Latest Digests RSSThu, 13 Aug 2026 04:11:21 GMTIn Kunkle & Suss (No 2) [2026] FedCFamC1F 346, Stewart J admitted a series of audio recordings made by the mother for use in parenting proceedings. The father did not expressly consent to being recorded, and the Court was not satisfied that his apparent awareness of some recordings amounted to implied consent. However, the Court accepted, on a prima facie basis, that the recordings were reasonably necessary for the mother’s protection in the context of alleged family violence. The recordings were therefore admitted under the exception in the Surveillance Devices Act 2016 (SA), and Stewart J added that, even if that conclusion were wrong, the recordings would have been admitted under s 138 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth).🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The matter came before the Court during parenting proceedings involving one child, X, born in 2018. The mother sought to rely on a number of audio recordings and transcripts said to support her allegations of family violence. The recordings were made covertly, or at least treated by the Court as covert on a prima facie basis.The father did not expressly consent to the recordings. Some later recordings suggested he may have known he was being recorded, because he spoke as though he was aware of it and expressed his view that the recordings would not be admissible in Court. Stewart J considered whether that awareness could amount to implied consent, but found that it did not, at least on the facts of this case.The mother’s position was that the recordings were made because they were necessary for her protection from family violence. The father largely denied the allegations or placed a different context around them. The Court treated the matter as a discrete evidentiary hearing — effectively a voir dire — about admissibility, not a final determination of the truth of the family violence allegations.The recordings admitted included 12 recordings dated between 11 June 2022 and 13 July 2022, ranging from about two and a half min... Read more

]]>Thu, 13 Aug 2026 04:11:21 GMTIn Bekker & Lantosca [2026] FedCFamC1F 344, Parker J determined parenting, property and de facto spousal maintenance issues after a short de facto relationship involving a young child, X, with significant special needs. The mother sought to exclude the father from X’s life. The Court rejected that position, finding that the father did not pose an unacceptable risk and that the evidence did not support the mother’s claim that X’s dysregulation was caused by time with the father. However, the Court also recognised X’s autism, sensory sensitivities, dysregulation and reliance on the mother as coregulator. The result was a cautious reintroduction regime: X lives with the mother in Adelaide, the mother has sole major long-term decision-making responsibility, and the father spends gradually increasing daytime time with X, initially supervised and subject to therapeutic and educational conditions. The Court also divided non-superannuation assets 80/20 in the mother’s favour, equalised superannuation, and ordered the father to pay $510 per week spousal maintenance until 1 February 2028.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The parties commenced cohabitation in Victoria in January 2020 and separated on 4 December 2022, after a relationship of just under three years. Their child, X, was born in 2021 and was aged five by the end of the trial. X has significant special needs, including an autism spectrum disorder diagnosis, speech delay, emotional regulation difficulties, sensory sensitivities, self-harming behaviours when dysregulated, and heavy reliance on the mother for coregulation.After separation, the mother unilaterally relocated with X from Victoria to South Australia. The father remained in Victoria. X spent 10 periods of professionally supervised time with the father between November 2023 and May 2024, but otherwise had not spent time with him for close to two years by the end of the trial.Both parties made serious allegations of family violence and poor mental health. The moth... Read more

]]>Mon, 10 Aug 2026 06:08:17 GMTIn Potter (A Pseudonym) v The King [2026] HCA 25, the High Court unanimously dismissed an appeal concerning the admissibility of a covert audio recording made by a wife of a private conversation with her husband. In that recording, the husband admitted he had previously sexually assaulted her while she was asleep. The High Court held the recording was not unlawful because it was reasonably necessary for the protection of the complainant’s lawful interests, namely her right to bodily autonomy and integrity. This is a major authority for domestic and family violence contexts because it recognises that a victim-survivor may make a secret recording not merely to gather evidence, but to protect herself from real ongoing risk.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The appellant was tried in the District Court of South Australia on four counts of rape. The complainant was his wife. The prosecution alleged that the appellant had sex with her without her knowledge and consent while she was asleep. He was convicted on counts 2 and 4.Before the conduct alleged in count 4, the complainant secretly recorded a conversation with the appellant on her mobile phone. During that conversation, he admitted to having previously sexually assaulted her while she was asleep, including saying, “I sexually assaulted you” and that he started having sex with her while she was asleep.The complainant’s evidence was that she made the recording so she could use it to convince herself never to go back to him, no matter what happened or how he tried to convince her. At the time, she said she did not intend to take the matter further.The trial judge admitted the recording. The South Australian Court of Appeal majority held the recording was not covered by the statutory exception, but nevertheless admitted it under a discretionary approach. The High Court held that was wrong: if the recording was unlawful under the South Australian statute, there was no discretion to admit it. However, the High Court held the recordi... Read more

