part in the case, and dispensed with any further compliance with the service rules ([14]).

Issues

Was the discretion under s 60G(1) engaged, because the applicants fell within the definition of "prescribed adopting parent" ([15]–[16])?
Would granting leave be in the child's best interests, having regard to the effects of ss 60F(4)(a), 61E and 65J ([17]–[27])?

⚖️ Applicable Law – Legislation, Regulations, Rules

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth):

s 60G(1) is the leave power. A person may only apply to arrange the adoption of a stepchild if the Court has given leave ([1], [15]).
s 60G(2) requires the Court to consider whether granting leave is in the child's best interests, having regard to the effect of s 60F(4)(a) or s 60HA(3)(a), and of ss 61E and 65J ([17]).
s 4(1) defines "prescribed adopting parent". Both applicants fell within it, so the discretion was engaged ([16]).
s 60F(4)(a): a child who would otherwise be a "child of a marriage" stops being a child of that marriage if adopted after leave under s 60G(1) was granted ([18]).
s 61E: on an adoption for which leave was granted, a person's parental responsibility for the adopted child ends ([19]).
Part XIVB and s 114Q(2) are the publication restrictions and the approval of the pseudonym (cover notes).

Also relevant:

Adoption Act 2009 (Qld) is the statute under which the adoption process itself runs. Leave from this Court is only the first step ([1], [25]).
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth), r 2.34: dispensing with service ([13]–[14]).

📌 Precedents Relied On

Hanlon & Hanlon [2022] FedCFamC1F 435 and Haskova & Viraj [2025] FedCFamC1F 103 (at [19]) — cited for the point that, although the position was "subject of some debate in the past", s 61E(2) properly construed does not strip the mother of her parental responsibility if leave to adopt is granted ([19]).

🧠 Analysis

Issue

Should a stepfather and mother be given leave under s 60G(1) to commence adoption proceedings for the mother's child, where the biological father has been absent for years and has not taken part?

Rule

Leave is discretionary ([15]).
The discretion is engaged only for a "prescribed adopting parent". Both applicants fell within that definition ([16]).
The central question is best interests. The Court must consider whether leave is in the child's best interests, having regard to ss 60F(4)(a), 60HA(3)(a), 61E and 65J ([17]).
The question is not whether to make an adoption order. It is whether leave should be granted for the commencement of adoption proceedings, though "even at that preliminary stage" the Court must be satisfied that leave is consistent with the child's best interests ([20]).

Application

The consequence of adoption was weighed, not ignored

Jarrett J described the effect of s 60F(4)(a) as "significant and must not be overlooked": leave may ultimately permit an adoption that would extinguish the existing legal parent-child relationship between the child and the respondent ([18]). The Court weighed that against the facts. The respondent had not had contact for many years, had not taken part and there was no evidence of any continuing parental role. In those circumstances, "the legal consequence of adoption would therefore recognise, rather than disrupt, the reality" of the child's family life ([18]).

Parental responsibility: no practical bar to leave

Section 61E ends a person's parental responsibility on adoption. The mother held sole parental responsibility under the 2022 final orders, and the respondent had "not exercised parental responsibility for many years", so the s 61E consequences did "not weigh against the grant of leave" ([19]). The Court also confirmed, following the earlier cases, that s 61E(2) does not strip the mother of her own parental responsibility if leave is granted ([19]).

The relationship that exists is the one the law was asked to recognise

The Court found that the stepfather had "occupied the position of X's psychological and social father" for about seven years, and that there was an "established and enduring parent-child bond" ([21]). By contrast, the respondent had not maintained any relationship for many years and there was no evidence of ongoing involvement, emotional connection, financial support or communication. Leave "does not threaten an existing parent-child relationship capable of preservation", and there was no evidence he intended to resume a parental role or any objective basis to conclude a relationship was likely to be re-established ([22]).

The child's views carried substantial weight

The child was approaching adulthood and was "well capable of forming and expressing views concerning her family relationships", so those views warranted "substantial weight" ([23]). The evidence suggested they were long-standing, consistently expressed and genuinely held, and they matched the practical reality of her life. The Court saw no basis to regard them as "contrived or the product of pressure from others" ([23]).

"She already lives with them" did not make leave unnecessary

The Court considered whether leave was needed at all, given that the child already lived with and was cared for by the applicants. It concluded that the application was directed "not merely to administrative convenience" but to securing legal recognition of an enduring parental relationship that had existed in substance for many years ([24]).

Leave does not change legal status by itself

Granting leave "will not itself alter X's legal status". It only allows the applicants to invoke the Queensland statutory process, where "further consideration" will be given to whether an adoption order should be made ([25]).

Conclusion

Having taken into account the significant legal consequences adoption may ultimately have, including the extinguishment of the legal parent-child relationship with the respondent, Jarrett J was satisfied that granting leave was in the child's best interests ([26]). The reasons were the absence of any meaningful relationship with the respondent, the enduring parental relationship with the stepfather, and the child's own clearly expressed wishes. Adoption, if ultimately ordered, would bring the child's legal status into line with the reality of her family life ([27]). Order 1 granted leave to Mr and Ms Liell to commence adoption proceedings.

The Court did not decide whether an adoption order should be made. That is for the Queensland process ([25]). The respondent did not take part, so the Court did not hear from him ([3]).

🧠 Take-Home Lesson

Leave under s 60G is a gateway, not the adoption itself. The Court asks whether leave is in the child's best interests. The adoption decision itself is made under the State or Territory process ([20], [25]).
The Court looks at the real family. What mattered was evidence of an established parent-child bond with the stepfather and the absence of any relationship with the other parent ([21]–[22]).
An absent parent's lost relationship is still weighed. The Court treated extinguishing the legal relationship as significant, and explained why, on these facts, it did not outweigh the other considerations ([18], [26]).
A mature child's long-standing views can carry substantial weight, but they are tested. The Court looked at whether the views were consistent, genuinely held and free from pressure ([23]).
Prove the effort to find the other parent. The respondent's absence did not end the process. The applicants had to show extensive, documented attempts to locate and notify him before service was dispensed with ([12]–[14]).
Dispensing with service is not the same as not trying to serve. Here, the Registrar's condition (emailing documents to the last known address) was complied with ([13]).
A caution for readers: this was an unopposed application on evidence the Court accepted as uncontradicted ([8], [3]). It shows how the Court approached these facts. It is not a template for a contested application where the other parent is actively involved.
Support workers and McKenzie friends: adoption has permanent legal consequences. Anyone considering it should get specific legal advice, including about the State or Territory process that follows leave.

"Leave to start the adoption process is not the adoption. But the Court still asks the adoption question: is this in the child's best interests?"

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