Equal Time Collapsed: Final Consent Orders Reopened Under s 65DAAA

In Gulshan & Gulshan (No 3) [2026] FedCFamC1F 667, Anderson J determined the mother’s application under s 65DAAA of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) to reconsider final consent parenting orders made on 11 November 2024 ([1], [4(a)]). The result: reconsideration was permitted; listed November 2024 parenting, time and changeover orders were discharged; interim sole parental responsibility and live-with to the mother; alternate-Saturday time of six hours via E Contact Centre changeovers; selected s 68B injunctions; overseas travel to Country B refused; ICL, Family Report, s 67ZBD information orders, final hearing listed 19 April 2027, and s 102NA applied (Orders; [53]–[54], [58]–[62], [67], [71]). The important point is that alleged April/May 2025 threats did not open the gate — the mother kept emailing the father to resume equal time and conceded the children were safe with him ([40]–[41], [52]). What did found significant change was the collapse of the equal-time regime on the ground: no time under the orders since 21 May 2025, breakdown of cooperation, and the father’s concessions that joint decision-making and equal shared care were no longer appropriate or workable ([39(c)–(d)], [42]–[44]). All paragraph references below are to the judgment.

Why it matters: Section 65DAAA is often framed as a high bar after final consent orders. This interim judgment shows how the bar is cleared — and how it is not. Contested family-violence allegations, standing alone, did not warrant reconsideration where the mother’s own post-incident emails urged equal shared care and her advocate conceded the children were safe with the father ([40]–[41], [52]). Collapse of cooperation, cessation of court-ordered time, and mutual recognition that the consent equal-time / shared parental responsibility regime had failed did ([42]–[44]). The interim risk answer was conflict-mitigation (contact-centre changeovers and cautious six-hour Saturday time pending a Family Report), not “no time” ([53]–[54]). Overseas travel to a non-Hague country still failed on Line & Line grounds despite a $5,000 security offer ([63]–[67]).

🧩 Facts and Issues

The parties and the children

The father (Mr Gulshan) brought Part VII proceedings on 13 October 2023. The mother (Ms Gulshan) is the respondent. She now seeks reconsideration of the November 2024 final consent parenting orders under s 65DAAA ([1]–[2]).
The parties married and commenced cohabitation in February 2012 in Country B, and separated in September 2023 ([5]).
There are two children: a male child born in 2013 (now 13) and a female child born in 2021 (now five). The male child has autism spectrum disorder and what the mother describes as a severe intellectual disability from a genetic condition ([6]).
Financial issues were joined in February 2024. Disclosure disputes caused adjournment of a final hearing listed for 7 September 2026 ([3]).

The November 2024 consent orders and later allegations

On 11 November 2024 the parties consented to shared parental responsibility and, after a transition, week-about care from 1 March 2025 ([10]). Save for overseas travel, the mother had largely obtained the parenting orders she had sought nine months earlier ([12]).
A Final ADVO operated to November 2026, including a restraint from places where the mother lives or works and her Suburb C residence ([13]).
An April 2024 garage / ADVO-breach allegation was contested. The mother said the father hid in the garage and threatened her; she said he pleaded guilty to breach. The father said he did not deliberately contravene and that a court dealt with the matter under s 10 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) with no conviction. The Court could not determine the competing accounts on an interim basis ([9]).
The mother alleged further threats on 18 April 2025 and 18 May 2025. The father denied them. The Court made no finding that those alleged events occurred ([14]–[17], [40]).
The father last spent time under the November 2024 orders on 21 May 2025, though he continued to see the children at school until 26 August 2026 ([22]).

The application and shifting proposals

By Application in a Proceeding the mother sought leave to reopen, sole parental responsibility, live-with to her, time with the father as agreed, s 68B injunctions, and permission to travel overseas ([27]–[28]).
Anderson J criticised the poorly framed application by reference to Hough & Willis (No 3) [2012] FamCA 969: the purpose of an application is to enable proper assessment of best interests, including how a relationship with the father might continue if leave were granted ([30]).
Mid-hearing, the mother’s advocate said she believed the children were safe with the father and wanted him to spend time on a reasonable proposal ([32]). By the end of the hearing she sought no time. The Court treated that late shift as adding to confusion about the ambit and genuineness of the application ([33]).
The father invited dismissal of the s 65DAAA application, but his counsel conceded that joint decision-making and continuation of shared care were no longer sought ([34], [39(c)–(d)]).

Issues

Has there been a significant change of circumstances since the November 2024 final parenting orders ([36], [39])?
If so, is it in the children’s best interests to reconsider those orders, and to what extent ([4(a)], [45]–[46])?
What interim parenting, changeover and s 68B arrangements should follow ([53]–[62])?
Should the mother be permitted to travel with the children to Country B (Line & Line; [63]–[67])?
What case-management orders are required (ICL, Family Report, s 67ZBD, final hearing, s 102NA; [70]–[71])?

