Adjournment Denied, Transcript Extended: Relitigating Spent Fraud Allegations Will Not Delay an Appeal

In Okorie & Myska (No 4) [2026] FedCFamC1A 173, Campton J dealt with an Application in an Appeal by a self-represented applicant who sought to adjourn a listed Full Court appeal so she could obtain a transcript, gather further overseas evidence and pursue alleged fraud complaints. The result: the adjournment was refused, the Application in an Appeal was dismissed, but a short extension was granted to file the digital transcript (and, if it is not filed, the transcript obligation is dispensed with so the appeal is not deemed abandoned), with consequential extensions for Summaries of Argument (Orders 1–6; [31], [33]). The important point is that an appeal fixture will not be put off so a party can relitigate issues already disposed of where appeal rights have been exhausted, or chase new evidence and police complaints that sit outside the appeal. A delayed transcript can justify a short filing indulgence; it does not, by itself, justify abandoning the hearing date ([27]–[31]). All paragraph references below are to the judgment.

Why it matters: Self-represented appellants often treat a missing transcript, incomplete subpoenas or a desire to “investigate fraud” as reasons to stop the appeal clock. This judgment draws a hard line. The prejudice to the respondent from delay — lost fruits of litigation, further cost and delay — counts ([31]). Grounds that try to reopen spent orders are an abuse of process, and the Court put the applicant on notice that, absent more, the proposed grounds did not appear to enjoy reasonable prospects of success ([25]–[26]). Transcript remains useful for procedural fairness complaints, but legal and discretionary error can often be tested against the judgment and the Appeal Book alone ([30]).

🧩 Facts and Issues

The appeal under challenge

Ms Okorie (the applicant) appeals from orders of a Division 2 judge made on 18 June 2026 in Myska & Okorie (No 5) [2026] FedCFamC2F 888 ([1], [20]). Those orders required her to pay the respondent’s costs of a Review application and of a 5 June 2026 hearing, and dismissed cross-applications she made at that hearing ([1]).
Mr Myska is the respondent to the appeal ([2]).
Leave to appeal is required from the interlocutory refusal to discharge an enforcement order facilitating sale of a property. Leave is not required from the costs order ([23]).
The appeal is listed for hearing before a Full Court in Sydney on 27 October 2026. The digital Appeal Book has already been prepared and provided ([3]–[4]).

Procedural directions and the Application in an Appeal

On 28 August 2026 (amended 3 September 2026) an appeal judicial registrar ordered the applicant to obtain and file the digital transcript of the 5 June 2026 hearing by 18 September 2026, failing which the appeal would be taken to be abandoned under r 13.22. Summaries of Argument were due on 25 September 2026 (applicant) and 16 October 2026 (respondent) ([3]).
On 18 September 2026 — the transcript due date — the applicant filed an Application in an Appeal seeking: an extension of time to file the transcript (alternatively to 31 March 2027); adjournment of the 27 October hearing; extensions for an Amended Notice of Appeal and Summary of Argument tied to receipt of the transcript; a Mandarin interpreter at any hearing; and costs reserved ([5]).
She asked for an oral hearing. Campton J directed that the application be determined on the papers in the absence of the parties under r 13.38(2)(a) ([6]).
The respondent filed a Response seeking dismissal and costs ([7]).

Background litigation (short form)

The parties married in China in 1984 and divorced there in 1995. In July 2022 the respondent commenced Division 2 proceedings under Pt VIIIAB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). The applicant contested jurisdiction and the existence or timing of any de facto relationship ([8]).
On 24 April 2024 a Division 2 judge declared under s 90RD that the parties were in a de facto relationship from December 1998 to March 2021 (Myska & Okorie [2024] FedCFamC2F 488) ([9]).
The applicant’s appeal from that declaration was deemed abandoned when she failed to file a draft appeal index. Reinstatement was refused, and review of that refusal was dismissed by Aldridge J (Okorie & Myska (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC1A 234) ([10]–[11]).
Orders for sale of a jointly owned Queensland property followed. Multiple Applications for Review and Applications – Enforcement ensued. Claims of “fraud” were rejected as unsupported and irrelevant to enforcement. A Warrant for Possession was ordered; review of that order was dismissed on 28 April 2026 (Myska & Okorie (No 4) [2026] FedCFamC2F 573). Those 28 April 2026 orders have not been appealed ([12]–[18]).
The 18 June 2026 costs judgment under appeal followed the dismissal of a Review of the Warrant orders and oral cross-applications made at the costs hearing ([19]–[20]).
Separately, a Part VIIIAB trial was adjourned once on conditions as to costs, then proceeded in August 2026 after a further adjournment application was refused. Judgment on the final property issue is reserved. The applicant said she was considering appealing the August adjournment refusal ([21]–[22]).

