Latest Digests RSSWed, 01 Jul 2026 05:28:19 GMTIn Harridan & Harridan [2026] FedCFamC1A 104, the wife won her property appeal because the appeal court found the primary judge used the wrong method when assessing contributions. The trial judge had divided the case into separate contribution categories — initial contributions, contributions during the relationship, inheritance, and post-separation contributions — then effectively gave the wife only a 10% uplift for an inheritance that represented almost 50% of the existing property pool. Schonell J held that this compartmentalised approach was legally erroneous. Once that error was exposed, the appeal court was required to intervene, allow the appeal, and re-exercise discretion. The wife’s entitlement increased from 56% to 65% of a net pool of $6,641,254.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The parties had a long relationship of about 20 years, three adult children, and a substantial property pool. The wife was 54 and had significant health limitations arising from PTSD and a permanent back injury after a workplace assault. The husband was 66 and a tradesperson.During the relationship, the parties acquired several properties. Importantly, the wife received a substantial inheritance from her father’s estate in 2016, valued at approximately $3.3 million, including real property. That inheritance became the central issue in the appeal because it represented nearly half of the parties’ existing property.At trial, the wife sought a 75:25 outcome in her favour. The husband sought 70:30 in his favour. The primary judge found the net property pool was $6,641,254, assessed contributions at 60:40 in favour of the wife, then gave the husband a 4% adjustment under s 79(5), producing a final outcome of 56:44 in favour of the wife.The wife appealed. Her written grounds included inadequate reasons, factual error, and challenges to the contribution and s 79(5) findings. During oral argument, her counsel also advanced the clearer point: that the result fell outside a reasonable exercise of dis... Read more

]]>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 05:28:19 GMTIn Gowden & Taggart [2026] FedCFamC1A 106, Schonell J dismissed the appellant’s Application in an Appeal seeking further expedition and asking the Court to meet the cost of transcript for an appeal against interim parenting orders involving a newborn child born through an altruistic surrogacy arrangement. The Court accepted the appellant had acted promptly and recognised the sensitivity of the matter, but held that the appeal was already listed within a little over two months, which effectively amounted to expedition. The Court also held that a transcript was not required because the interim hearing proceeded on the papers, there was no cross-examination, and the grounds of appeal challenged the reasons and orders rather than anything arising from oral evidence. The appellant was therefore relieved of the obligation to provide the transcript, but the broader application was dismissed.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The case concerned a newborn child, X, born in 2026. The matter arose from a complex altruistic surrogacy arrangement involving the child’s intended parents and the appellant, who was the surrogate and the biological father’s sister. The intended parents and the surrogate are Aboriginal. The primary judge recognised the matter as complex and sensitive, involving family fracture, intergenerational trauma, cultural issues, child protection records, and competing allegations about drug and alcohol use, family violence and mental health.Proceedings were commenced in Division 2 on 7 April 2026, four days after X was born. An interim hearing occurred on 7 May 2026, and interim parenting orders were made on 14 May 2026. Those orders provided that X live with the intended parents, that they have joint decision-making responsibility, and that X spend time with the appellant on specified days.The appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on 1 June 2026 and an Application in an Appeal on 4 June 2026. She sought expedition of the appeal and an order that the Court dispense with the... Read more