⚖️ Applicable Law – Legislation, Regulations, Rules

s 65DAAA of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth): a court must not reconsider a final parenting order unless it has considered whether there has been a significant change of circumstances and is satisfied that, in all the circumstances, reconsideration is in the child’s best interests. Consent of all parties is a separate pathway ([36]).
ss 60CC and 60CG of the Act: best interests is paramount when making parenting orders; orders must, so far as consistent with best interests, be consistent with any family violence order and not expose a person to an unacceptable risk of family violence ([46]–[47]).
s 68B of the Act: power to grant injunctions appropriate for the welfare of the child, or that appear just or convenient. Not subject to the paramountcy principle, but best interests are powerful considerations (Attwood; Bennett; [56]–[57]).
s 68L / Independent Children’s Lawyer; s 67ZBD information orders; s 102NA(2): case-management tools used here ([71]; Orders).
Part XIVB / s 114Q: publication under the pseudonym Gulshan; identifying publication is restricted (cover notes). Use mother/father, not invented first names.
Cover sheet mistyped the Act year as 1976; the correct year is 1975.

📌 Precedents Relied On

The Court relied on these authorities:

Radecki & Radecki [2024] FedCFamC1A 246: s 65DAAA codifies the Rice & Asplund rule; parenting orders are never unequivocally final (s 65D(2)), but material change is a precondition, then best interests decide whether to reopen ([37]).
Arundell & Skewes [2024] FedCFamC1F 895 at [22]: three principles — prima facie significant change is necessary; the test is a manifestation of best interests; a court may authorise reconsideration of part only of a suite of orders ([37]).
Hough & Willis (No 3) [2012] FamCA 969: an application must enable proper assessment of best interests, including workable proposals for the children’s relationship with the other parent ([30]).
Franklyn & Franklyn [2019] FamCAFC 256; SS & AH [2010] FamCAFC 13; Deiter & Deiter [2011] FamCAFC 82: interim risk approach — serious contested allegations cannot simply be ignored; weigh probabilities and severity; risk assessment cannot always wait for every piece of tested evidence ([48]–[51]).
Attwood v Attwood [2022] FedCFamC1F 6; Bennett v Bennett (2001) FLC 93-088: s 68B is not subject to paramountcy, but best interests are powerful matters when the injunction intimately concerns the children’s welfare ([56]–[57]).
Line & Line (1997) FLC 92-729: overseas travel — assess risk of non-return, ties to Australia, motives to remain abroad, and Hague Convention status ([64]–[66]).
Wynn & Danilov (2023) 68 Fam LR 215 at [38]: self-represented litigants must still familiarise themselves with the legislation and present evidence properly ([20]).
Re K (1994) FLC 92-461: cited for appointment of an ICL in intractable conflict ([71], fn 48).

🧠 Analysis

Issue

When final consent orders provide for shared parental responsibility and equal shared care, and the mother later alleges family violence while also urging the father to resume equal time, when will s 65DAAA permit reconsideration — and what interim arrangements follow if the equal-time regime has collapsed on the ground?

Rule

Under s 65DAAA the Court must consider significant change and then whether reconsideration is in the children’s best interests ([36]). Radecki treats the section as codifying Rice & Asplund; Arundell adds that change must be shown on a prima facie basis, best interests then control, and partial reconsideration is available ([37]). At an interim hearing, contested risk allegations are assessed cautiously on agreed facts, less contentious evidence and available inferences (Franklyn; SS & AH; Deiter; [48]–[51]). Section 68B injunctions are assessed with careful regard to best interests even though paramountcy does not formally apply ([56]–[57]). Overseas travel is assessed under Line & Line, including Hague status and adequacy of security ([64]–[66]).

Application

Alleged April/May 2025 events did not warrant reconsideration

The father denied the alleged 18 April and 18 May 2025 threats. The Court could not make findings about that contested conduct ([40]). More decisively, after those dates the mother emailed the father urging compliance with week-about / equal shared care, complained that his non-compliance placed an unfair burden on her, disputed his accommodation explanation, and even asked whether he would assume full care while she travelled overseas ([40]–[41]). Her solicitor advocate conceded she believed the children were safe with the father ([32], [52]). On that material, the alleged events did not warrant reconsideration ([41]).

Significant change was found from collapse of the consent regime

What did found change was different. The children had not spent time under the November 2024 orders since May 2025 ([22], [42]). The father described conflict (including involvement of the mother’s family) and an inability to reach agreement about time ([42]). The Court found a breakdown of the cooperation that marked the relationship when the consent orders were made, underscored by the father’s concession that joint decision-making was no longer appropriate ([43]). He also conceded he had been “unable to avail himself” of shared time and gave no timeline for fixing accommodation ([44], [39(c)–(d)]). That combination was a significant change.

