Posts of FLAST RSSTue, 05 May 2026 00:01:48 GMTIn Zakariya & Rana [2026] FedCFamC1A 75, the Full Court (Riethmuller J) reinforced a critical principle in parenting litigation: lawful use of medicinal cannabis does not immunise a parent from scrutiny regarding its impact on parenting capacity. The decision confirms that courts may impose protective conditions (such as drug testing) even in the absence of direct evidence of impairment, where broader risk factors justify caution.🧩 FactsThe parties had three children (aged 14, 12, and 9) who had lived with the mother since separation in 2018.Key background:The father had a significant criminal history, including drug supply and weapons offencesHe had previously engaged in family violence toward the motherHe had no meaningful contact with the children since 2019He was using prescribed medicinal cannabis at the time of trialThe primary judge ordered a graduated reintroduction regime, including:Supervised contact progressing to unsupervised timeA requirement that the father provide three negative hair follicle tests (including THC-free) before progressing to overnight timeThe father appealed, arguing:His cannabis use was legal and medically necessaryDrug testing requirements were excessiveOther ancillary orders (injunctions, travel, changeovers) were unreasonable⚖️ IssuesWhether the primary judge erred in imposing drug testing conditions despite lawful medicinal cannabis use.Whether the Court improperly assessed the impact of cannabis on parenting capacity.Whether ancillary parenting orders (injunctions, travel, changeovers) were outside discretion.Whether the appeal disclosed error under appellate principles.⚖️ Applicable Law – Legislation, Regulations, RulesFamily Law Act 1975 (Cth)s 60CA — Best interests of the child paramounts 60CC — Best interests factors (including parental capacity and safety)s 102NA — Restrictions on personal cross-examination in family violence casess 114UB — Costs in family law proceedingsFCFCOA Rules 2021 (Cth)r 13.39 — Further evidence ... Read more

]]>Tue, 05 May 2026 00:01:48 GMTIn Hong & Lai [2026] FedCFamC1A 28 (Riethmuller J, 4 March 2026), the Appellate Division dealt with a practical barrier that routinely kills appeals before they start: the cost of transcripts. Although r 13.19(4) ordinarily requires an appellant to file and serve the transcript, the Court held this was one of the exceptional cases where it was in the interests of justice for the Court itself to obtain the missing day’s transcript and provide it to both parties—relieving the self-represented appellant from an expense of over $2,300 for a single day.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts: The appellant brought a de facto property application. The final hearing ran over two days (25 September 2025 and 4 December 2025). By the second day the appellant was unrepresented, despite earlier legal-aid assistance connected to s 102NA (cross-examination restrictions), and the hearing proceeded with the appellant unable to personally cross-examine the respondent. The primary judge dismissed the property application on limitation grounds (relationship found to have ended in 2011; no extension under s 44(6)).After the Notice of Appeal was filed, a registrar made appeal preparation orders. Importantly, the National Appeal Registry already had the transcript for day 1, but the appellant was ordered to obtain day 2 by 27 February 2026. The appellant then filed an Application in an Appeal seeking either:the requirement to obtain/file the transcript be dispensed with; orthe Court provide the transcript.Issues (the informative “how-to” point of the decision):Is the day-2 transcript actually necessary to determine the appeal issues?If it is necessary, should the Court dispense with the appellant’s obligation to file it under the Rules and instead obtain it itself (and why would that ever happen)?⚖️ Applicable Law – Legislation, Regulations, RulesFederal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)r 13.19(4) – transcript requirement in appeal preparation (the default rule the appe... Read more

]]>Fri, 13 Mar 2026 02:51:51 GMTIn Arata & Rex (No 9) [2025] FedCFamC1F 920, the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1) refused the wife’s attempt to stay enforcement of final property orders while she pursued a s 79A application (and pointed to an ASIC referral). The Court treated the stay bid as another effort to delay the “fruits of litigation” where the wife’s “new” material was largely old ground, her prospects under s 79A were poor, and sale of the home was the predictable consequence of her non-payment under the final orders.Facts:Final parenting and property orders were made on 1 November 2024 (“2024 Final Orders”). The property orders required the wife to pay the husband $1,043,248 within 30 days, failing which the former matrimonial home would be sold (Orders 31(a), 35) ([1]–[3]). The wife’s stay pending appeal was dismissed, her initial appeal was struck out as vexatious/oppressive, and her amended appeal was dismissed ([4]–[5]). When she still did not pay and resisted sale, the husband obtained enforcement orders on 17 October 2025 setting out a sale mechanism, vacancy/possession arrangements, payments (including costs and lenders), s 106A relief, and fixed costs of $13,200 ([6]–[9]). The wife then amended her initiating application to seek a stay of the enforcement orders pending her s 79A application (and referenced ASIC/police material) ([10]–[17]). A Judicial Registrar gave her an opportunity to file a further affidavit strictly for the stay, which she did not do ([25]–[26]). On the hearing date she attempted to rely on numerous historic affidavits at the last minute; the Court refused that course as unfair and non-compliant with directions ([27]–[29]). The stay application was dismissed ([94] + Orders).🧩 Facts and IssuesKey FactsFinal property structure: pay $1,043,248 or the home is sold ([3]).Appeal path exhausted: stay pending appeal dismissed; original appeal struck out; amended appeal dismissed ([4]–[5], [76]).Enforcement orders made: sale/vacancy/warr... Read more

