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Five-Judge Full Court Rules Pickford "Plainly Wrong": Behaviour Is Family Violence Only If It Coerces, Controls or Causes Fear, and Judges Must Decide the Disputed Allegations
In Cannon & Moore [2026] FedCFamC1A 206, a five-judge Full Court (Alstergren CJ, Christie, Schonell, Strum & Curran JJ) allowed a self-represented father's appeal from final parenting orders. Those orders gave the mother sole decision-making responsibility and limited the father to supervised time indefinitely ([1], [8], [13], [17]). The appeal succeeded on Grounds 1 and 5 taken together ([14]). The primary judge had set out the mother's allegations of family violence in detail but never said which were proved and which were not, while relying on a "history of family violence" to justify supervision ([24], [37], [70]). The Court also used the appeal to correct the law. Statements in Pickford & Pickford (2024) FLC 94-230 suggesting that "family violence" can include behaviour that neither coerces nor controls nor causes fear are "plainly wrong" ([57]). The matter was remitted for rehearing, and the existing orders stay in force in the meantime ([71], Orders 1–3). All paragraph references below are to the judgment.
Why it matters: This five-judge bench decision is now the key statement on the meaning of "family violence" in s 4AB(1). The definition has two parts. First, there must be violent, threatening or other behaviour. Second, that behaviour must coerce or control a family member, or cause the family member to be fearful ([53]–[54], [63]). Behaviour alone is not enough. The case is also a strong reminder that a judge cannot simply say it is "unnecessary to determine whether every allegation of family violence is made out" and then rely on that "history" to make orders. Material disputed allegations must be decided, and the reasons must show why ([19]–[20], [26], [56]).
🧩 Facts and Issues
Background
- The parents have two young children ([1]). The parties separated after child protection involvement, which began when the mother told school staff she was afraid to go home ([2]–[3]).
- An interim family violence intervention order was made in December 2023. A final order followed in January 2024, by consent and without admissions, for 12 months ([4]). The father later breached that order, and the Magistrates' Court dealt with the breach by way of diversion ([5]).
- At trial the children lived with the mother and spent professionally supervised time with the father ([6]).
The trial
- The father sought joint decision-making responsibility and graduated time building to a week-about arrangement. The mother sought sole decision-making responsibility and supervised time. The Independent Children's Lawyer (ICL) supported the mother's proposal ([8]).
- A single expert psychologist assessed the father's "parenting risk" as high in two Family Reports, and found that his "insight and accountability remained limited" ([9]–[10]). The father had not engaged a clinical psychologist as recommended ([10]). His own psychologist had not worked with him on the family violence allegations ([11]).
- The father had attended 78 supervised visits, and the reports consistently described his interactions with the children as "positive, warm and child-centred" ([12]).
- Final orders were made on 19 June 2026. They gave the mother sole decision-making responsibility, provided for the children to live with her and for supervised time with the father with no end date, and reduced his electronic communication ([13], [17], [38], [40]).
The disputed allegations
The mother alleged a long list of behaviour that she said met the definition of family violence and posed a future risk to the children. These were allegations. The trial judge did not clearly say which of them were established ([21], [24]). They included:
- angry and abusive comments, and financially controlling conduct;
- a 2013 incident in which, she alleged, the father dragged her from bed and threw her out of the house at night, causing bruising;
- an alleged 2018 threat to "gouge out your eyes and bury you alive";
- an alleged 2021 incident in which he swung his fist at her face ([55]);
- abusive name-calling of the mother and one of the children, and keeping her family away from the home;
- using a location app to monitor her movements;
- rough handling of the younger child, including a December 2023 incident; and
- stopping payment of household bills and insurance without notice in 2024.
The father admitted calling the mother names such as "birdbrain", "pathetic" and "freeloader", but said the abuse was "mutual" conflict ([22]–[23]).
Issues on appeal
The father relied on seven grounds. The Full Court dealt only with two, applying the principle of judicial economy ([14]):
- Ground 1: were the reasons inadequate to expose the path to the critical findings on harm, indefinite supervision, the weight given to positive supervision reports and sole decision-making ([17])?
- Ground 5: did the primary judge find an ongoing risk of "coercive and controlling behaviour" without the forensic rigour and objective assessment required by Pickford ([41])?
⚖️ Applicable Law – Legislation, Regulations, Rules
- Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 4AB(1) — "family violence means violent, threatening or other behaviour by a person that coerces or controls a member of the person's family … or causes the family member to be fearful" ([43]).
- Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 4AB(2) and (2A) — non-exhaustive examples of behaviour that "may constitute" family violence, including economic or financial abuse ([44], [64]).
- Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 4AB(3) and (4) — the expansive meaning of a child being "exposed" to family violence ([48]).
- Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 43(1)(ca) — the mandatory requirement to have regard to the need to ensure protection from family violence ([45]).
- Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 60CG — parenting orders must, consistently with the child's best interests, be consistent with any family violence order and not expose a person to an unacceptable risk of family violence. It applies whether or not the parties raise it ([46]–[47]).
- Replacement Explanatory Memorandum, Family Law Legislation Amendment (Family Violence and Other Measures) Bill 2011 (Cth) — the background to the current s 4AB ([50]).
- ALRC and NSWLRC, Family Violence – A National Legal Response (Report No 114, 2010) — the source of the core definition (Recommendation 6–4) ([60]–[61], [65]).
- Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth) ss 6, 8 and 9 — costs certificates for the appeal and the rehearing ([72]–[73], Orders 4–7).
- Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) — provision for a Submitting Notice, relevant to refusing the ICL's costs application ([74]).
📌 Precedents Relied On
- Pickford & Pickford (2024) FLC 94-230 — the earlier Full Court decision on s 4AB(1). Statements of the majority (at paragraphs 3, 41 and 43 of Pickford), and its example of a punch at paragraph 44, are now held "plainly wrong" ([57], [59]). In all other respects it remains an accurate statement of the law, including the fact-finding guidance of Aldridge and Carew JJ ([66]–[68]).
- Sun Alliance Insurance Ltd v Massoud [1989] VR 8 and Bennett and Bennett (1991) FLC 92-191 — reasons are inadequate where the reasoning is not apparent or justice is not seen to be done, and an appeal court need not uphold a result merely because it falls within the range of discretion ([15]–[16]).
- Resource Pacific Pty Ltd v Wilkinson [2013] NSWCA 33 — failing to determine a material dispute of fact needed to decide the case may be an error of law ([20]).
- ASB17 v Minister for Home Affairs (2019) 268 FCR 271 — where an account is rejected, the decision-maker will usually need to explain why ([56]).
- SZEEU v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 150 FCR 214 — when an intermediate appellate court may depart from its own earlier decision as plainly wrong ([57]).
- Boensch v Pascoe (2019) 268 CLR 593 — judicial economy: the remaining grounds did not need to be decided ([14]).
- Re: Devin [2025] FedCFamC1F 211 — conduct that falls short of "family violence" as defined is still likely to be relevant to best interests ([69]).
🧠 Analysis
Issue
Were the primary judge's reasons adequate when he relied on a "history of family violence" without deciding which disputed allegations were proved? And what does s 4AB(1) actually require before behaviour counts as "family violence"?
Rule
- It will not always be necessary to decide every dispute, but failing to decide a material dispute of fact needed to dispose of the case may be an error of law ([20]).
- A party is entitled to know which allegations have been accepted and which rejected ([26]). Fact finding requires more than a bare statement that the judge is not satisfied something happened ([56]).
- Under s 4AB(1), behaviour is family violence only if it coerces or controls a family member, or causes the family member to be fearful. The word "that" operates as a qualifier ([53]–[54], [63]).
Application
A "history of family violence" with no findings behind it
The primary judge said it was "unnecessary to determine whether every allegation of family violence is made out", but found that the father's conduct over a long period placed the mother and children at risk and exposed the mother to "coercive and controlling behaviour" ([19]). The Full Court agreed that not every dispute must always be decided, but these disputes were material ([20]–[21]). The reasons "comprehensively detail" the mother's allegations but do not say which were established ([24]).
The judge's statement that "allegations made by both parents … constitute family violence" was "unhelpful" ([25]–[26]). The mother had made no concessions about any violence by her. So the statement could be read as a finding, without reasons, that her swearing at the father was family violence ([27]).
A global finding is not fact finding
The primary judge's key paragraph rejected the allegations of physical assault "globally", along with the threats to kill and the most humiliating alleged incident. He accepted that the father was "extremely rude and arrogant" and handled the younger child roughly in December 2023, but found this was not "an assault" ([28]). The Full Court said the paragraph dealt with specific issues globally. It did not explain why the mother's account of one specific incident was rejected, and did not identify which "violent, threatening or other behaviour" it addressed ([29]).
The alleged 2021 swing of a fist shows the problem. The mother's evidence described both an act (swinging a fist) and an effect (fear). If accepted, it would "plainly satisfy" both parts of s 4AB(1). Yet there was no explicit finding about it ([55]–[56]).
Not every part of Ground 1 succeeded
Ground 1 succeeded only in part:
- Supervision instead of a less restrictive regime: the Full Court disagreed with the father. The judge had relied on the expert's evidence, his finding that the father lacked insight, and the father's verbal aggression, and the reasons explained why supervision was needed for time to be "safe" ([30]–[35]).
- Positive supervision reports: the judge weighed them against "the history of family violence". Because it was unclear which allegations had been accepted, this global reference "may not provide adequate reasons for the imposition of supervision" ([36]–[37]).