Best interests favoured reopening — with conflict as the primary interim risk

Best interests then favoured permitting reconsideration ([4(a)], [45]–[46]). The greatest interim risk identified was conflict between the parties, not a finding that the father was unsafe with the children ([52]–[53]). Changeovers at a Children’s Contact Service were ordered to reduce exposure to conflict ([53]). Pending a Family Report, time was limited to each alternate Saturday for six hours (10.00 am–4.00 pm or such other six-hour window as the Contact Service could accommodate) ([54]; Orders 4–6 — E Contact Centre).

Interim orders: discharge, sole PR, limited time, selected injunctions

Listed November 2024 parenting, time and changeover orders were discharged; sole parental responsibility and live-with to the mother; alternate-Saturday time via E Contact Centre ([68]; Orders 1–6). Under s 68B the Court granted a 100-metre residence restraint and a school/day-care restraint (save for ordinarily invited parent events / parent-teacher nights), plus a restraint on harassing, molesting, intimidating or stalking the mother ([58]–[59], [62]; Order 7). It refused a public-approach ban (children’s wish to see their father, on the mother’s own communications, made that counterintuitive) and a “removing the children” restraint (no evidentiary foundation of withholding since November 2024) ([60]–[61]). Stalking in the vicinity of the residence was not found proved; the residence injunction was framed to minimise conflict pending final hearing ([58]).

Overseas travel refused under Line & Line

The mother’s Country B travel application failed. Country B is not a Hague Convention country ([65]). Applying Line & Line, the Court noted maternal family ties in Country B, no real estate in Australia, unemployment / benefits-dependent income, ongoing animus from continuous litigation since October 2023, and that $5,000 security was inadequate to secure return ([66]–[67]). Permission to remove the children from Australia was dismissed ([67]).

Case management and criticism of how the case was run

Anderson J recorded that since October 2023 the litigation had generated 33 filed documents, 24 orders, 33 subpoenas and two published judgments while the parties appeared impecunious — litigation prolonged unnecessarily by the parties themselves ([70]). Orders followed for an ICL, a Family Report, s 67ZBD information from the Department of Communities and Justice and NSW Police, a five-day final hearing on 19 April 2027 at Parramatta, and s 102NA(2) for cross-examination ([71]; Orders). Separately, the Court criticised the mother’s poorly framed application (Hough) and her late shift to a “no time” proposal ([30]–[33]).

Conclusion

Reconsideration under s 65DAAA was permitted because the consent equal-time / shared parental responsibility regime had collapsed on the ground — not because the alleged April/May 2025 threats were proved ([40]–[44], [4(a)]). Interim orders put sole parental responsibility and live-with with the mother, restored limited Saturday time through E Contact Centre changeovers, granted selected s 68B protections, refused Country B travel, and set the matter on a managed path to a April 2027 final hearing (Orders; [53]–[54], [58]–[62], [67], [71]).

🧠 Take-Home Lesson

s 65DAAA asks two questions. Significant change, then best interests — not change alone ([36]; Radecki; Arundell; [37]).
Allegations are not findings. Contested threats that are denied, and that the Court cannot determine at an interim hearing, do not automatically reopen final orders ([40]–[41]).
Your own emails can defeat your threshold case. Urging equal time after the alleged incidents undercut the proposition that those incidents warranted reconsideration ([40]–[41], [52]).
Collapse on the ground can be the change. No time under the orders, breakdown of cooperation, and concessions that joint decision-making / equal care no longer work can clear the gate ([42]–[44]).
Partial reconsideration is available. The Court can reopen part of a suite of parenting orders (Arundell; [37], [68]).
Conflict can be the primary interim risk. Contact-centre changeovers and cautious time pending a Family Report may be the proportionate answer ([53]–[54]).
s 68B is not paramountcy — but best interests still bite. Grant what minimises conflict; refuse restraints that are counterintuitive or without foundation ([56]–[62]).
Non-Hague travel is hard. Family overseas, weak Australian ties, animus, and thin security ($5,000) failed under Line & Line ([63]–[67]).
Frame the application properly. Hough still matters: give the Court workable proposals for the children’s relationship with the other parent if leave is granted ([30]). Late shifts to “no time” damage credibility ([33]).
Support workers and McKenzie friends: when a client seeks to reopen consent equal-time orders, separate (1) what is alleged, (2) what can be proved now, and (3) what has actually stopped working on the ground — and do not ask for travel to a non-Hague country on inadequate security while the parenting threshold case is still being built ([40]–[44], [63]–[67]).

"I do not consider that the events of 18 April 2025 or 18 May 2026 warrant a reconsideration of the parenting orders made in November 2024. On the mother’s own evidence as tendered during the hearing, the mother insisted that the father comply with the orders." ([41]; “18 May 2026” appears to be a slip for 18 May 2025 — see [14]–[17], [40])

"Consent equal-time orders can be reopened when they stop working on the ground — even where contested violence allegations are not proved at the interim hearing." (FLAST takeaway)

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