Disliking Joint Decisions Isn't Being Unable to Make Them: Joint Decision-Making Kept and a Graduated Path to Week-About Care After Dad Moved Closer

In Manzur & Danielle [2026] FedCFamC1F 600, the Court dealt with a high-conflict parenting dispute about three children, aged 11, 8 and 5. The mother sought sole decision-making and a limited increase in the father's time. The father sought joint decision-making and shared care if he lived close enough to the children ([1]–[2], [7]–[9]). The result: the parents have joint decision-making responsibility. The children live with the mother, and their time with the father increases from four to five nights a fortnight, then to week about, over 12 months. That pathway is suspended, and time drops back to four nights a fortnight, if the father moves more than 35 km from the children's schools (Orders 2, 7–9; [157], [165], [167]–[168]). The important point is that slow, frustrating and conflict-laden joint decision-making is not the same as an inability to decide jointly ([152]–[156]). The children's best interests were served by keeping both parents involved and building to equal time once the practical obstacle of distance was removed ([161], [168]). All paragraph references below are to the judgment.

Why it matters: Many separated parents argue that the other parent's communication style makes joint decisions impossible. Chief Justice Alstergren drew a clear line between parents who cannot decide together and parents who simply dislike doing so ([154]). Frustration, mistrust and long email chains do not, by themselves, justify removing a parent from major decisions ([155]–[156]). The case also shows how a move closer to the children, even after the trial has finished, can change the outcome on time ([11]–[12], [161]).

🧩 Facts and Issues

The family

The parents were in a de facto relationship from about 2013 and separated in 2022 ([3]). They have three children: X (11), Y (8) and Z (5) ([1]–[2]). Both parents have re-partnered ([21]).
The children live mainly with the mother and are well settled at their school and in their local community ([20]).
The post-separation relationship was characterised by "an unusually high degree of conflict". Communications were "lengthy, often adversarial", and often about matters that would ordinarily be resolved routinely ([22], [86]).
Disputes included delays in arranging therapy for Y, his ADHD assessment, X's secondary schooling, extracurricular activities and family events ([23]–[32]).
Under interim consent orders, the children spent three to four nights a fortnight with the father ([36]).

Distance and the re-opened hearing

At trial in May 2026 the father lived with his parents, about 90 km from the children's school ([64]).
Both parties accepted that if he stayed more than 50 km away, the existing three nights a fortnight should continue ([7]).
After judgment was reserved, the father moved to a rental property about 15 km from the children's school. The proceedings were re-opened on 22 June 2026 to receive that evidence, by consent ([11]–[12], [38], [65]).
A Judicial Conciliation Conference followed but did not resolve the dispute ([13], [39]–[40]). By the date of judgment, neither party was legally represented ([41]).

The competing proposals

The father: joint decision-making, and an eventual shared care arrangement if he lived within 50 km. He abandoned his earlier proposal that he have the final say if the parents disagreed ([8]–[9]).
The mother: sole decision-making, and an increase to four nights a fortnight, rising to five within two years, if the father moved within 20 km of the school ([8]–[9]).

Issues

Can the parents co-parent and communicate effectively and, if not, should the mother have sole decision-making responsibility ([48])?
Is it feasible and in the children's best interests to increase their time with the father, given the distance between the homes and his later relocation ([48])?

⚖️ Applicable Law – Legislation, Regulations, Rules

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), ss 64B, 65D and 60B: the meaning of "parenting order", the power to make parenting orders the Court considers proper, and the objects of Part VII ([117]).
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), ss 60CA and 65AA: the children's best interests are the paramount consideration ([118]).
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 60CC: the best-interests considerations, including safety, the children's views, their needs, each parent's capacity, and the benefit of a relationship with both parents ([118], [123]–[151]).
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), ss 61B, 61C and 61D: parental responsibility, which each parent holds unless a court order changes it, and the power to allocate decision-making jointly or individually ([119]–[121]).
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 4(1): the definition of "major long-term issues", including education, religion, culture, health, name and significant changes to living arrangements ([121]; Order 3).
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), ss 61DAA and 61DAB: what joint decision-making requires, and the rule that a parent need not consult the other about day-to-day decisions ([122]; Order 6).
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 114UB(1): each party bears their own costs unless circumstances justify a costs order ([188]).
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 140: the civil standard of proof for findings ([51], fn 2).
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), Part XIVB: the publication restrictions, which is why the parties and children are given pseudonyms (cover notes).

