Latest Digests RSSWed, 06 May 2026 23:24:38 GMTIn Driesen & Klerk [2026] FedCFamC1A 74, Schonell J allowed a property appeal because the primary judge materially misstated the mortgage on the wife’s initial property as $509,000 instead of $509. That error was not a harmless clerical slip: it radically understated the wife’s initial financial contribution and infected the equal-contributions assessment. The appellate court re-exercised discretion under the amended s 79 framework, assessed contributions 60/40 in the wife’s favour, dismissed the husband’s cross-appeal, and reduced the wife’s payment obligation from about $730,369.50 to $323,795.20.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The parties married in 2009, separated under one roof in late 2020, and had one child. The appeal concerned only property orders.At the commencement of cohabitation, the wife owned the Suburb D property, purchased before the relationship. Her evidence was that the property was effectively unencumbered, with a mortgage balance of only $509. However, the primary judge recorded the mortgage as approximately $509,000, then found the parties’ contributions to be equal.The husband also cross-appealed, arguing the primary judge wrongly gave no weight to his adversarial expert accountant’s retrospective valuation of his business interest. The expert had been engaged unilaterally by the husband, with information supplied only by him, and the report failed to explain key valuation reasoning.Issues:Was the incorrect mortgage figure a mere clerical error, or a material factual error affecting the contribution assessment?Should the appeal court remit the case or re-exercise discretion?Did the primary judge err by giving no weight to the husband’s adversarial expert valuation evidence?Under the amended s 79, how should the Court assess contributions and existing property interests?⚖️ Applicable Law – Legislation, Regulations, RulesFamily Law Act 1975 (Cth)s 79 — alteration of property interests, including identification of existing property/liabilities, assessme... Read more

]]>Wed, 06 May 2026 23:24:38 GMTIn Zakariya & Rana [2026] FedCFamC1A 75, the Full Court (Riethmuller J) reinforced a critical principle in parenting litigation: lawful use of medicinal cannabis does not immunise a parent from scrutiny regarding its impact on parenting capacity. The decision confirms that courts may impose protective conditions (such as drug testing) even in the absence of direct evidence of impairment, where broader risk factors justify caution.🧩 FactsThe parties had three children (aged 14, 12, and 9) who had lived with the mother since separation in 2018.Key background:The father had a significant criminal history, including drug supply and weapons offencesHe had previously engaged in family violence toward the motherHe had no meaningful contact with the children since 2019He was using prescribed medicinal cannabis at the time of trialThe primary judge ordered a graduated reintroduction regime, including:Supervised contact progressing to unsupervised timeA requirement that the father provide three negative hair follicle tests (including THC-free) before progressing to overnight timeThe father appealed, arguing:His cannabis use was legal and medically necessaryDrug testing requirements were excessiveOther ancillary orders (injunctions, travel, changeovers) were unreasonable⚖️ IssuesWhether the primary judge erred in imposing drug testing conditions despite lawful medicinal cannabis use.Whether the Court improperly assessed the impact of cannabis on parenting capacity.Whether ancillary parenting orders (injunctions, travel, changeovers) were outside discretion.Whether the appeal disclosed error under appellate principles.⚖️ Applicable Law – Legislation, Regulations, RulesFamily Law Act 1975 (Cth)s 60CA — Best interests of the child paramounts 60CC — Best interests factors (including parental capacity and safety)s 102NA — Restrictions on personal cross-examination in family violence casess 114UB — Costs in family law proceedingsFCFCOA Rules 2021 (Cth)r 13.39 — Further evidence ... Read more