The proposed grounds and the adjournment reasons

The Notice of Appeal lists six grounds. Grounds include alleged failure to consider the respondent’s “fraudulent conduct”, procedural injustice on the cross-applications, misapplication of costs provisions, and broader claims that earlier orders were obtained by fraud, that property was “unlawfully sold”, and that the respondent’s conduct should be referred for criminal investigation ([23]).
For the adjournment, the applicant relied on delay obtaining the transcript, incomplete subpoenas and a need to obtain evidence from China, and a desire to report alleged fraud to police and the CDPP ([24]).

Issues

Should the Full Court appeal fixture of 27 October 2026 be adjourned ([5], [31])?
Should time to file the digital transcript (and Summaries of Argument) be extended, or the transcript obligation dispensed with ([5], [33])?
Should a Mandarin interpreter be provided by the Court ([5], [34])?
How should the Court treat grounds that seek to relitigate matters already finally disposed of ([25]–[26])?

⚖️ Applicable Law – Legislation, Regulations, Rules

Under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), the following provisions mattered:

Pt VIIIAB is the de facto property jurisdiction in the underlying proceedings ([8]).
s 90RD is the source of the 24 April 2024 declaration of a de facto relationship ([9]).
Pt XIB Div 1B was noted as a possible path for the respondent to consider in light of repeated unsuccessful applications ([32]).
Part XIVB and s 114Q(2) are the publication restrictions and the approval of the pseudonym (cover notes).

Under the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth), the following rules mattered:

r 10.13 — amendment of the appeal directions ([3]).
r 13.14 — deemed abandonment for failure to file a draft appeal index ([10]).
r 13.19(4) — digital transcript obligation (Order 1).
r 13.22 / r 13.22(2) — appeal taken to be abandoned if transcript is not filed by the due date ([3]; Order 2).
r 13.23 — Summary of Argument and List of Authorities ([3]).
rr 13.37, 13.38 and Pt 5.3 — referral and determination of an Application in an Appeal on the papers ([6]).
The judgment does not set out a freestanding adjournment statute. The analysis turns on whether an adequate foundation was shown, balanced against prejudice to the respondent ([31]).

📌 Precedents Relied On

Myska & Okorie [2024] FedCFamC2F 488 — s 90RD declaration of a de facto relationship ([9]).
Okorie & Myska (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC1A 234 — dismissal of review of refusal to reinstate the abandoned appeal from the declaration ([11]).
Myska & Okorie (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC2F 1641 — dismissal of review of sale orders ([12]).
Myska & Okorie (No 3) [2025] FedCFamC2F 505 — enforcement orders; unsupported “fraud” claims rejected as irrelevant ([14]).
Okorie & Myska [2025] FedCFamC2F 1523 — dismissal of a further review of enforcement orders ([16]).
Myska & Okorie (No 4) [2026] FedCFamC2F 573 — dismissal of review of Warrant for Possession; those orders not appealed ([18]).
Myska & Okorie (No 5) [2026] FedCFamC2F 888 — the costs and cross-application orders under appeal ([1], [20]).

(The judgment’s consideration of the Application in an Appeal relies primarily on the Rules, the procedural history and an assessment of prejudice and prospects, rather than extended citation of appellate authority.)

🧠 Analysis

Issue

Could a self-represented appellant adjourn a listed Full Court appeal because the transcript was not yet available, overseas subpoenas were incomplete, and she wanted time to pursue alleged fraud with police — or was a short transcript indulgence, without moving the hearing date, the proper response?

Rule

An Application in an Appeal to extend time or dispense with transcript can be determined on the papers ([6]).
Adjournment of a listed appeal requires an adequate foundation. Prejudice to the respondent from delay — including deprivation of the fruits of litigation and further costs — is material ([31]).
Grounds that seek to relitigate matters disposed of by earlier orders, where appeal rights have been exhausted, are an abuse of process ([26]).
Legal and discretionary error can often be identified from the judgment and the digital Appeal Book without a transcript. Transcript may assist a procedural fairness complaint, but the merit of such a complaint must still be assessed ([30]).
Interpreter assistance is not ordered merely on request. Evidence of entitlement, or of insufficient English to participate, is required ([34]).

Application

Grounds 5 and 6 were not competent, and spent issues are an abuse of process

Campton J held Grounds 5 and 6 (unlawful sale / systemic fraud and criminal referral) “are not competent” ([25]). Insofar as grounds sought to revisit matters already disposed of by earlier orders where appeal rights were exhausted, they were an abuse of process. The applicant’s reasons for seeking an adjournment to revisit those issues on appeal were rejected. She was put on notice that, absent more, it was not apparent the proposed grounds enjoyed reasonable prospects of success ([26]).

