Latest Digests RSSFri, 09 Oct 2026 07:32:20 GMTIn Demelza & Arlie [2026] FedCFamC2F 1175, the Court dealt with a wife’s application to join her former husband’s parents to her property case, so that she could seek a declaration under s 78 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) that the husband held a beneficial interest in the home registered in the parents’ names, by way of a constructive trust or, alternatively, a resulting trust. The result: the joinder application was dismissed, the wife’s points of claim were struck out, the husband’s application for security for costs was formally dismissed, and the costs of the joinder application will be decided on written submissions (Orders 1–6; [81], [83]–[84]). The important point is that joining third parties requires an arguable case built on facts that, if proved, would support the relief sought ([37]–[41]). The husband’s statements to the wife that “we own half” and that he had contributed $400,000 were not evidence of what his parents intended, and the objective documents showed the home was bought with a loan and the parents’ savings, not with a $400,000 contribution from him ([73], [79]–[80]). All paragraph references below are to the judgment.Why it matters: Many couples live in a property owned by one spouse’s parents, and many spouses are told it is “partly ours”. This judgment shows that, when a marriage ends, those words alone will not bring the parents into the case. To join the legal owners, the claimant needs evidence of the owners’ own intention or of an actual contribution to the purchase, not just what their spouse said. And a planned bequest in a will is not the same as a present share in the house: here, the husband’s talk of “$400,000 equity” was potentially explicable by his understanding of a bequest in his parents’ will ([67], [73(d)]).🧩 Facts and IssuesThe parties and the proceedingsThis is an interlocutory decision in property proceedings that the wife started on 3 April 2025, after a marriage of seven years ([1], [20]). The judgment is published ... Read more

]]>Fri, 09 Oct 2026 07:32:20 GMTIn Kotsas & Balleas [2026] FedCFamC2F 1180, the Court dealt with an oral application by the respondent, made on the first day of a final property hearing, to adjourn the trial because his solicitor had been ill and because he said the applicant had not disclosed documents, including bank statements and a trust deed. The result: the application was dismissed (Order 1; [11]), the trial went ahead, and the case settled on the second day ([13]). The important point is that an adjournment is weighed against the interests of justice as a whole, including the other party’s right to have the case heard and the direction in s 81 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) to finally determine the parties’ financial relationships ([9]). Here, the parties had been separated for almost as long as they had lived together ([5]), an adjournment would have meant “many, many months” rather than days ([10]), the trust deed had already been provided ([6]), and the respondent had filed a detailed affidavit, so he was “not bereft of evidence” ([8]). All paragraph references below are to the judgment.Why it matters: Many parties assume that if they are not fully ready on the first morning of trial, the Court will simply give them more time. This judgment shows why that is a risky assumption. An adjournment on the day is not a short pause. In a busy, over-listed court, it can push the case back many months and displace other families who have been waiting for their own hearings ([10]). The Court weighs that cost, and the cost of further delay to the other party, against the reasons for asking.🧩 Facts and IssuesThe parties and the proceedingsThe parties began a de facto relationship in or about August 2021. They never married, and they separated in April 2024, so they lived together for “a bit more than two and a half years but less than three” ([2]).Ms Kotsas started the proceedings on 11 August 2025 ([2]). The judgment is published under a pseudonym with approval under s 114Q(2) of the Family Law A... Read more

]]>Fri, 09 Oct 2026 05:27:12 GMTIn Cannon & Cannon [2026] FedCFamC1F 615, the Court dealt with a self-represented mother's application, in long-running parenting proceedings, for an order that the protections in s 102NA(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) apply at the final hearing, so that neither parent personally cross-examines the other and any cross-examination is done by a lawyer ([1]–[3]). The result: deciding the application on the papers, Jarrett J ordered under s 102NA(1)(c)(iv) that the requirements of s 102NA(2) apply to the cross-examination of each party (Order 1; [6], [26]). The important point is that, even where none of the circumstances that trigger the ban automatically is present, the Court has a discretion to apply it. That discretion is "not available merely for the asking" ([16]), but the Court does not have to decide whether the family violence allegations are true. It looks at the existence, nature and seriousness of the allegations and any objective circumstances supporting or undermining them ([18]–[19]). Here, the respondent's concessions, and the fact that neither he nor the Independent Children's Lawyer opposed the order, were important ([22]–[23], [25]). All paragraph references below are to the judgment.Why it matters: Parties sometimes assume that if criminal charges were dropped and no family violence order is currently in force, they will have to face personal cross-examination by the other party. The respondent made those very points here ([10]). This judgment shows that the Court can still order that cross-examination be done only by lawyers, where that protects the quality of the evidence and the integrity of the trial ([24], [26]).🧩 Facts and IssuesThe parties and the proceedingsThese are parenting proceedings with origins in litigation that started in 2020. The current case is the applicant mother's application, filed in May 2025, to vary parenting orders made by consent on 6 September 2022 ([2]). The parties "have been engaged in litigation and conflict sin... Read more