]]>Sat, 08 Aug 2026 23:25:04 GMTIn Cowden & Walsman [2026] FedCFamC1A 129, Campton J dealt with a late Application in an Appeal filed by the mother shortly before the substantive parenting appeal was due to be heard. The mother sought to fundamentally recast her appeal grounds, rely on amended appeal documents, and adduce further evidence. The father opposed the application, arguing prejudice and delay. The Court accepted that the amended grounds changed the nature of the appeal and that the father was prejudiced, but held that the interests of justice required the appeal to be determined on its “true merits”. Leave was granted in part, the appeal was adjourned to 29 September 2026, and the mother was required to pay the father’s thrown-away costs fixed at $15,241 as a condition of the indulgence.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The mother appealed parenting orders made on 20 March 2026 concerning two children, X, born in late 2015, and Y, born in early 2018. The parents commenced cohabitation in 2011, married in late 2012, separated in early 2021, and divorced in late 2022.X had significant additional needs. He was diagnosed with a neurological condition soon after birth, lived with epilepsy, had a mild intellectual disability, and was being assessed for autism spectrum disorder or ADHD. The parenting dispute included issues about schooling, treatment and therapy for X, extracurricular activities, the children’s needs, parental capacity, co-parenting capacity, and the role of the father’s fiancée, Ms D, in the children’s lives.At trial, final orders were made for the children to live with the father, spend week-about time with the mother, and for the father to have sole decision-making responsibility for both children’s education and health, and for X’s extracurricular activities. The father was also to hold the children’s travel documents when not in use.The mother’s original appeal challenged those orders on grounds including failure to consider Ms D’s harmful behaviour or lack of insight, inadequat... Read more

]]>Thu, 06 Aug 2026 06:00:00 GMTIn Suss & Kunkle [2026] FedCFamC1A 127, the Full Court dismissed the father’s parenting appeal. The father argued he was denied procedural fairness because audio recordings were admitted despite late disclosure, and because he was forced to continue with a solicitor appointed shortly before trial under the legal aid scheme connected with s 102NA. The Court rejected both arguments. The decisive point was that the father had been given a reasonable opportunity to arrange representation well before trial, but his lack of preparation resulted from his own choices, repeated changes of solicitors and late legal aid arrangements — not from any denial of procedural fairness. The father was ordered to pay the mother’s costs fixed at $13,723.60 and the ICL’s costs fixed at $7,764.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The parties were both aged 34. They began living together in January 2016 and finally separated in June 2022. They had one child, X, born in June 2018. After separation, the father remained in the family home with the child. The mother initially saw the child only under limited supervised arrangements controlled by the father.The mother commenced parenting proceedings on 19 August 2022. Interim consent orders later gave the mother increasing time with the child, first four nights per fortnight and then five nights per fortnight.The final hearing was originally listed to commence on 16 June 2025. Shortly before that hearing, the mother disclosed 24 audio recordings, of which she sought to tender 12. The recordings appeared to contain admissions by the father to significant acts of family violence. The father objected to the recordings being admitted, relying on late disclosure and issues under surveillance and evidence legislation. The primary judge allowed time for the father’s counsel to listen to the recordings and take instructions, then heard the admissibility argument. The recordings were admitted.The final hearing was relisted to 13 August 2025. By that time, the fat... Read more