]]>Tue, 05 May 2026 00:01:48 GMTIn Bartos & Smagulova [2026] FedCFamC1A 70, the Full Court (Harper, Riethmuller & Behrens JJ) delivered an important appellate decision clarifying a recurring misconception in parenting litigation: a trial judge is not required to determine every disputed allegation of family violence, particularly where those allegations are not central to the issues the Court must decide. The case reinforces that parenting proceedings are not a forum for resolving all factual disputes or moral grievances, but are instead tightly focused on the child’s best interests.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The case concerned a five-year-old child who had always lived with the mother. The primary judge ordered:The child live with the motherSpend regular time with the father (alternate weekends, holidays, special occasions)The mother have sole parental responsibility, with obligations to inform the fatherThe father appealed, arguing that the primary judge failed to:Make findings that the mother had made false allegations of serious family violenceProperly assess risk and parental capacityAdequately consider evidence (including a Catholic priest’s evidence denying alleged threats)Critically:Neither parent alleged unacceptable riskNeither sought supervised timeThe case was not framed as a safety caseIssues:Whether the primary judge erred by failing to make findings on alleged false family violence claims.Whether the judge failed to properly assess risk and best interests under s 60CC.Whether the reasons were inadequate for failing to address all disputed evidence.Whether failure to resolve factual disputes amounted to appealable error.⚖️ Applicable Law – Legislation, Regulations, RulesFamily Law Act 1975 (Cth)s 60CA — Best interests of the child are paramounts 60CC — Factors relevant to best interests (no longer “primary” vs “additional”)s 65D — Broad discretion to make parenting orderss 65AA — Reinforces best interests frameworkFCFCOA (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)r 13.23 — Requirements for challengin... Read more

]]>Fri, 01 May 2026 04:47:10 GMTIn Fierro & Bien (No 2) [2026] FedCFamC1A 65, the Full Court (Gill, Howard & Christie JJ) delivered a highly instructive appellate decision demonstrating how procedural fairness, jurisdictional limits, and statutory cost prohibitions operate independently. The appeal was allowed in part only, with the Court carefully isolating where error mattered—and where it did not.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The appellant (a self-represented litigant and the child’s older half-sibling) brought an appeal against orders which:Dismissed parenting proceedings for want of prosecutionDismissed three interlocutory applications (contempt, costs, translation)Ordered the appellant to pay ICL costs (~$6,961)The litigation history was extensive and repetitive, spanning multiple registries and years. By the time of appeal:The child had turned 18Parenting proceedings were effectively spentKey procedural events:Late attempt to adduce further evidence was rejectedTrial adjournment refusedAppellant declined to proceed → proceedings dismissedIssues:Whether dismissal of the parenting proceedings for want of prosecution was erroneous.Whether dismissal of the three extant applications breached procedural fairness.Whether the costs order against the appellant was lawful.Whether procedural unfairness requires automatic appellate relief.⚖️ Applicable Law – Legislation, Regulations, RulesFamily Law Act 1975 (Cth)s 114UB — General rule: each party bears own costss 114UC(1) — Court may order parties to pay ICL costss 114UC(2) — Mandatory prohibition: no costs order if financial hardship would resultFederal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth)s 69(4) — Power to dismiss for want of prosecutions 26(2)(b)(ii) — No appeal from adjournment decisionss 100 — Review of registrar decisions (de novo)Rulesr 13.39 — Time limits for adducing further evidence on appealr 13.40 — Review of registrar decisions📌 Precedents Relied OnAppeals & Error PrinciplesHouse v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 — appellate error pr... Read more

]]>Thu, 30 Apr 2026 03:58:15 GMTIn Fierro & Bien (No 2) [2026] FedCFamC1A 65, the Full Court (Gill, Howard & Christie JJ) delivered a highly instructive appellate decision demonstrating how procedural fairness, jurisdictional limits, and statutory cost prohibitions operate independently. The appeal was allowed in part only, with the Court carefully isolating where error mattered—and where it did not.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The appellant (a self-represented litigant and the child’s older half-sibling) brought an appeal against orders which:Dismissed parenting proceedings for want of prosecutionDismissed three interlocutory applications (contempt, costs, translation)Ordered the appellant to pay ICL costs (~$6,961)The litigation history was extensive and repetitive, spanning multiple registries and years. By the time of appeal:The child had turned 18Parenting proceedings were effectively spentKey procedural events:Late attempt to adduce further evidence was rejectedTrial adjournment refusedAppellant declined to proceed → proceedings dismissedIssues:Whether dismissal of the parenting proceedings for want of prosecution was erroneous.Whether dismissal of the three extant applications breached procedural fairness.Whether the costs order against the appellant was lawful.Whether procedural unfairness requires automatic appellate relief.⚖️ Applicable Law – Legislation, Regulations, RulesFamily Law Act 1975 (Cth)s 114UB — General rule: each party bears own costss 114UC(1) — Court may order parties to pay ICL costss 114UC(2) — Mandatory prohibition: no costs order if financial hardship would resultFederal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth)s 69(4) — Power to dismiss for want of prosecutions 26(2)(b)(ii) — No appeal from adjournment decisionss 100 — Review of registrar decisions (de novo)Rulesr 13.39 — Time limits for adducing further evidence on appealr 13.40 — Review of registrar decisions📌 Precedents Relied OnAppeals & Error PrinciplesHouse v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 — appell... Read more