]]>Tue, 30 Jun 2026 23:15:37 GMTIn Fowles (No 3) [2026] FedCFamC1A 103, the Full Court granted limited leave to appeal where the applicant was subject to a harmful proceedings order and sought to challenge contravention orders that imposed a conditional 12-month term of imprisonment. The central issue was whether the primary judge should have applied the **criminal standard of proof — beyond reasonable doubt — rather than the civil standard — balance of probabilities — before making orders that could result in imprisonment. Leave was granted only on that ground. The other proposed grounds were rejected as irrelevant, misconceived, lacking reasonable prospects, or insufficiently particularised.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The applicant was subject to a harmful proceedings order under s 102QAC of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). Because of that order, he could not simply file an appeal as of right. He needed leave under the harmful proceedings regime before instituting appeal proceedings.The proposed appeal concerned orders made on 19 September 2025 after findings that the applicant had contravened final orders made on 6 October 2023. Those final orders required him to make payments for, or for the benefit of, the wife and to sign a document.The primary judge made a serious enforcement order: if the applicant did not comply with specified obligations within 60 days, he would be sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment, commencing from arrest and ending earlier if he complied with the obligations or by further order.Issues:Could the applicant, despite a harmful proceedings order, be granted leave to appeal?Did the proposed appeal have reasonable prospects of success?Should contraventions under Pt XIIIA that may lead to imprisonment be proved beyond reasonable doubt?Were the alternative grounds about s 140 Evidence Act, reliance on prior findings, and refusal of an adjournment sufficiently arguable?⚖️ Applicable Law – Legislation, Regulations, RulesFamily Law Act 1975 (Cth)s 102QAC — harmful proceedings orders.s... Read more

]]>Mon, 29 Jun 2026 23:59:38 GMTIn Rocchi & Hadak [2026] FedCFamC1A 100, Williams J dismissed the father’s appeal from final parenting orders that provided for the children to live with the mother, the mother to have sole decision-making responsibility except as to the children’s names, and the father to spend initially supervised time with the children after family therapy, progressing later to unsupervised time. The appeal failed because the father’s grounds and Summary of Argument did not properly identify appealable error. Instead, they were dense, repetitive, overlapping and largely attempted to re-agitate the case he had run unsuccessfully at trial.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The parties had two children. After separation, the children spent time with the father for a period, but that time ceased in May 2023. The parenting dispute then proceeded to a contested trial.The final orders provided that:the children live with the mother;the mother have sole long-term decision-making responsibility, except for changing the children’s names;the children spend time with the father, initially through a contact centre;the family attend family therapy;the father’s time progress gradually to unsupervised time, ultimately reaching three nights a fortnight during term time, holidays and special occasions.The father appealed, alleging procedural unfairness, inadequate reasons, misapprehension of evidence, improper reliance on expert evidence, misapplication of the best-interests framework, risk assessment errors, factual findings not open on the evidence, and discretionary error.He also filed an Application in an Appeal seeking to adduce further evidence, issue subpoenas to police officers, rely on subpoena material from District Court proceedings, and rely on amended orders if the appeal succeeded. That application was dismissed.Issues:Should the father be permitted to adduce further evidence on appeal?Were the father’s appeal grounds properly framed and compliant with the Rules?Did the primary judge deny the f... Read more

]]>Wed, 17 Jun 2026 04:43:58 GMTIn Rocchi & Hadak [2026] FedCFamC1A 100, Williams J dismissed the father’s appeal from final parenting orders that provided for the children to live with the mother, the mother to have sole decision-making responsibility except as to the children’s names, and the father to spend initially supervised time with the children after family therapy, progressing later to unsupervised time. The appeal failed because the father’s grounds and Summary of Argument did not properly identify appealable error. Instead, they were dense, repetitive, overlapping and largely attempted to re-agitate the case he had run unsuccessfully at trial.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The parties had two children. After separation, the children spent time with the father for a period, but that time ceased in May 2023. The parenting dispute then proceeded to a contested trial.The final orders provided that:the children live with the mother;the mother have sole long-term decision-making responsibility, except for changing the children’s names;the children spend time with the father, initially through a contact centre;the family attend family therapy;the father’s time progress gradually to unsupervised time, ultimately reaching three nights a fortnight during term time, holidays and special occasions.The father appealed, alleging procedural unfairness, inadequate reasons, misapprehension of evidence, improper reliance on expert evidence, misapplication of the best-interests framework, risk assessment errors, factual findings not open on the evidence, and discretionary error.He also filed an Application in an Appeal seeking to adduce further evidence, issue subpoenas to police officers, rely on subpoena material from District Court proceedings, and rely on amended orders if the appeal succeeded. That application was dismissed.Issues:Should the father be permitted to adduce further evidence on appeal?Were the father’s appeal grounds properly framed and compliant with the Rules?Did the primary judge deny the f... Read more

