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Citation: Baum & Gunson (No 2) [2026] FedCFamC2F 1593

No Evidence, No Second Go: Fresh Bid to Reopen Final Parenting and Property Orders Made in the Mother's Absence Summarily Dismissed, With Costs

In Baum & Gunson (No 2) [2026] FedCFamC2F 1593, Judge A. Humphreys dealt with a father's application to summarily dismiss a mother's new Initiating Application. She was seeking fresh final parenting and property orders about two years after final orders were made following an undefended hearing she did not attend ([1], [3]). The result: the mother's application was summarily dismissed under s 102QAB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). Taking her case at its highest, she had no reasonable prospect of setting the orders aside under r 10.13(1)(a), of getting the parenting orders reconsidered under s 65DAAA, or of varying the property orders under s 79A ([80]–[81]; Order 1). She was ordered to pay the father's costs, fixed on the Division 2 scale at $8,729.49, within 90 days ([100], [104]–[105]; Order 2). The important point is that final orders made in your absence are still final orders. Coming back to court needs a recognised legal pathway and real evidence for each step of it, not a general wish for a different result. All paragraph references below are to the judgment.

Why it matters: Parents who miss a final hearing often believe they can simply file again later and "start over". This judgment shows why that does not work. The Court will test a fresh application against every legal pathway that might be open: setting aside orders made in a party's absence, reconsidering final parenting orders, and varying property orders. Each one has its own threshold. An unparticularised application, a four-page affidavit of broad assertions and submissions about matters not in evidence will not clear any of them ([44], [55], [72], [79], [95]). It can also lead to a costs order, even against a self-represented party who says she has limited means ([92], [100]).

🧩 Facts and Issues

The family and the first proceeding

  • The parties have one child, X, a boy aged 8 ([2]). They began their relationship in 2010, married in 2016 and separated finally in December 2023 ([23]–[24]).
  • Intervention order proceedings followed on both sides. By early 2024 there were interim orders protecting each party, and a final intervention order made in the mother's absence named X and the father as protected persons for 12 months ([25]).
  • The mother started the first family law proceeding on 11 January 2024 ([3], [26]). Her solicitor withdrew on 19 January 2024. The mother then did not attend later hearings or file the documents she was directed to file ([27]).
  • The final hearing on 17 April 2024 proceeded on an undefended basis, as had been foreshadowed. Final parenting and property orders were made by a Senior Judicial Registrar on 31 May 2024 and served on the mother by email on 7 June 2024. She does not dispute receiving them ([3], [29]–[31]).

The final orders

  • Parenting: the father has sole parental responsibility, and X lives with him and spends time with the mother as agreed in writing. X has not spent time with the mother since the orders were made ([4], [35]).
  • Property: a 60/40 division of net assets and superannuation in the father's favour, implemented by a cash payment to the mother and a superannuation split in her favour, with a small costs order against her ([5]).
  • The mother did not seek a review of those orders ([6]). The father paid the required sum (less the costs order) and the superannuation split was implemented in September 2024. The mother did not dispute this ([7]).
  • The father's evidence, which the mother did not dispute, is that she has repeatedly contravened the intervention order protecting him and X, and has been charged. She described her breaches as "a mother trying to visit her son" ([32]).

The new application

  • On 20 February 2026 the mother filed a new Initiating Application. It sought "custody" of X, any orders the Court thought appropriate, a "forensic financial audit" of the father if required, and further property distribution ([8], [33]). She also sought interim orders for X to fly interstate, unaccompanied by a parent, to spend every school holiday with her, and an airport watchlist order ([10]).
  • The application did not identify the legal basis for reopening the final orders. The Court took it that she sought to vary or set them aside ([11]).
  • On parenting, she submitted that her circumstances had materially changed because she had moved interstate and built a stable home and working life ([12], [68]). On property, she said the finances had "always been hidden" from her and mentioned, in oral submissions only, a letter about a trust fund for X ([13]–[14], [75]–[76]).
  • At the first court event on 13 April 2026 she declined to see a duty lawyer, was encouraged to get legal advice, and then did not file the consolidated affidavit the Court allowed for ([34]).
  • She represented herself at the hearing on 11 June 2026 and appeared electronically. The father was represented by counsel ([17]).

Issues

  1. Should the mother's application be summarily dismissed because it has no reasonable prospect of success, or is frivolous or vexatious ([18(a)])?
  2. If so, should she pay the father's costs, and how should they be fixed ([18(b)])?

