Posts of FLAST RSSMon, 08 Jun 2026 00:00:13 GMTIn Anselmo & Anselmo [2026] FedCFamC1A 87, the Full Court dismissed the mother’s parenting appeal but allowed her property appeal in part. The most practical parenting point is this: the mother complained on appeal that the primary judge wrongly relied on an adversarial psychological report from Dr Phil Watts, but she had not applied to exclude it at trial, had long known the father intended to rely on it, and had herself relied on its contents in closing submissions. The Court held that, in those circumstances, the report was properly before the primary judge and no appealable error was shown. The property appeal succeeded only because the primary judge failed to give adequate weight to the wife’s very substantial initial contributions, leading the Full Court to re-exercise discretion and increase her entitlement from 52.5% to 60% by way of a larger superannuation split.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The parties commenced living together in 2006 and separated in 2021. They had two children, born in 2012 and 2014. The trial involved both parenting and financial proceedings. At trial, the mother was self-represented. Final parenting orders provided that the children live with the mother outside Perth and spend time with the father in the Perth metropolitan area. The mother had sole decision-making responsibility, but subject to specific restraints designed to protect the children’s relationship with the father.The father had obtained reports from Dr Phil Watts, a clinical psychologist, in 2023 and 2024. Those reports concerned the father’s psychological functioning and capacity for employment. They were filed and relied on by the father. The mother later argued on appeal that the reports were inadmissible because leave had not been obtained to rely on adversarial expert evidence.In the financial proceedings, the primary judge found a net pool of approximately $1.32 million, assessed contributions at 52.5% to the mother / 47.5% to the father, and made no further adjustme... Read more

]]>Mon, 08 Jun 2026 00:00:13 GMTIn Caldwell & Caldwell [2026] FedCFamC1A 81, the Full Court allowed the wife’s appeal and declared that three family trusts — the B Trust, C Trust and D Trust, and/or their assets — were property of the husband for the purposes of s 79 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). The decision is significant because the majority held that the primary judge wrongly mixed up two separate questions: first, whether the trusts were property of a party to the marriage; and second, whether it would later be just and equitable to adjust those trust assets in favour of the wife. Those are not the same question.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The husband’s father established three family trusts connected with a long-running family business. The husband and the parties’ two adult sons became co-appointors/principals after the father’s death. The husband also held preferential voting rights in the trustee companies and had the ability to remove the sons as co-appointors or principals.The wife sought a preliminary declaration that the trusts and/or their assets were property of the parties or either of them for the purposes of s 79. The primary judge refused that declaration, holding that the trusts were not property because, among other things, they were established as intergenerational family business structures, the wife was an excluded beneficiary, the trust assets were not built up by the parties’ marital contributions, and the husband had not actually exercised control over the trusts.On appeal, the majority held that this approach was wrong. The husband had effective control and the capacity to benefit himself. That was sufficient to characterise the trusts and/or their assets as his property for s 79 purposes, even though the later question of whether the wife should actually receive any adjustment from those assets remained separate.Issues:Were the trusts and/or their assets property of the husband for the purposes of s 79?Did the primary judge wrongly treat matters relevant to adjustm... Read more

]]>Thu, 21 May 2026 06:48:27 GMTIn Zakariya & Rana [2026] FedCFamC1A 75, the Full Court (Riethmuller J) reinforced a critical principle in parenting litigation: lawful use of medicinal cannabis does not immunise a parent from scrutiny regarding its impact on parenting capacity. The decision confirms that courts may impose protective conditions (such as drug testing) even in the absence of direct evidence of impairment, where broader risk factors justify caution.🧩 FactsThe parties had three children (aged 14, 12, and 9) who had lived with the mother since separation in 2018.Key background:The father had a significant criminal history, including drug supply and weapons offencesHe had previously engaged in family violence toward the motherHe had no meaningful contact with the children since 2019He was using prescribed medicinal cannabis at the time of trialThe primary judge ordered a graduated reintroduction regime, including:Supervised contact progressing to unsupervised timeA requirement that the father provide three negative hair follicle tests (including THC-free) before progressing to overnight timeThe father appealed, arguing:His cannabis use was legal and medically necessaryDrug testing requirements were excessiveOther ancillary orders (injunctions, travel, changeovers) were unreasonable⚖️ IssuesWhether the primary judge erred in imposing drug testing conditions despite lawful medicinal cannabis use.Whether the Court improperly assessed the impact of cannabis on parenting capacity.Whether ancillary parenting orders (injunctions, travel, changeovers) were outside discretion.Whether the appeal disclosed error under appellate principles.⚖️ Applicable Law – Legislation, Regulations, RulesFamily Law Act 1975 (Cth)s 60CA — Best interests of the child paramounts 60CC — Best interests factors (including parental capacity and safety)s 102NA — Restrictions on personal cross-examination in family violence casess 114UB — Costs in family law proceedingsFCFCOA Rules 2021 (Cth)r 13.39 — Further evidence ... Read more