That finding mattered for the adjournment. Once those foundations fell away, the adjournment application reduced to the transcript delay ([27]).

Transcript delay justified a short extension, not an adjournment of the hearing

The applicant started the transcript process on 2 September 2026, had difficulty with the forms, and could not complete provision by 18 September 2026. She filed the Application in an Appeal only on the due date itself ([28]). She had not paid for the transcript and did not claim incapacity to meet that cost ([29]).

She said the transcript was “essential” for her appeal. The Court held that may or may not be so. Asserted legal and discretionary errors could be identified from the judgment and the Appeal Book. They did not depend on the transcript. Error would be evident (or not) from comparing the reasons with applicable legal principles. Transcript would assist a procedural fairness complaint, but the merit of that complaint was “opaque” ([30]).

On that basis, there was no adequate foundation to adjourn the appeal. The respondent would be prejudiced by delay. The adjournment was refused ([31]).

A short indulgence, with a safety valve against abandonment

Despite the respondent opposing any extension, Campton J extended a short indulgence to obtain the transcript, with consequential extensions for Summaries of Argument. If the transcript is not filed within the extended time, the obligation is dispensed with so the appeal is not deemed abandoned under r 13.22(2) ([33]; Orders 1–4). The Application in an Appeal was otherwise dismissed, and the respondent’s costs of that application were reserved to the appeal hearing (Orders 5–6).

No Court-funded interpreter on this material

The applicant adduced no evidence of an entitlement to an interpreter, or that she could not understand or speak English sufficiently to participate. She prepared her Notice of Appeal and affidavit without translation. There was an “incongruity” between that demonstrated capacity and any requirement for an interpreter. If she seeks an interpreter, she can arrange it at her own cost ([34]).

Repeated unsuccessful applications: a note, not a finding under Pt XIB

The respondent complained of “ten applications for review or appeal, none of which [have] been successful”, relying on substantially the same fraud allegations. The evidence did not show whether the applicant had paid the costs orders against her. The Court noted it would be a matter for the respondent to consider any application under Pt XIB Div 1B ([32]). That is an observation, not a vexatious-proceedings order in this judgment.

Conclusion

The Application in an Appeal was dismissed insofar as it sought to adjourn the 27 October 2026 Full Court hearing and to obtain Court-provided interpreting. A short extension was granted for the digital transcript and Summaries of Argument, with dispensation of the transcript obligation if it is not filed in time, so the appeal is not deemed abandoned (Orders 1–6; [31], [33]–[34]).

The legal point is practical and firm: you do not adjourn a listed appeal to relitigate spent controversies, chase incomplete overseas subpoenas or prepare police complaints. Transcript delay can earn a filing indulgence. It does not automatically earn a new hearing date when the respondent would lose the fruits of litigation ([26]–[31]).

This judgment does not decide the underlying appeal from the 18 June 2026 costs and cross-application orders, and it makes no findings that any party committed fraud. Those issues, so far as they are properly before the Full Court, remain for the appeal hearing.

🧠 Take-Home Lesson

A listed appeal fixture is not a soft date. Adjournment needs an adequate foundation. Prejudice to the other party from delay — lost fruits of litigation, further cost and delay — counts ([31]).
Spent issues stay spent. Grounds that try to reopen orders already disposed of, where appeal rights have been exhausted, are an abuse of process. An adjournment sought so those issues can be revisited will be refused ([26]).
Transcript is useful, not always essential. Legal and discretionary error can often be tested from the judgment and the Appeal Book. Transcript helps with procedural fairness complaints, but the complaint still needs discernible merit ([30]).
Pay for the transcript, or explain why you cannot. Filing an extension application on the due date, without having paid and without claiming incapacity, undercuts an adjournment case ([28]–[29]).
A short extension can protect the appeal from abandonment without moving the hearing. Here the Court extended time to file the transcript and, if it is not filed, dispensed with the obligation so r 13.22(2) would not deem the appeal abandoned ([33]; Orders 1–2).
Interpreter requests need evidence. Preparing untranslated appeal documents in English sits poorly with an unsupported claim that Court-provided interpreting is required ([34]).
Self-represented litigants: police complaints, incomplete overseas subpoenas and a wish to gather more evidence are not, without more, reasons to stop a listed appeal ([24], [27], [31]).
Practitioners for respondents: record the prejudice of delay, and remember Pt XIB Div 1B if the pattern of unsuccessful applications warrants it ([31]–[32]).

“Do not adjourn the appeal to relitigate lost causes. A delayed transcript may buy filing time. It does not buy a new hearing date.”

“Abuse of process is not cured by calling it preparation.”

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