]]>Thu, 30 Apr 2026 03:57:39 GMTIn Dayan & Shaul [2026] FedCFamC1F 242, Parker J delivered a powerful and sobering decision on unacceptable risk, confirming that serious non-physical family violence, coercive control, mental health factors, and lack of insight can justify a complete severance of parental contact. The Court ultimately ordered no time, no communication, and strict injunctions, prioritising the child’s safety over any theoretical benefit of a relationship.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The case concerned a five-year-old child who had lived exclusively with the mother since birth. The father had no meaningful relationship with the child, having last seen her as an infant.The mother alleged serious family violence, including:Threats to kill and rapeCoercive control, intimidation, and stalkingHarassment via messages and associatesPsychological manipulation using her past traumaThe father denied these allegations, but the Court found:His evidence was unreliable due to cognitive impairmentHis behaviour demonstrated anger, impulsivity, and poor insightThere was illicit drug use, criminal history, and ongoing risk factorsExpert evidence (family consultant and psychologists) raised significant concerns about risk, particularly given:No existing relationship with the childThe father’s volatility and lack of insightThe likely psychological harm to the mother, impacting her parentingThe Independent Children’s Lawyer (ICL) supported the mother’s position:➡️ No time, no communicationIssues:Whether the father posed an unacceptable risk of harm to the child.Whether any protective measures (e.g. supervision) could adequately mitigate that risk.Whether it was in the child’s best interests to have any relationship with the father.⚖️ Applicable Law – Legislation, Regulations, RulesFamily Law Act 1975 (Cth)s 60CA — Best interests of the child are paramount.s 60CC — Factors include safety, psychological needs, and parental capacity.s 60CG — Court must ensure orders do not expose a person to unacceptable risk of... Read more

]]>Thu, 23 Apr 2026 01:44:54 GMTIn Ashdown & Markin (No 2) [2026] FedCFamC1F 164 (Wilson J, 16 March 2026), the Court delivered a highly practical ruling explaining when and why four medical experts should give evidence concurrently (“in the hot tub”) in a parenting trial involving serious family violence allegations and disputed psychological risk evidence. Although the final orders were made by consent, the reasons function as an unusually clear procedural guide for practitioners: the Court grounded the “hot tub” decision in (i) expert duties to the Court, (ii) the Evidence Act admissibility principles for expert opinion, (iii) the Family Law Act’s case-management duties and relaxed evidence regime in parenting matters, and (iv) the overarching statutory obligation to conduct parenting litigation quickly, inexpensively and efficiently.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts: This parenting proceeding commenced in 2022 (Division 2) and was later transferred to Division 1. The trial was vacated twice in 2025 (including for updated expert assessments and because earlier time estimates were unrealistic). The matter ultimately proceeded in March 2026 as a 10-day trial. There were extensive allegations of family violence and competing views about the father’s psychological state and future risk. Four medical experts (three psychologists and one psychiatrist) produced reports that diverged on key matters such as diagnosis, risk, insight and change.Because the lay evidence had already overrun its planned duration, the Court explored whether the expert phase—estimated to take at least two full days if done sequentially—should instead be taken concurrently. After a recusal application was dismissed, the judge raised the question and the parties took instructions. Ultimately, orders were made by consent for concurrent evidence.Issues:In a Division 1 parenting trial, when is it appropriate to take expert evidence concurrently rather than sequentially?What principles and safeguards ensure procedural fairness when experts ar... Read more

