AI-Written Appeal, Real-World Rules: Father Loses Bid to End Indefinite Supervision

In Blanc & Sarno [2026] FedCFamC1A 22 (Austin J, 18 February 2026), the Division 1 Appellate Court dismissed a father’s appeal from final parenting orders that required his time with the child to remain professionally supervised on an ongoing basis. The appeal failed across the board: the Court rejected the “my trial counsel was incompetent” miscarriage argument, upheld the primary judge’s unacceptable risk assessment, and confirmed that the additional restraints (communication limits, gift limits, school attendance limits) had an evidentiary basis and were not punitive.

🧩 Facts and Issues

Facts: The child (born 2020) has always lived with the mother since the parties separated in January 2021. Over time, the child spent varying periods of supervised time with the father—first in public places, then under family supervision, then under a mix of professional and family supervision. Family supervision broke down after conflict involving the paternal grandmother, and the parties later resumed professional supervision on a reduced schedule before trial. At trial it was common ground the child should live with the mother; the dispute was the scope and conditions of the father’s time and whether the mother should have sole decision-making.

Key issues on appeal (in substance):

1. Procedural unfairness / miscarriage: Did the father’s own barrister’s alleged incompetence cause a miscarriage of justice?
2. Unacceptable risk / reasons: Did the primary judge misapply principle (incl. M v M) or fail to give adequate reasons connecting past conduct to current risk?
3. Indefinite professional supervision: Was ongoing professional supervision an impermissible “last resort” order without staged progression/review?
4. Ancillary restraints: Were limits on communications, gifts, and school involvement disproportionate/punitive or unsupported by evidence?
5. Child’s views: Did the primary judge fail to consider them?

⚖️ Applicable Law – Legislation, Regulations, Rules

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (Pt VII):

• Definition of family violence (s 4AB) and child safety / unacceptable risk controls through best interests factors and protective obligations (ss 60CC, 60CG).
• Parenting order powers and variation pathway (ss 65D, 65DAAA) and finality expectations in parenting litigation (s 95).
• Evidentiary use of official records in family violence context (s 102NN) (referred to in the appellate reasons when explaining why certain facts were objectively verifiable).

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth):

• Use of certain official records (s 178) (noted and relied on in context of proving objectively verifiable facts).

Professional conduct / forensic choices:

• Barristers’ duties of candour and independence (Vic Bar Rules cited) were used to explain why counsel is not a “mouthpiece” and why some cross-examination choices may be ethically constrained or forensic.

📌 Precedents Relied On

• House v The King: appellate restraint and the requirement to demonstrate legal/factual/discretionary error (the “different outcome was open” point is not enough).
• Smits v Roach; D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victorian Legal Aid; TKWJ v The Queen; Mawhinney v ASIC: an appellant can run a “my lawyer botched it” type ground, but it is hard to make out and usually belongs in separate civil/disciplinary pathways unless a true miscarriage is shown.
• Isles & Nelissen: risk findings are protective assessments and do not operate like ordinary “facts must be proved on the balance” propositions; the appellate court reaffirmed that frame when rejecting the “unproven allegations” complaint.

🧠 Analysis

Issue

Whether the primary judge committed appealable error by (a) accepting family violence / erratic behaviour findings as grounding an unacceptable risk assessment, (b) ordering ongoing professional supervision as the only safe mechanism for the father to have time, and (c) imposing “tight” ancillary restraints around communication, gifts, and school involvement—particularly where the father claimed trial counsel incompetence and inadequate reasons.

Rule

• Appeals from discretionary parenting orders require demonstration of appellate error; it is not enough that another outcome was open.
• A lawyer-incompetence miscarriage argument is legally possible but difficult; it does not succeed by assertion—there must be a demonstrated miscarriage connected to the conduct complained of.
• In risk cases, the Court’s duty is protective: the question is whether an unacceptable risk exists and what safeguards are required; and risk assessments are not confined by a simplistic “prove harm on the balance” lens.
• Long-term professional supervision is generally discouraged but can be ordered where the only alternative would be eliminating the relationship; final orders need not include an internal “review mechanism” because future change can be dealt with by fresh proceedings if circumstances materially change.

Application

1. AI-generated submissions didn’t expand the appeal
2. The father’s Summary of Argument (prepared using an AI tool) did not align with his pleaded grounds; the Court confined itself to the pleaded grounds and disregarded “new grievances” outside the Notice of Appeal.
3. No miscarriage from “counsel incompetence”
4. The Court treated the complaint as a grievance about the father’s own counsel rather than any unfairness caused by the trial judge. It emphasised: (a) family violence has a wide statutory meaning, (b) some aspects of the evidence inevitably established at least some family violence, and (c) counsel’s duties constrain what can be put. The father also terminated his lawyers after evidence closed, did not seek to reopen evidence, and did not complain to the trial judge that the evidentiary state was unsatisfactory—undermining the miscarriage claim.
5. Unacceptable risk findings were reasoned and tied to patterns
6. The appeal court pointed to the primary judge’s findings about repeated angry confrontations, harassment, and coercive/control behaviour, and the emphasis on a pattern of “snapping/freaking out/panic responses” rather than isolated incidents. The primary judge’s explanation was that the aggregate risks created an unacceptable risk of emotional harm if time were unsupervised, and that the father lacked insight or responsibility-taking—making recurrence more likely.
7. Indefinite professional supervision upheld as the only feasible option
8. The father argued supervision should not be indefinite and that alternatives (supported/therapeutic, staged progression) were not considered. The appellate reasons reject that: the primary judge found there was no feasible alternative (parenting plan failed, family supervision failed and was no longer available), and that without evidence of steps taken by the father to address behaviour, the risk could not be acceptably reduced. The appellate court also noted the parties sought final orders, and any later change can be pursued through future proceedings if circumstances materially shift.
9. Ancillary restraints (communication, gifts, school) were not punitive
10. The challenged orders were explained as protective and practical: limiting “relentless” messaging to reduce burden and conflict; restricting gifts to special occasions to stop pressure dynamics; and limiting school attendance as a corollary of “only supervised interaction” being permitted. The appeal court held these orders had an evidentiary premise and were not manifestly unreasonable.
11. Child’s views ground was factually wrong
12. The child was about four, no recorded views existed, and the primary judge said weight could not be afforded given age—so the “failure to consider views” claim failed.

Conclusion

The appeal was dismissed. The father failed to demonstrate any legal, factual, or discretionary error. The Court fixed the mother’s legally aided party/party costs at $3,994, payable six months after the orders.

🧠 Take-Home Lesson

A parenting appeal won’t succeed because your submissions are longer, louder, or AI-drafted: the appeal is confined to pleaded grounds, and you must pinpoint appealable error. Where a primary judge finds a continuing pattern of coercive/volatile behaviour, lack of insight, and no workable lesser safeguard, the appellate court will generally uphold ongoing professional supervision as a protective (not punitive) solution.