📌 Precedents Relied On

R & R (Children's Wishes) (2002) FLC 93-108: children's views are relevant and must be considered, but they cannot decide the outcome. Here, limited weight was given to them because of the children's ages, their exposure to the conflict and the absence of any firm preference ([134]).

🧠 Analysis

Issue

When separated parents communicate poorly and argue about nearly every decision, should one parent be given sole decision-making responsibility? And once the non-resident parent moves close to the children, should time increase to equal care?

Rule

Best interests are paramount. The Court applies the s 60CC considerations to each parent's proposal ([118]).
Parental responsibility is shared by default. Each parent has parental responsibility unless a court order changes that, and the Court may allocate decision-making about major long-term issues jointly or to one parent ([119]–[121]).
What joint decision-making involves. Under s 61DAA, parents with joint decision-making responsibility must consult about major long-term issues, while day-to-day decisions do not require consultation (s 61DAB) ([122]).

Application

Safety was not in issue

Family violence allegations were not pursued. The mother had made allegations of family violence in her material. At the start of the trial her counsel confirmed she was not seeking findings of unacceptable risk, and the allegations were not pursued ([49], [124], [126]).
The family report. The family report writer described the incidents the mother alleged as "episodic" and symptomatic of "dysfunctional relationship dynamics", rather than a pattern of family violence or coercive control ([125]).
No parental alienation. The Court did not accept that the children's reports of negative comments amounted to parental alienation ([127]).
Both homes safe. Each parent conceded the other could parent safely, and the Court found the children were not at risk in either home ([128]–[129]).

The real problem was conflict, not parenting capacity

Both experts' evidence pointed to conflict as the central issue:

The family report writer observed the children's interactions with both parents to be "positive and relaxed" ([98]). He considered the conflict was "keenly felt by the children" and "must be addressed with a sense of urgency" ([103]). He concluded there was "no unmanageable impediment" to the parents sharing responsibility if they were prepared to "recalibrate and prioritise the children's needs" ([113]).
The mother's treating psychologist accepted that the communications from the father he had seen "appeared to be cordial, appropriate and well-mannered" ([93]). He doubted that parenting courses alone would resolve the difficulties ([94]).

The Court accepted that the greatest risk to the children's wellbeing was their continued exposure to parental conflict ([143]). It also found the difficulty was "not one of individual parenting capacity, but of co-parenting capacity" ([147]–[148]).

Credibility and conduct of both parents

The father gave measured evidence and made concessions, but could be "uncompromising in the pursuit of his position and reluctant to abandon a point once raised" ([62], [69]).
The mother became defensive under cross-examination and found the father's messages "passive-aggressive" ([84]–[85]). The Court found her distrust had at times affected her willingness to engage constructively ([87]). Where her recollection conflicted with contemporaneous documents, the Court preferred the documents. That was expressly not a finding that she was deliberately untruthful ([89]).
Her concessions. She also conceded "I could have handled it better", and had at one stage accepted that five nights a fortnight was "a good place to start" if the father moved closer ([83], [90]).

Sole decision-making was refused

The mother's case was that the parents were incapable of deciding jointly. The Court did not accept that "in its absolute form" ([152]). Decisions were reached "slowly, inefficiently and only after considerable disagreement", but they were reached. Examples were Y's ADHD assessment, X's secondary school and the interim consent orders ([152]–[153]). The Chief Justice said:

"The evidence, therefore, does not establish an inability to make decisions jointly. Rather, it establishes that the parties dislike doing so. The distinction is important." ([154])