]]>Thu, 06 Aug 2026 00:58:25 GMTIn Tiang & Pen [2026] FedCFamC1A 121, Schonell J allowed the mother’s appeal from final de facto property orders. The primary judge had assessed contributions at 98% to the father and only 2% to the mother, despite finding that the mother had been the children’s primary carer throughout their lives and had undertaken the substantial majority of parenting over approximately 13 years. The appeal succeeded because that assessment gave the mother’s parenting contributions only token weight. On re-exercise, the Court assessed contributions at 16.5% to the mother, added an 8.5% adjustment under s 90SM(5), and varied the orders to produce an overall division of 25% to the mother and 75% to the father.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The parties met in Country G in 2006. The primary judge found that they lived together in a de facto relationship in New South Wales from March 2018 to November 2021, a period of approximately three years and eight months.The parties had two children, aged 13 and 12 at the time of hearing. The children had always lived with the mother. The primary judge found that the mother undertook the majority of parenting before, during and after the de facto relationship. Since separation, the father had spent no time with the children and had contributed only by way of assessed child support, which commenced in June 2025.The father brought all significant assets into the relationship. The mother made no direct or indirect financial contribution to the acquisition, conservation or improvement of those assets. Her contributions were non-financial, primarily as parent and carer.At trial, the mother sought an equal division of the net asset pool. The father argued she should receive a lump sum of $350,000, representing about 10% of the pool. The primary judge found the net pool was $3,477,870, assessed contributions as 98% to the father and 2% to the mother, then added 8.5% under s 90SM(5). That produced an overall outcome of 10.5% to the mother and 89.5% to the ... Read more

]]>Tue, 04 Aug 2026 00:23:21 GMTIn Pensak & Department of Families, Seniors, Disability Services and Child Safety [2026] FedCFamC1A 117, Campton J dealt with an urgent Application in an Appeal arising from Hague Child Abduction Convention return orders requiring two children to be returned to Japan. The substantive appeal was listed one week later, on 3 July 2026. The applicant father was permitted to file an Amended Amended Notice of Appeal, an Amended Summary of Argument, and an Amended List of Authorities, narrowing the appeal to a procedural fairness ground. The request to adduce further evidence was deferred to the Full Court hearing, while the proposed subpoena to the father’s former solicitors was withdrawn on the basis of agreed facts recorded for the appeal. Costs were reserved.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The Department commenced Hague return proceedings on 10 April 2025. The trial was conducted over several dates: 30 March 2026 to 1 April 2026, and 10 April 2026. On 23 April 2026, the primary judge ordered the return of the children, X born in 2018 and Y born in 2021, to Japan under the Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986 (Cth).The father filed a Notice of Appeal on 24 April 2026. On 1 May 2026, return of the children to Japan was stayed pending determination of the appeal. On 11 May 2026, procedural appeal orders were made requiring the father to file his Summary of Argument and List of Authorities by 5 June 2026, and requiring the Department and the Independent Children’s Lawyer to file their materials by 26 June 2026.The original Notice of Appeal contained 14 grounds, mixing legal, factual, discretionary and procedural complaints. The father later sought to amend and narrow the appeal to a single procedural fairness ground. That amended ground alleged that the primary judge relied on unsound bar table representations about the father’s legal representation and readiness to proceed, denied him a real opportunity to prepare, refused to consider objections to evidenc... Read more