⚖️ Applicable Law – Legislation, Regulations, Rules

  • s 102QAB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth): the Court may decide a proceeding for one party if the other has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting it. The proceeding need not be "hopeless" or "bound to fail" ([38], [40]).
  • rr 10.09, 10.10 and 10.11 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth): the procedure for applying for summary orders and a separate decision, and the power to dismiss all or part of a proceeding ([39]).
  • r 10.13(1)(a): the Court may vary or set aside an order made in the absence of a party ([45]).
  • s 65DAAA: a final parenting order must not be reconsidered unless the Court has considered whether there has been a significant change of circumstances and is satisfied that reconsideration is in the child's best interests ([58]).
  • s 79A: property orders may be varied or set aside only on listed grounds, such as a miscarriage of justice through fraud, duress or suppression of evidence, impracticability, default, exceptional circumstances relating to a child, or a proceeds of crime order ([73]).
  • s 114UB: each party bears their own costs unless circumstances justify another order, having regard to the s 114UB(3) factors. Section 114UB(5) allows costs to be fixed in a specific amount or by reference to the scale ([87], [101]).
  • Schedule 1 to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth): the Division 2 costs scale ([84], [102]–[104]).

📌 Precedents Relied On

  • Mahoney & Dieter [2020] FamCAFC 88 and Ebner & Pappas (2014) FLC 93-619: the "no reasonable likelihood of success" test is applied in its own terms, but the power is exercised with caution ([41]). The magnitude of the change sought informs how significant the change of circumstances must be ([66]).
  • Bigg v Suzi (1998) FLC 92-799: take the respondent's case at its highest, rather than resolving disputed facts ([43]).
  • Scott (No 4) [2023] FedCFamC1A 239, Novikov & Novikov (2024) 69 Fam LR 663 and Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172: the two-part test for setting aside orders made in a party's absence. First a reasonable excuse for not appearing, then a reasonable prospect of a different result ([46]–[47]).
  • Kennon & Kennon (1997) FLC 92-757 and Boulton & Boulton (2024) FLC 94-202: how family violence may bear on contributions and future needs in property cases ([56(a)]).
  • Carlyon & Graham [2024] FedCFamC1F 443, Radecki & Radecki (2024) FLC 94-232 and Rice and Asplund (1979) FLC 90-725: s 65DAAA codifies the rule in Rice and Asplund and requires a two-step process ([59]–[62]).
  • Fagan & Fagan (No 4) [2026] FedCFamC1F 375: s 65DAAA is a threshold constraint, not an invitation to make "preferable" orders on a fresh look at the merits ([63]).
  • Lehtinen & Lehtinen (2025) 394 FLR 39: the real question is whether the change is enough to justify a new hearing ([64]).
  • Aquila & Aquila [2025] FedCFamC1F 848: s 79A is remedial and construed liberally, but not so as to circumvent the principle of one property settlement ([74]).
  • Davis & Peterson (2023) FLC 94-130: impecuniosity is not a basis for refusing a costs order ([92]).

🧠 Analysis

Issue

Did the mother's fresh application, filed nearly two years after final orders were made in her absence, have any reasonable prospect of reopening those orders? And, if not, should she pay the father's costs ([18])?

Rule

On a summary dismissal application, the father bears the onus. The Court takes the mother's case at its highest, looking only at her evidence and any relevant admissions by the father ([42]–[43]). Because the mother did not say which power she relied on, the Court tested her claim against each available one: r 10.13(1)(a), s 65DAAA and s 79A ([44]). Costs follow only if s 114UB(2) justifying circumstances exist ([87]–[88]).

Application

The Court tested every possible pathway, and none was open

The mother's application "does not identify the basis" for reopening the orders ([11], [16]). Rather than dismissing it for that reason alone, the Court considered every head of power the father had identified ([44]). That is a fair approach to a self-represented party, but it also means the result does not turn on a technicality. Each pathway failed on its merits.

Setting aside orders made in her absence: the excuse limb survived, the outcome limb did not

To set aside orders made in a party's absence, the party must show both a reasonable excuse for not appearing and a reasonable prospect of a different result ([46]–[47], [53]).

  • The mother did not mention the earlier proceeding in her affidavit or case outline at all ([48]). Her oral explanation was "sheer shock" and the father's alleged family violence, including alleged coercive control ([50]).
  • The earlier reasons recorded concerns about her functioning at the time, and untested allegations of family violence by the father, which he denied ([51]). Taking her case at its highest, the Court was not persuaded she had no reasonable prospect of establishing a reasonable excuse ([52]).
  • But on parenting, she offered no evidence addressing the risk factors that led the earlier decision to limit her time with X. These included unaddressed mental health concerns, erratic behaviour, other parenting-capacity concerns and repeated contravention of the intervention order ([54]–[55]).
  • On property, she did not say the alleged violence affected her contributions or future needs. She identified no new evidence, no undisclosed assets, and no contribution or needs evidence capable of changing the result ([56]).

So the second limb failed, and r 10.13(1)(a) offered no reasonable prospect ([57]).