]]>Wed, 17 Jun 2026 04:43:13 GMTIn Rockford & Burnell [2026] FedCFamC1A 99, Strum J mostly dismissed the husband’s appeal from an indemnity costs order requiring him to pay the wife’s costs of the financial proceedings. The husband had been ordered to pay $171,900 on an indemnity basis, principally because of his litigation conduct, false evidence, non-disclosure, collateral pressure on the wife and her solicitor, and unreasonable rejection of offers. The appeal succeeded only on a small mathematical correction, reducing the amount to $164,700. Because the husband’s success was minor and the wife conceded the error once identified, he was still ordered to pay the wife’s appeal costs, with the $7,200 overpayment set off against those costs.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The original property proceedings ran over six trial days and produced final property orders under s 79. The wife later sought costs. The primary judge ordered the husband to pay the wife’s costs on an indemnity basis, fixed at $171,900.The primary judge’s reasons relied heavily on findings made in the property judgment, including that the husband:gave deliberately false and misleading evidence;failed to make adequate disclosure;engaged in coercive and controlling behaviour;caused the wife significant anxiety and pressure;pursued allegations against the wife’s solicitor;threatened collateral legal action;was belligerent about children’s school fees and financial support; andprolonged the proceedings through groundless contentions and unnecessary complexity.The husband appealed the costs order. He alleged bias, failure to consider one of his settlement offers, factual errors, calculation errors, and an improper exercise of discretion. His earlier appeal from the substantive property judgment had been deemed abandoned, so the findings in that judgment remained undisturbed.Issues:Did the primary judge’s adverse findings create a reasonable apprehension of bias in the later costs judgment?Did the primary judge fail to consider a material settl... Read more

]]>Tue, 16 Jun 2026 01:33:02 GMTIn Poirier & Poirier (No 3) [2026] FedCFamC1A 95, Aldridge J dismissed the husband’s appeal against a $150,000 costs order, rejected the wife’s cross-appeal seeking indemnity costs, but allowed the wife’s cross-appeal in part against enforcement orders requiring her to refinance or sell property. The key split in the case is this: the costs order survived because the primary judge’s broad-brush assessment was logical, fair and reasonable; however, the enforcement order was set aside because fresh evidence showed the husband had been charged with allegedly forging the wife’s signature on Westpac home loan documents, creating a real possibility that the mortgage liability itself may be challenged.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:After completed property proceedings, the primary judge ordered the husband to pay the wife’s costs fixed at $150,000. The reason was the husband’s litigation conduct: the primary judge found he failed to give timely and complete disclosure, was not honest about his financial interests, made valuation difficult, was dishonest in cross-examination, and pressured his father to give dishonest evidence. This conduct substantially increased the wife’s legal costs.The wife’s actual legal costs were over $500,000. The primary judge assumed a party/party assessment would likely reduce that to around 50–60%, then fixed the husband’s contribution at $150,000. The husband appealed, arguing this was too broad, inadequately reasoned, unsupported by evidence, and not properly tied to the scale of costs.The wife cross-appealed. She argued the costs order should have been indemnity costs, and also challenged enforcement orders requiring her to refinance a Westpac loan or sell property to discharge the husband’s liability. After the enforcement orders, the husband was charged with allegedly forging the wife’s signature on Westpac loan documents. The wife sought to rely on that fresh evidence on appeal.Issues:Was the $150,000 fixed costs order a permissible broad-brush ... Read more