]]>Mon, 03 Aug 2026 03:56:06 GMTIn Tschida & Tschida [2026] FedCFamC1A 114, the Full Court dismissed almost all of the husband’s property appeal. The husband tried to rely on fresh valuation evidence, complained about delay, addbacks, gambling findings, the wife retaining the former matrimonial home, treatment of alleged third-party funds, and capital gains tax protections. Nearly all grounds failed because the husband was trying to escape forensic positions he had taken at trial. The only successful point was a narrow correction under the slip rule: the primary judge had used $925,000 for the former matrimonial home when the parties had agreed on $975,000. That correction reduced the amount payable to the wife by $22,500, but the appeal was otherwise dismissed and the husband was ordered to pay the wife’s costs of $24,179.47.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The parties married in 1979, separated in late 2021 or early 2022, and had three adult children. The wife had been the primary homemaker and caregiver. The husband had been the primary breadwinner until 1992, when he was diagnosed with cancer and did not return to full-time work.At first instance, the primary judge determined that a property division of 55% to the wife and 45% to the husband was just and equitable. The orders included transfer of the husband’s interest in the former matrimonial home to the wife, sale of two investment units, and distribution of the sale proceeds so that the husband received his overall 45% entitlement. The husband retained interests in overseas properties and other assets.A major issue at trial was the treatment of addbacks, including payments to adult children, litigation funding, legal fees and allegations of gambling by both parties. After judgment, the husband appealed and also filed an Application in an Appeal seeking to rely on fresh valuation material suggesting the former matrimonial home had increased in value since the valuation relied on at trial.Issues:Should the husband be allowed to adduce fresh valuation... Read more

]]>Thu, 30 Jul 2026 03:15:27 GMTIn Charis & Charis [2026] FedCFamC1A 92, the Full Court dismissed the husband’s property appeal and upheld an equal division of a property pool exceeding $127 million. The major asset was the husband’s shares and options in D Company, a valuable United States technology company he co-founded. The husband argued that the company’s dramatic post-separation increase in value was attributable to his post-separation work and should have produced a 70/30 division in his favour. The Full Court rejected that argument, holding that the primary judge was entitled to assess contributions holistically over the whole relationship and was not required to quarantine the D Company interests into a separate pool. The husband was ordered to pay the wife’s appeal costs fixed at $91,371.53.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The parties commenced cohabitation in 2005 and had two children, born in 2008 and 2010. Over the relationship, they accumulated substantial wealth, largely connected to the husband’s involvement in D Company, a United States corporation involved in quantum computing technology. The husband co-founded D Company in 2015 and became its CEO, president and board chair in 2016.The husband received 2.5 million common stock shares in D Company, which vested over four years. By July 2025, those shares were valued at approximately AUD75.7 million. He also held 1,725,000 options, which had vested by November 2023, with a strike price of USD1.29 per option. The total property pool was found to be approximately AUD127.7 million.At trial, the husband sought 70% of the net assets. The wife sought an equal division. The primary judge assessed contributions as equal, declined any further adjustment under s 79(5), and made orders giving effect to a broadly equal division.The husband appealed, arguing procedural unfairness, error in the treatment of foreign law and transferability of shares, error in treating shares and options as property, inadequate reasons, and error in assessing contribution... Read more

]]>Tue, 28 Jul 2026 01:30:38 GMTIn Hong & Lai (No 2) [2026] FedCFamC1A 125, Riethmuller J allowed the appellant’s appeal after finding that the refusal of an adjournment denied him a real opportunity to present his case. The appellant was part-way through a property trial when the matter was adjourned. On the resumed hearing date, his lawyers did not appear, his Legal Aid position was unresolved, and s 102NA prevented him from personally cross-examining the respondent. The primary judge refused an adjournment, proceeded with the hearing, and dismissed the appellant’s property application. On appeal, that refusal was found to have affected the final result and caused a miscarriage of justice.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The parties were in dispute about whether their de facto relationship ended in April 2011 or October 2022. That date mattered because the appellant filed his property settlement application on 5 December 2023. If the relationship ended in 2022, the application was within time. If it ended in 2011, the application was long out of time and required an extension.The final hearing began on 25 September 2025. Both parties were legally represented. The hearing was not completed because the Court had another matter to hear, so it was adjourned part-way through the appellant’s cross-examination to 4 December 2025.On the resumed date, the appellant’s lawyers did not appear. The appellant sought an adjournment, explaining that there were issues with his Legal Aid representation and that he needed a lawyer to conduct the balance of the case. This was critical because an earlier order under s 102NA prohibited the parties from personally cross-examining each other. If the appellant remained unrepresented, he could not personally cross-examine the respondent.The primary judge refused the adjournment, proceeded with the hearing, found the de facto relationship ended in April 2011, refused an extension of time, and dismissed the appellant’s property application. The appellant appealed.Issues:Did the pri... Read more

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