]]>Mon, 13 Apr 2026 01:08:03 GMTIn Sauter & Holt (No 2) [2026] FedCFamC1F 153 (Carew J, 12 March 2026), the Court delivered a highly instructive property decision where a husband transferred control of multiple businesses to a third party lender after separation, purportedly to satisfy loans. The Court set aside the share transfers under s 106B, ordered the sale of the businesses and multiple properties, repaid the third party’s loans with interest only up to the transfer date, and divided the net property 65/35 in the wife’s favour, including a significant uplift due to family violence impacts and future factors. The judgment is also notable for its extraordinary referrals: documents were directed to the Attorney-General’s Department for possible investigations, and referrals were made to professional regulators regarding conduct at trial.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts: The wife and husband separated in late 2022/early 2023. The husband controlled companies operating three businesses and acquired multiple properties. A third party (second respondent) had advanced $650,000 in cash loans (two at 15% p.a., one at 18% p.a.) documented as company borrowings with the husband as guarantor. After proceedings commenced, the third party demanded repayment and, in May–June 2023, the husband transferred his shares (and control) in the companies to her, giving her control of the businesses. The wife sought property orders and relief under s 106B to unwind those dispositions.Issues (as framed by the Court after concessions mid-trial):Were the share transfers made to defeat (or likely to defeat) an anticipated property order, so as to be set aside under s 106B?Did the businesses’ value at transfer time “roughly equal” the debt (so the transfer didn’t defeat the wife’s claim)?Was there enough other property to make a just settlement without setting aside the transfers?Should the loans be treated as the husband’s personal liability alone, or as liabilities to be accounted for in the pool?What is a just and equitable... Read more

]]>Fri, 10 Apr 2026 00:58:44 GMT🚨 Major wake-up call for AI users 🚨A federal court has ruled in United States v. Heppner (Feb 2026): Your chats with public generative AI (ChatGPT, etc.) are NOT protected by attorney-client privilege.Why? You're sharing with a third party → no confidentiality. AI is not your lawyer. The reasoning is straightforward. Privilege depends on confidentiality, and using a public Al tool involves sharing information with a third party.👀🤔This position is consistent with the Australian position, that AI-Chats are even potentially breaching s 114Q of the Family Law Act (Cth) which is a prohibition on publishing Court information.In a recent Australian Case (unpublished) a Judge held :"The conduct of this appeal illustrates the challenges presented to the Court and litigants fromreliance on artificial intelligence, notwithstanding that it may present as offering expertise andefficiency. The risk that entering documents into an AI program will result in a breach ofs 114Q of the Act (Mertz & Mertz (No 3) (2025) FLC 94-285) is outside the scope of thisappeal."With FLAST-AI Private Server you are safe as any data is stored on your own server and AI chat history logs are disabled. However if you use the publicly available products like ChatGPT, Gemini, Claude or Grok, those records are potentially subject to a subpoena application and/or a case against you for breaching s 114Q of the Family Law Act. Click Here to Schedule a Free Demo of FLAST-AI

]]>Mon, 30 Mar 2026 08:04:40 GMTIn Koroma & Ishak [2026] FedCFamC1A 18 (Aldridge, Jarrett & Schonell JJ, 4 March 2026), the Full Court dismissed a property appeal that tried to weaponise Shinohara & Shinohara to undo an orthodox “add-back” approach taken under the pre–Family Law Amendment Act 2024 regime. The decision is significant as precedent because it draws a clear transitional line: Shinohara’s post-amendment s 79 reasoning about notional property has no application to cases governed by the earlier legislative framework, and the long-standing add-back authorities remain binding unless and until properly overruled. The Court also gave a practical evidentiary warning: post-separation ATO liabilities won’t be brought into the pool without evidence explaining how they arose and where the money went.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts: The parties are both medical professionals, married in 2003, with five children. They separated under one roof around mid-2020 and divorced in 2021. The wife commenced property proceedings in 2021 (later also parenting, though parenting was not appealed). At trial, a balance sheet (Exhibit 1(v4)) recorded agreed and disputed items, including a contentious “ADDBACKS” section. The primary judge found the husband had transferred very large sums (over $3.4m) to related parties / overseas accounts / associates, rejected his explanations, found him an unsatisfactory witness, and treated those sums as “add-backs” (in substance: value that ought to have been available for division but was unilaterally dealt with). The primary judge assessed net assets at about $22.67m, found contributions equal, then adjusted 2.5% in the wife’s favour (52.5/47.5), resulting in a payment to the wife of about $1.87m, plus superannuation split.Issues:Shinohara / procedural fairness: Did the primary judge err by not inviting post-hearing submissions about Shinohara & Shinohara?“Add-backs” legality: Did the primary judge err in notionally adding back large sums to the pool?Reasons / factual error: Were the... Read more

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