]]>Tue, 05 May 2026 00:01:48 GMTIn Hong & Lai [2026] FedCFamC1A 28 (Riethmuller J, 4 March 2026), the Appellate Division dealt with a practical barrier that routinely kills appeals before they start: the cost of transcripts. Although r 13.19(4) ordinarily requires an appellant to file and serve the transcript, the Court held this was one of the exceptional cases where it was in the interests of justice for the Court itself to obtain the missing day’s transcript and provide it to both parties—relieving the self-represented appellant from an expense of over $2,300 for a single day.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts: The appellant brought a de facto property application. The final hearing ran over two days (25 September 2025 and 4 December 2025). By the second day the appellant was unrepresented, despite earlier legal-aid assistance connected to s 102NA (cross-examination restrictions), and the hearing proceeded with the appellant unable to personally cross-examine the respondent. The primary judge dismissed the property application on limitation grounds (relationship found to have ended in 2011; no extension under s 44(6)).After the Notice of Appeal was filed, a registrar made appeal preparation orders. Importantly, the National Appeal Registry already had the transcript for day 1, but the appellant was ordered to obtain day 2 by 27 February 2026. The appellant then filed an Application in an Appeal seeking either:the requirement to obtain/file the transcript be dispensed with; orthe Court provide the transcript.Issues (the informative “how-to” point of the decision):Is the day-2 transcript actually necessary to determine the appeal issues?If it is necessary, should the Court dispense with the appellant’s obligation to file it under the Rules and instead obtain it itself (and why would that ever happen)?⚖️ Applicable Law – Legislation, Regulations, RulesFederal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)r 13.19(4) – transcript requirement in appeal preparation (the default rule the appe... Read more

]]>Fri, 13 Mar 2026 02:51:51 GMTIn Arata & Rex (No 9) [2025] FedCFamC1F 920, the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1) refused the wife’s attempt to stay enforcement of final property orders while she pursued a s 79A application (and pointed to an ASIC referral). The Court treated the stay bid as another effort to delay the “fruits of litigation” where the wife’s “new” material was largely old ground, her prospects under s 79A were poor, and sale of the home was the predictable consequence of her non-payment under the final orders.Facts:Final parenting and property orders were made on 1 November 2024 (“2024 Final Orders”). The property orders required the wife to pay the husband $1,043,248 within 30 days, failing which the former matrimonial home would be sold (Orders 31(a), 35) ([1]–[3]). The wife’s stay pending appeal was dismissed, her initial appeal was struck out as vexatious/oppressive, and her amended appeal was dismissed ([4]–[5]). When she still did not pay and resisted sale, the husband obtained enforcement orders on 17 October 2025 setting out a sale mechanism, vacancy/possession arrangements, payments (including costs and lenders), s 106A relief, and fixed costs of $13,200 ([6]–[9]). The wife then amended her initiating application to seek a stay of the enforcement orders pending her s 79A application (and referenced ASIC/police material) ([10]–[17]). A Judicial Registrar gave her an opportunity to file a further affidavit strictly for the stay, which she did not do ([25]–[26]). On the hearing date she attempted to rely on numerous historic affidavits at the last minute; the Court refused that course as unfair and non-compliant with directions ([27]–[29]). The stay application was dismissed ([94] + Orders).🧩 Facts and IssuesKey FactsFinal property structure: pay $1,043,248 or the home is sold ([3]).Appeal path exhausted: stay pending appeal dismissed; original appeal struck out; amended appeal dismissed ([4]–[5], [76]).Enforcement orders made: sale/vacancy/warr... Read more