- Sole decision-making: the reasoning, based on conflict and the children living with the mother, was "unassailable" ([38]–[39]).
- Reduced electronic communication: there was no assumption that the interim level of communication remained appropriate under final orders ([40]).
What s 4AB(1) really means
The Full Court agreed with Austin and Williams JJ in Pickford that the definition admits behaviour as family violence in only one of two ways. Either it "coerces" or "controls" a family member, which is objective, or it causes the family member to be "fearful", which is subjective ([51]–[52]). Violent, threatening or other behaviour alone will not satisfy the definition ([63]). Even an assault, which s 4AB(2)(a) lists as an example, "may" be family violence but will not be in every case ([64]).
The majority statements in Pickford that family violence could include conduct that neither coerces nor controls nor causes fear are "plainly wrong" ([57]). The Pickford example of a woman punching her partner without coercing, controlling or frightening him "falls short of meeting the statutory definition, and deliberately so" ([59]). The Court said this reading is "not to read it down, but to read it as intended" ([58]).
That reading reflects ALRC Report 114. The Commissions wanted the definition to describe the context of the conduct, not merely list incidents. A central feature of family violence is "a person exercising control and power over the victim by inducing fear" ([60]–[61]). Looking at the effect of conduct brings in seemingly minor behaviour that has real significance, and keeps out conduct such as violent resistance by a victim ([65]).
Leave criminal law language out of it
Section 4AB is about the nature and effect of conduct within a family relationship. The language of "assault" is "potentially unhelpful", because it imports criminal law concepts, including intention, that are not part of the definition ([62]). That bears on the primary judge's focus on whether the father "intended" to hurt anyone and whether conduct was "an assault" ([28]–[29]). Behaviour can be coercive, controlling or frightening without any intent, and the judge must find objectively whether behaviour was coercive or controlling. A person's own perception is not decisive ([68]).
What remains of Pickford
The rest of Pickford remains good law, including its guidance on fact finding. The judge should identify the behaviour, its full context and any explanation, and its impact (a bare assertion of feeling coerced is not enough). The judge should then make all relevant findings and explain why the behaviour is or is not family violence ([66]). The Full Court added that, where it arises, the judge must also decide whether the behaviour caused the target to experience fear ([67]).
Conduct outside the definition still matters
The judgment does not say that conduct falling outside s 4AB(1) is irrelevant. Adopting Strum J in Re: Devin, the Court said such conduct "will still likely be relevant" and will likely influence the overall exercise of discretion under Pt VII. Whether conduct meets the definition is only one issue in deciding a child's best interests ([69]).
Error shown, but the orders stay in place
Failing to make explicit findings about a lengthy history of asserted violence, which then implicitly underpinned supervised time, was error ([70]). But the lack of findings did not justify discharging the orders. The Court remitted the matter for rehearing and left the orders in place ([71]). A differently constituted court may still find that a significant number of the mother's allegations are established ([37]).
Costs
The appeal was allowed on a question of law. Both parents received costs certificates for the appeal and the rehearing ([72]–[73], Orders 4–7). The ICL's application was refused. Counsel for the ICL had filed no Summary of Argument, made no submissions and attended as a courtesy, and no Schedule of Costs was filed, even though the Rules allow a Submitting Notice ([74], Order 8).
Conclusion
The appeal was allowed, the orders of 19 June 2026 remain in force, and the proceedings were remitted to a judge of Division 1 for rehearing (Orders 1–3). The remaining five grounds were not decided ([14]). The judgment makes no findings about whether any of the mother's allegations happened. That is for the rehearing ([37], [71]).
🧠 Take-Home Lesson
- Family violence has two parts. There must be violent, threatening or other behaviour, and it must coerce or control, or cause fear ([53], [63]).
- An "assault" is not automatically family violence under s 4AB. Ask what the behaviour did to the family member ([59], [64]).
- Leave criminal law thinking at the door. Intent and "assault" are not part of the definition ([62], [68]).
- Conduct outside the definition can still count. It remains relevant to best interests ([69]).
- Judges must decide the material allegations. Reciting them, or saying it is unnecessary to decide them, is not enough if the orders rely on them ([20], [24], [26], [70]).
- Rejecting an account needs reasons. A bare "I am not satisfied it occurred" will not do ([56]).
- Winning an appeal does not end supervised time. Here the orders stayed in place pending rehearing ([71]).
- ICLs who only attend as a courtesy should not expect a costs certificate ([74]).
- Self-represented litigants and support workers: when presenting or responding to allegations, address each incident and its effect: coercion, control or fear. For an appeal, identify the specific allegations the judge failed to decide and show how the orders depended on them ([21], [37], [70]).
"Reciting the allegations is not the same as deciding them."
"Behaviour is family violence when it coerces, controls or causes fear. Find the behaviour, then find the effect."