Reconsidering the parenting orders: moving interstate is not enough

Section 65DAAA requires the Court first to find what (if any) change of circumstances has occurred and then decide whether reconsideration is in the child's best interests ([58], [61]). It is "not directed to whether the Court might now make preferable parenting orders" ([63]).

  • The change the mother sought was large: a move from no time in practice to unsupervised school-holiday time interstate, with X flying unaccompanied by a parent to a location she did not disclose ([65]). Under Mahoney & Dieter, the bigger the change sought, the more significant the change of circumstances must be ([66]).
  • Her only evidence of change was that she had moved interstate ([69]). Her claims of stable work and housing were in submissions, not evidence ([36], [68]–[70]).
  • Again, she did not address the risk factors identified in the earlier reasons ([71]).

The Court found no reasonable prospect of establishing a significant change, and no reasonable prospect of showing reconsideration was in X's best interests even if the move counted as a change ([72]).

Varying the property orders: a "concern" is not a miscarriage of justice

The mother's financial evidence was four short assertions: the father is on a high income, the assets are in his name, the finances were "hidden" from her, and he handled everything ([75]). The trust fund letter was not in evidence at all ([76]).

  • Everything she raised was known to her when she started the first proceeding and at the time of the final hearing ([77]).
  • A general concern that finances were "hidden", without evidence of undisclosed assets, cannot ground a miscarriage of justice claim under s 79A(1)(a) ([77]).
  • No other s 79A ground was even asserted. It was not suggested that the father had failed to carry out the orders, there were no exceptional child-related circumstances alleged, the mother does not have caring responsibility for X, and there was no proceeds of crime order ([78]).

There was no reasonable prospect of establishing any s 79A ground ([79]).

Costs: conduct in the litigation, not conduct generally

The Court worked through each s 114UB(3) factor ([89]–[99]).

  • The mother said she had limited means but gave no evidence of her finances, including what happened to the property settlement payment. Even if her means were limited, impecuniosity is not a reason to refuse costs ([91]–[92]).
  • The Court made clear that "conduct" under s 114UB(3)(c) is conduct in this litigation. It did not extend to her conduct around the intervention orders ([94]).
  • What counted was how she ran the case. The application was unparticularised, the affidavit was four pages of mostly broad assertions, she did not file the further affidavit allowed, and her submissions relied on matters not in evidence. The father had to speculate about her case, at significant cost ([95]).
  • She was also wholly unsuccessful ([97]).

Lack of success plus conduct justified costs ([100]). The father dropped his claim for indemnity costs and sought $10,778.35 on the Division 2 scale ([84], [102]). The Court reduced the hearing fee from a full day to a half day because the hearing ran from 10.35 am to 12.12 pm, fixing costs at $8,729.49, payable within 90 days ([103]–[105]).

Conclusion

The mother's Initiating Application was summarily dismissed, and she was ordered to pay $8,729.49 in costs within 90 days. The father's Response was otherwise dismissed ([81], [104]–[105]; Orders 1–3). The final parenting and property orders made in May 2024 remain in place.

🧠 Take-Home Lesson

  • Missing the final hearing has lasting consequences. Orders made in your absence are final orders, and they stay in place unless you clear a legal threshold to reopen them ([3], [80]).
  • Name your legal pathway. Say whether you rely on r 10.13(1)(a), s 65DAAA or s 79A, and address its elements directly. Here the Court had to work out the possible pathways itself, and found none open ([11], [44]).
  • A good excuse is only half the test. Even if you had a reasonable excuse for not attending, you must also show a real prospect that the result would have been different ([52]–[53], [57]).
  • Address the reasons for the original orders. If the earlier decision identified risk factors, a fresh parenting application must deal with them with evidence ([54]–[55], [71]).
  • The bigger the change you want, the stronger your evidence must be. Going from no time to unsupervised holiday travel interstate needs much more than "I have moved" ([65]–[66], [69]–[72]).
  • Submissions are not evidence. Claims about work, housing or a trust fund that are not in an affidavit do not count ([36], [70], [76]).
  • s 79A needs a ground, not a suspicion. Point to the undisclosed asset or other specific miscarriage, and remember that what you knew at the time of the original orders will not help ([77]–[78]).
  • Costs can follow, even if you are self-represented and say you are short of money ([92], [95], [100]).
  • Support workers and McKenzie friends: when someone wants to "reopen" final orders, help them first get legal advice (including from the duty lawyer), identify which pathway applies, and gather actual evidence of what has changed and of how the concerns in the original reasons have been addressed ([34], [44], [54]).
"Section 65DAAA is not directed to whether the Court might now make preferable parenting orders upon a fresh consideration of the merits." (Fagan & Fagan (No 4), quoted at [63])
"Final orders made in your absence are still final orders. To reopen them, bring a legal pathway and the evidence to walk it." (FLAST takeaway)

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