]]>Mon, 16 Feb 2026 20:32:00 GMTNicolescu & Umar [2026] FedCFamC1A 15: The Family Report Fight That Went NowhereWhat Was the Appellant Trying to Achieve — and Why?The Appellant’s ObjectiveThe appellant (the mother) was attempting to stop the Family Report from being used and to force the appointment of a new single expert.Specifically, she sought to appeal interlocutory orders made on 15 December 2025 which:Refused to exclude the existing Family Report from evidence; andAllowed the parties to instead conference with the single expert and put written questions to clarify the report (Orders 3 and 8).📍 Paras [4]–[6]Why She Tried to AppealThe appellant was dissatisfied with the content and conclusions of the Family Report and believed:The report was flawed or unfair; andA new expert should be appointed immediately, rather than waiting until trial.Her appeal was an attempt to:Short-circuit the trial process, andObtain appellate intervention before her substantive parenting rights were determined.The Court later characterised this strategy as premature and procedurally misconceived (see discussion of Bass & Bass at [30]).Why the Appeal Failed: Why This Interlocutory Order Could Not Be Appealed1. Appeals Only Lie From a “Judgment”Under ss 26 and 28 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth), an appeal may only be brought from a “judgment”.A judgment must be:An operative judicial act, andDecisive of a party’s legal rights.📍 Paras [8]–[11], citing Driclad Pty Ltd v FCT and Yule v Junek.The orders challenged here:Did not determine where the children live,Did not determine parental responsibility, andDid not finally decide any issue under Pt VII of the Family Law Act.They were purely procedural.📍 Paras [11]–[12]2. Procedural Orders Are Not Appealable JudgmentsJustice Strum relied on a long line of authority confirming that procedural rulings about evidence, experts, or case management are not appealable.Key cases applied:Fierro & Fierro [2022] FedCFamC1A 72 – refusal to discharge an ... Read more

]]>Sun, 08 Feb 2026 23:34:34 GMT🧭 Introductory ParagraphIn Ritter & Hermann (No 3) [2026] FedCFamC1F 19, the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1) exercised its powers under the Australian Passports Act 2005 (Cth) to authorise the issue of a child’s passport without maternal consent, following clear and unexplained non-compliance with earlier court orders. The case is a sharp reminder that parenting disputes about international travel are not determined by obstruction, delay, or opposition in principle—particularly where a party has already agreed to comply and then failed to do so. The Court also imposed fixed costs against the non-compliant parent, reinforcing the consequences of disregarding interim orders.🧩 Facts and IssuesKey FactsFinal parenting proceedings concluded early in December 2025, with judgment reserved until 27 February 2026 (¶1–2).At the end of trial, the father sought interim time with the child and an order that the mother sign a passport application and produce the child’s expired passport (¶3).The mother did not oppose signing the passport application and expressly confirmed she could do so and could produce the expired passport (¶4–5).On 16 December 2025, the Court made orders requiring her to sign the passport application and provide the expired passport (¶6).The father’s solicitor followed up requesting supporting documents to progress the passport application (¶7).Although the father’s time with the child occurred as ordered (¶8), the mother failed to sign the passport application and failed to produce the expired passport, despite multiple attempts to contact her (¶9).The father filed an Application in a Proceeding on 23 December 2025 seeking enforcement and alternative relief (¶10).At the hearing on 19 January 2026, the father pressed only the order under s 11(1)(b)(i) of the Australian Passports Act (¶11).The mother opposed the application, arguing it should be dismissed or adjourned until final judgment (¶13).IssuesWas the mother in breach of ... Read more