]]>Thu, 11 Jun 2026 04:47:32 GMTIn Abramsson & Abramsson (No 5) [2026] FedCFamC1A 90, the Full Court dismissed the mother’s appeals against both the final parenting orders and the separate property orders. The parenting appeal challenged a severe outcome: the children were to live with the father, the father had sole parental responsibility, and the mother was to have no time and no communication with the children unless agreed, apart from limited cards/gifts and information-sharing. The Full Court held that the appeal was largely an attempt to re-argue evidence, re-weight recordings, revisit factual findings, and introduce material that was available at trial. None of that established appealable error.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The parties had two young children. The mother had been the primary carer until September 2024, when interim orders placed the children with the father. After the first final parenting decision was successfully appealed and remitted, the matter was reheard. During the remitted proceedings, the mother withheld the children from March to May 2025, leading to delivery/recovery orders and a restraint on her contact.At the rehearing, the primary judge made strong findings against both parents, but especially against the mother. The father was criticised for provocative and insensitive behaviour, including recording incidents instead of protecting the children, but the Court was not persuaded he posed an unacceptable risk. By contrast, the mother was found to have perpetrated family violence, engaged in coercive and controlling behaviour, lacked insight, and posed an unacceptable risk of psychological and emotional harm to the children.The mother appealed on broad grounds including bias, procedural unfairness, factual error, misapprehension of evidence, inadequate reasons, erroneous use of recordings, and failure to apply the best-interests framework. She also appealed separate property orders dismissing the parties’ s 79 applications and discharging interim spousal maintenance and... Read more

]]>Mon, 08 Jun 2026 20:16:39 GMTIn Anselmo & Anselmo [2026] FedCFamC1A 87, the Full Court dismissed the mother’s parenting appeal but allowed her property appeal in part. The most practical parenting point is this: the mother complained on appeal that the primary judge wrongly relied on an adversarial psychological report from Dr Phil Watts, but she had not applied to exclude it at trial, had long known the father intended to rely on it, and had herself relied on its contents in closing submissions. The Court held that, in those circumstances, the report was properly before the primary judge and no appealable error was shown. The property appeal succeeded only because the primary judge failed to give adequate weight to the wife’s very substantial initial contributions, leading the Full Court to re-exercise discretion and increase her entitlement from 52.5% to 60% by way of a larger superannuation split.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The parties commenced living together in 2006 and separated in 2021. They had two children, born in 2012 and 2014. The trial involved both parenting and financial proceedings. At trial, the mother was self-represented. Final parenting orders provided that the children live with the mother outside Perth and spend time with the father in the Perth metropolitan area. The mother had sole decision-making responsibility, but subject to specific restraints designed to protect the children’s relationship with the father.The father had obtained reports from Dr Phil Watts, a clinical psychologist, in 2023 and 2024. Those reports concerned the father’s psychological functioning and capacity for employment. They were filed and relied on by the father. The mother later argued on appeal that the reports were inadmissible because leave had not been obtained to rely on adversarial expert evidence.In the financial proceedings, the primary judge found a net pool of approximately $1.32 million, assessed contributions at 52.5% to the mother / 47.5% to the father, and made no further adjustme... Read more

]]>Mon, 08 Jun 2026 00:00:13 GMTIn Winston & Winston [2026] FedCFamC1A 88, Austin J dismissed the mother’s appeal from final parenting orders requiring the child to live with the father in rural Queensland and spend time with the mother. The mother had sought to relocate with the child to Brisbane, but the primary judge found the father offered greater stability, security and routine. On appeal, the mother argued she was denied procedural fairness because the Court did not reconvene the matter to seek further submissions about her fallback option of remaining in City C. Austin J rejected that argument: the mother had ample opportunity to present her case, had effectively disavowed City C as a workable option, and the primary judge was not required to disclose provisional views before delivering judgment.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The parties had one child. During the relationship, the family lived on a rural property west of City B in Queensland. In 2018, the mother and child moved to City C so the mother could establish a retail business. The parties separated in 2019. For several years, the child moved between the parents in shared-care cycles, but that arrangement became impractical once the child started school. The child then lived primarily with the mother and spent time with the father on occasional weekends and school holidays.The father commenced parenting proceedings in 2023 after the mother proposed moving away from City C. By trial, the mother’s primary position was that the child should live with her in Brisbane. Her fallback position was that the child remain with her in City C, but only temporarily until secondary school. The father’s primary position was that the child live with him in rural Queensland.The primary judge ordered that the child live with the father, spend regular time with the mother, and undertake distance education while still of primary school age. The mother appealed.Issues:Was the mother denied procedural fairness because the primary judge did not reconvene the Cou... Read more

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