]]>Fri, 09 Oct 2026 02:12:03 GMTIn Lyric & Lyric [2026] FedCFamC1F 623, the Court dealt with a husband's oral application, made as he began his evidence on the first day of a five-day property trial, for leave to rely on an affidavit he had filed at 10.32am that morning about alleged structural defects in a Queensland property he bought in late 2022 ([2]–[3], [6], [9]). The result: Anderson J dismissed the application in ex tempore reasons delivered the next day (Order 1; [1], [24]). The important point is that the husband had known about the alleged defects since 2024 and early 2025, had filed two trial affidavits and had been before the Court many times without raising them, so the material "could have with reasonable diligence been disclosed and discovered earlier" ([18]–[24]). In any event, the quotation he relied on was provisional and "wholly unhelpful", letting it in would have caused "clear prejudice" to the wife, and the alleged defects could still be put to the single expert valuer in cross-examination ([25]). All paragraph references below are to the judgment.Why it matters: Final hearings run on timetables, and every filing deadline is set for a reason. A party who sits on an issue that could affect the value of a major asset, then tries to bring it in on the morning of trial, risks being shut out of relying on that evidence. This judgment also shows how a judge tests an explanation for delay: against everything else the party managed to do in the meantime ([21]).🧩 Facts and IssuesThe parties and the proceedingsThis is a property case under s 79 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). The wife is the applicant and the husband the respondent (cover page; [2]). The judgment is published under a pseudonym with approval under s 114Q(2) (cover notes).The parties began living together in July 1999, married in 2005 and physically separated on 11 October 2021. The wife says they effectively separated under one roof in July 2019 ([4]).In late 2022, the husband bought a property at "Suburb D" in Queen... Read more

]]>Fri, 09 Oct 2026 00:32:41 GMTIn Shumakov & Ankudinova [2026] FedCFamC1A 174, Christie J dealt with a self-represented father’s appeal from Division 2 orders made on a Review of interim parenting (and related) orders of a senior judicial registrar. The result: the appeal was allowed, the Application for Review and the father’s Application in a Proceeding were remitted for rehearing before a different judge, and the father received a costs certificate under s 9 of the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth) capped at $1,969.44 (Orders 1–3; [46], [49]–[50]). The important point is that procedural fairness is about the fairness of the hearing, not the fairness of the outcome ([32]). Where a represented party files a late affidavit inside the r 5.07 two-business-day window, a self-represented litigant must be given a real opportunity to be heard about receiving that material and to meet the new case. Reading the affidavit without that inquiry, then dismissing the father’s extant application as “vexatious” without a proper opportunity to address that characterisation, was appealable error ([26], [38], [45]). All paragraph references below are to the judgment.Why it matters: Interim parenting Reviews often run on the papers with curtailed procedure. That does not cancel the hearing rule. Self-represented parents frequently face late affidavits, shifting ICL proposals and multiple applications on the same day. This judgment says the Court (and the represented parties who know the file) must still make sure the unrepresented party can meet the case actually being run ([35], [41]–[42]). A finding that an application is “vexatious” is serious. If it engages s 102QB, the statutory gateway and a specific opportunity to be heard are required ([45]).🧩 Facts and IssuesThe parties and the childrenMr Shumakov (the appellant father) appealed against a Division 2 judge’s decision on a Review of parenting and property orders of a senior judicial registrar made on 9 January 2026 ([1]).Ms Ankudinova is the respond... Read more