Frustration with the other parent's communication style "does not justify the removal of one parent from decision-making" ([155]). The main impediment was "not an absence of capacity but an absence of trust" ([156]). Joint decision-making was ordered ([157]). It comes with a structured process, plus a requirement that both parents complete a co-parenting program, which the Court combined with encouragement to keep using therapeutic supports ([158]–[159]):

written notice of a proposed decision (Order 4(a))
a written response within 14 days (Order 4(b))
mediation if the parents still disagree (Order 4(c))
communication through Our Family Wizard (Order 5)
the Focus on Kids parenting program within six months (Order 37)

Time: distance was the obstacle, and it had been removed

Distance was the barrier. It had framed both parties' proposals at trial. The father's move to about 15 km from the school substantially removed it ([160]–[161]).
Gradual, but not as limited as the mother proposed. The Court accepted a gradual transition, but not the mother's limit on the children's time with the father ([162]).
Expert support for more time. Neither expert suggested increased time should not occur, and the family report writer supported considering equal care if the father lived closer ([106], [163]).
Commitment shown. The father had taken the step that both experts and both parents regarded as central to any increase ([164]).
A 35 km radius. This balanced the practical realities of finding housing against travel burdens on the children. Because proximity underpins equal care, time drops back to four nights a fortnight if he moves outside that radius ([165]; Order 9).
Ordinary travel is fine. Moderate travel for school, activities and changeovers is a commonplace part of family life ([166]).

With no unacceptable risk, two capable parents and the distance obstacle gone, the children's best interests favoured equal shared care "implemented in a structured and graduated manner" ([167]–[168]).

Other orders and costs

Agreed arrangements. Holidays, special occasions, changeovers, communication and extracurricular arrangements were largely agreed and ordered substantially in those terms ([169]–[177]).
Travel and passports. Interstate and overseas travel is permitted with safeguards, and the passports stay with the mother. The Court expects reasonable requests for them not to be unreasonably withheld ([178]–[182]).
Injunctions. Both parents are restrained from discussing adult issues with the children, denigrating the other parent or their family, and showing the children communications between the parents ([183]–[184]; Order 38).
Future disputes. Family dispute resolution, at equal cost, is required before further litigation ([185]–[186]; Orders 39–42).
Costs. Neither party was wholly successful. The mother's costs application was refused, and each party bears their own costs ([187]–[191]).

Conclusion

The parents' difficulty was distrust and poor communication, not an inability to make joint decisions. So joint decision-making was ordered, with a structured consultation process, the Our Family Wizard app, a co-parenting program and injunctions to shield the children from the conflict ([154]–[159], [184]). Once the father lived about 15 km away, the children's time with him was set to increase in six-month steps, from four nights to five nights a fortnight, then to week about. That progression is tied to him staying within 35 km of the schools (Orders 8–9; [165], [167]–[168]).

🧠 Take-Home Lesson

"Difficult" is not "impossible". Courts distinguish parents who cannot make joint decisions from parents who make them slowly and unhappily. Evidence that decisions do eventually get made (a school choice, an assessment, consent interim orders) undermines a sole decision-making case ([152]–[154]).
Trust is the real issue, and it can be worked on. The Court treated an "absence of trust" as something to address through structure and education, not by excluding a parent ([156], [158]).
Proximity matters, and timing can be flexible. A relocation after the trial justified re-opening the evidence and changed the outcome ([11]–[12], [161]). An order tying equal time to a distance radius is a practical safeguard ([165]).
Your own concessions count. Accepting that you "could have handled it better", or that a proposal was "a good place to start", can shape the result ([83], [90]).
Keep children out of it. The family report writer's evidence of children feeling pressure to choose between their parents weighed heavily. Injunctions against discussing adult issues and denigration are standard and "necessary" in high-conflict cases ([101], [132], [184]).
Self-represented parents: contemporaneous documents generally beat recollection where they conflict. Keep your messages short, polite and child-focused, because the Court will read them ([86], [89], [93]).
Practitioners: a sole decision-making case built on communication problems needs evidence that decisions cannot be made, not just that they are hard. Courses alone may not satisfy the Court that the conflict will reduce, so consider therapeutic supports as well ([94], [158]–[159]).

"The evidence ... does not establish an inability to make decisions jointly. Rather, it establishes that the parties dislike doing so."

"The principal impediment to effective co-parenting is not an absence of capacity but an absence of trust."

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