]]>Tue, 03 Feb 2026 02:56:40 GMTAbramsson & Abramsson (No 8) [2025] FedCFamC1F 919 is one of the most confronting parenting judgments of 2025. After an appeal and rehearing, the Court made the rare and extreme order that two very young children live with their father and spend no time with their mother, despite evidence of mutual conflict and acknowledged love between the children and the mother.The decision is a stark illustration of how persistent emotional abuse of a child, lack of insight, and refusal to accept responsibility can ultimately outweigh biological attachment, history of primary care, and even a parent’s genuine love.FACTSThe FamilyTwo children: X (born 2018) and Y (born 2021) (¶1, ¶11)Parents married in 2013, separated April 2022 (¶10)Mother was primary carer until September 2024 (¶13)Proceedings commenced in May 2022; ICL appointed June 2022 (¶15)Key Traumatic EventsApril 2022 cliff incident: children witnessed mother drive off a cliff; father filmed part of the incident while holding Y (¶2)Recorded verbal abuse: mother taunted X and involved her directly in parental conflict, forcing loyalty choices (¶3–4)Repeated exposure of children to intense adult conflict (¶5–7)Procedural HistoryInterim supervised time for father (¶18–19)Children later placed with father; mother ultimately restrained from contact (¶21–26)Final parenting orders appealed and successfully set aside (¶23)Matter reheard before Carew J over 11 hearing days (¶31–32)ISSUES (IRAC – “I”)Did either parent pose an unacceptable risk to the children?Were allegations of coercive control and family violence proven?Is it in the children’s best interests to have a relationship with both parents?Can the Court order no time with a parent despite mutual love and attachment?RELEVANT LAW (IRAC – “R”)Key statutory provisions:Best interests paramount – s 60CA Family Law Act 1975 (¶70)Primary considerations – safety, family violence, meaningful relationships (s 60CC; ¶71–72)Family violence definition – s 4AB (¶73–76)Unacceptable... Read more

]]>Wed, 28 Jan 2026 22:16:14 GMTThe Full Court of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (McClelland DCJ, Riethmuller & Kari JJ) in Arrighetti & Qodirova [2026] FedCFamC1A 1 delivered a landmark appellate judgment clarifying the scope of judicial discretion in cases involving emotional and psychological harm to children. The Court dismissed a mother’s appeal challenging draconian parenting orders that imposed a six-month moratorium on contact with her daughter, indefinite supervision thereafter, and a total prohibition on contact between the child and the maternal grandmother. The case underscores the balance courts must strike between protecting children from emotional harm and preserving their right to maintain relationships with both parents under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.Facts and IssuesFacts:The child (aged 10) had lived primarily with the mother since 2018.The mother alleged the father sexually abused the child; these claims were not substantiated.The primary judge found that the mother and maternal grandmother’s entrenched and unjustified beliefs caused emotional harm to the child, justifying a change of residence to the father and a moratorium on maternal contact for six months, followed by indefinite supervised time.The mother appealed, arguing the measures were disproportionate, unsupported by evidence, and failed to consider alternatives that preserved the child’s relationship with her primary carer and extended family.Issues:Did the trial judge err in finding the mother posed an “unacceptable risk” of harm?Were the orders for six-month moratorium and indefinite supervision disproportionate?Did the primary judge fail to consider less restrictive alternatives that protected both safety and relationship continuity?Did the trial judge’s reasoning satisfy the obligation to explain key factual and legal conclusions?Rule (Law)Best Interests Principle: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 60B, 60CA, 60CC, 65AA, 65D. The child’s b... Read more

]]>Tue, 20 Jan 2026 05:32:25 GMTThe appellate judgment in Leena & Leena [2025] FedCFamC1A 241 (Hogan, Altobelli & McNab JJ) serves as a critical reminder that judicial neutrality must not only exist but must be seen to exist. The Court partially allowed an appeal from parenting and property orders after finding that the trial judge’s premature comments and conduct during the hearing gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. The case further addressed errors in the trial judge’s approach to contributions in the property settlement, setting aside those orders and remitting the matter for rehearing before a different judge.Facts and IssuesThe appellant (mother) and respondent (father) disputed both parenting arrangements for two children and property settlement orders.During trial, the mother applied for the primary judge’s recusal, arguing his comments suggested prejudgment. Her application was refused, and the final orders were made largely in the father’s favour.The judge commented mid-trial that he was “not persuaded” the father posed a risk to the children—before the father was cross-examined—and made remarks suggesting the mother would “never find [the father] good enough”.On appeal, the mother alleged apprehended bias, failure to consider material evidence, and error in applying a presumption of equal contributions in property division.The issues were:Whether the judge’s conduct and comments created a reasonable apprehension of bias.Whether the judge misapplied the law on property contributions, suggesting a presumption of equality.Whether the judge failed to provide adequate reasons and consider all relevant material.Rule (Law)Apprehended Bias Principle: A judge is disqualified if “a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question” (Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; Charisteas v Charisteas (2021) 273 CLR 289).Judicial Conduct and Commentary: Judges may offer provisiona... Read more

]]>Thu, 15 Jan 2026 04:07:50 GMT