]]>Thu, 08 Oct 2026 21:34:14 GMTIn Okorie & Myska (No 4) [2026] FedCFamC1A 173, Campton J dealt with an Application in an Appeal by a self-represented applicant who sought to adjourn a listed Full Court appeal so she could obtain a transcript, gather further overseas evidence and pursue alleged fraud complaints. The result: the adjournment was refused, the Application in an Appeal was dismissed, but a short extension was granted to file the digital transcript (and, if it is not filed, the transcript obligation is dispensed with so the appeal is not deemed abandoned), with consequential extensions for Summaries of Argument (Orders 1–6; [31], [33]). The important point is that an appeal fixture will not be put off so a party can relitigate issues already disposed of where appeal rights have been exhausted, or chase new evidence and police complaints that sit outside the appeal. A delayed transcript can justify a short filing indulgence; it does not, by itself, justify abandoning the hearing date ([27]–[31]). All paragraph references below are to the judgment.Why it matters: Self-represented appellants often treat a missing transcript, incomplete subpoenas or a desire to “investigate fraud” as reasons to stop the appeal clock. This judgment draws a hard line. The prejudice to the respondent from delay — lost fruits of litigation, further cost and delay — counts ([31]). Grounds that try to reopen spent orders are an abuse of process, and the Court put the applicant on notice that, absent more, the proposed grounds did not appear to enjoy reasonable prospects of success ([25]–[26]). Transcript remains useful for procedural fairness complaints, but legal and discretionary error can often be tested against the judgment and the Appeal Book alone ([30]).🧩 Facts and IssuesThe appeal under challengeMs Okorie (the applicant) appeals from orders of a Division 2 judge made on 18 June 2026 in Myska & Okorie (No 5) [2026] FedCFamC2F 888 ([1], [20]). Those orders required her to pay the respondent’s costs of a Rev... Read more

]]>Thu, 08 Oct 2026 19:23:28 GMTIn Burgess & Burgess (No 2) [2026] FedCFamC1F 649, the Court dealt with whether a wife could keep relying on a recording she had secretly made of a conversation with her husband, after the High Court's decision in Potter (A Pseudonym) v The King [2026] HCA 25 changed the legal ground under an earlier ruling that had let it in. The result: the earlier order admitting the recording was discharged, Parker J recused herself, the part-heard property trial was aborted and sent for reallocation to another judge, and the husband was granted a costs certificate (Orders 1–6; [48], [59]–[60], [63]). The important point is that, under the South Australian legislation applied here, even a recording made lawfully to protect the maker's lawful interests can only be used in the limited situations the Act allows, and these family law property proceedings were not one of them ([32]–[36]). Section 138 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) could not override that restriction ([44]–[45]). And because the judge had already heard the recording and lengthy cross-examination based on it, she could not fairly be seen to put it out of her mind ([58]–[59]). All paragraph references below are to the judgment.Why it matters: Secret recordings come up all the time in family law. Many parties assume that if the recording is relevant, or if they had a good reason to make it, the court will let it in under a general discretion. This judgment shows why that assumption is dangerous. The State surveillance law can control whether the recording can be used at all, not just whether it was lawfully made. Getting it wrong can cost more than the recording: here it cost four days of trial, the trial judge and the hearing itself ([3], [58]–[60]).🧩 Facts and IssuesThe parties and the proceedingsThis is a property case under s 79 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) between the applicant husband and the respondent wife ([1]). The judgment is published under a pseudonym with approval under s 114Q(2) (cover notes).The parti... Read more

]]>Thu, 08 Oct 2026 03:19:42 GMTIn Assies & Assies (No 2) [2026] FedCFamC1F 640, the Court dealt with a mother’s application to stay a final parenting order. That order let the father relocate their five-year-old daughter, Y, to “Country C” while the mother’s appeal was pending. The result: the stay was refused, and the interim restraint on removing Y from Australia was discharged ([120]–[121]; Orders 1–2). The important point is that a stay is not automatic just because an appeal has been filed. The applicant has to show a proper basis. Here, Bennett J’s preliminary view was that every ground of appeal was weak, not arguable or misconceived ([71], [85], [89], [103], [105]). The judge also found the mother’s bona fides “questionable” because of how she timed her consent to the older child’s departure against the filing of her appeal ([106]–[107]). Finally, the judge was satisfied that Y’s best interests were served by going to Country C now, even though she might have to come back if the appeal succeeds ([120]). All paragraph references below are to the judgment.Why it matters: Many parents, and some practitioners, treat a Notice of Appeal as an emergency brake. It isn’t. “The mere filing of an appeal is insufficient to grant a stay” ([50]). If you want the status quo kept pending appeal, you need arguable grounds that would actually change the outcome, evidence supporting your factual case, and conduct that shows the application is brought in good faith and with the child in focus.🧩 Facts and IssuesThe familyThe parents married in 2005 in City B, Country C, and separated in February 2025 ([14]). The parents and all the children hold dual Australian/Country C citizenship. The family moved from Country C to Australia in 2019 ([16]).There are four children ([15]):Ms CC (20) was living with the father at trial and planned to return to Country C in November 2026 ([15(a)]).Mr R (18) has lived in City B since December 2025, near the maternal grandmother ([15(b)], [25]).X (14) moved to Country C in Septe... Read more

]]>Thu, 08 Oct 2026 01:49:20 GMTIn Kozlowska & Maiella [2026] FedCFamC1A 170, the mother appealed final parenting orders made by the Magistrates Court of Western Australia. Those orders placed the 13-year-old child, X, in the father’s sole care and conferred sole parental responsibility on him. The appeal was dismissed, the application to adduce further evidence was dismissed, and the mother was ordered to pay the father’s costs fixed at $13,000. 170All paragraph references below are to the judgment paragraphs in Kozlowska & Maiella [2026] FedCFamC1A 170.The central point is this:The mother’s procedural fairness appeal failed because the Court found she had been given a real opportunity to participate. She left Court, filed a Notice of Discontinuance, maintained that position the next day, and no party sought an adjournment. The Court was still required to determine the father’s and ICL’s applications in X’s best interests.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The parties were the parents of one child, X, aged 13: [3]. They had final parenting orders made by consent in June 2019, providing for equal shared parental responsibility and week-about care: [5].In 2022, disputes arose about X’s care, welfare and development. Both parties sought to vary the 2019 orders: [6]. By the time of the final hearing, the mother sought orders that X live with her and that she have sole parental responsibility. The father, supported by the ICL, sought orders that X live with him and that he have sole parental responsibility. X had been living exclusively with the father since about mid-2025: [8].The final hearing commenced on 7 April 2026. The mother was self-represented. The father was legally represented and X was represented by the ICL: [9].On 8 April 2026, while the mother was still under cross-examination, members of the father’s family attended Court during the lunch adjournment. The mother became distressed, left Court and did not return that day: [10]. The matter was adjourned until the following morning and the ... Read more

]]>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 07:09:40 GMTIn Verissimus & Polycarpe [2026] FedCFamC1A 166, the Full Court allowed the appeal in part. The mother succeeded on the property and spousal maintenance issues, but failed on the parenting appeal. The financial orders were partly set aside and remitted for rehearing, while the parenting orders changing the residence of the younger two children to the father remained in place. All paragraph references below are to the Full Court’s reasons in case 166. 166The core distinction is simple:The property appeal succeeded because the primary judge failed to make necessary findings. The parenting appeal failed because the primary judge had made clear findings of unacceptable risk, lack of insight, coaching, alienation and psychological harm.At [2]–[3], the Full Court explained the outcome: error was established in relation to the Part VIII financial orders, but not in relation to the parenting orders or the dismissal of the contravention and enforcement applications.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The parties commenced cohabitation in about 2002, married in 2004, and separated finally on 24 July 2024. There were three children: X, aged 15, Y, aged 13, and Z, aged nine: [4]–[6].The family’s financial circumstances were serious. At [8], the Full Court recorded unpaid school fee judgments, further Tasmanian school fee debts, liquidation of one of the father’s business entities, and a writ over the former matrimonial home securing a judgment debt of approximately $857,671.In parenting, the children had not seen or had meaningful contact with the father since 24 November 2024: [17]. The father sought orders that Y and Z live with him; the mother sought orders that all three children live with her and spend time with the father according to their wishes; and the ICL supported a change of residence for Y and Z: [18]–[20].The primary judge ordered that Y and Z live with the father, while X remained living with the mother. The father was given sole long-term decision-making responsibilit... Read more

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