]]>Mon, 16 Feb 2026 20:32:00 GMTNicolescu & Umar [2026] FedCFamC1A 15: The Family Report Fight That Went NowhereWhat Was the Appellant Trying to Achieve — and Why?The Appellant’s ObjectiveThe appellant (the mother) was attempting to stop the Family Report from being used and to force the appointment of a new single expert.Specifically, she sought to appeal interlocutory orders made on 15 December 2025 which:Refused to exclude the existing Family Report from evidence; andAllowed the parties to instead conference with the single expert and put written questions to clarify the report (Orders 3 and 8).📍 Paras [4]–[6]Why She Tried to AppealThe appellant was dissatisfied with the content and conclusions of the Family Report and believed:The report was flawed or unfair; andA new expert should be appointed immediately, rather than waiting until trial.Her appeal was an attempt to:Short-circuit the trial process, andObtain appellate intervention before her substantive parenting rights were determined.The Court later characterised this strategy as premature and procedurally misconceived (see discussion of Bass & Bass at [30]).Why the Appeal Failed: Why This Interlocutory Order Could Not Be Appealed1. Appeals Only Lie From a “Judgment”Under ss 26 and 28 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth), an appeal may only be brought from a “judgment”.A judgment must be:An operative judicial act, andDecisive of a party’s legal rights.📍 Paras [8]–[11], citing Driclad Pty Ltd v FCT and Yule v Junek.The orders challenged here:Did not determine where the children live,Did not determine parental responsibility, andDid not finally decide any issue under Pt VII of the Family Law Act.They were purely procedural.📍 Paras [11]–[12]2. Procedural Orders Are Not Appealable JudgmentsJustice Strum relied on a long line of authority confirming that procedural rulings about evidence, experts, or case management are not appealable.Key cases applied:Fierro & Fierro [2022] FedCFamC1A 72 – refusal to discharge an ... Read more

]]>Sun, 08 Feb 2026 23:34:34 GMT🧭 Introductory ParagraphIn Ritter & Hermann (No 3) [2026] FedCFamC1F 19, the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1) exercised its powers under the Australian Passports Act 2005 (Cth) to authorise the issue of a child’s passport without maternal consent, following clear and unexplained non-compliance with earlier court orders. The case is a sharp reminder that parenting disputes about international travel are not determined by obstruction, delay, or opposition in principle—particularly where a party has already agreed to comply and then failed to do so. The Court also imposed fixed costs against the non-compliant parent, reinforcing the consequences of disregarding interim orders.🧩 Facts and IssuesKey FactsFinal parenting proceedings concluded early in December 2025, with judgment reserved until 27 February 2026 (¶1–2).At the end of trial, the father sought interim time with the child and an order that the mother sign a passport application and produce the child’s expired passport (¶3).The mother did not oppose signing the passport application and expressly confirmed she could do so and could produce the expired passport (¶4–5).On 16 December 2025, the Court made orders requiring her to sign the passport application and provide the expired passport (¶6).The father’s solicitor followed up requesting supporting documents to progress the passport application (¶7).Although the father’s time with the child occurred as ordered (¶8), the mother failed to sign the passport application and failed to produce the expired passport, despite multiple attempts to contact her (¶9).The father filed an Application in a Proceeding on 23 December 2025 seeking enforcement and alternative relief (¶10).At the hearing on 19 January 2026, the father pressed only the order under s 11(1)(b)(i) of the Australian Passports Act (¶11).The mother opposed the application, arguing it should be dismissed or adjourned until final judgment (¶13).IssuesWas the mother in breach of ... Read more

]]>Tue, 03 Feb 2026 02:56:40 GMTAbramsson & Abramsson (No 8) [2025] FedCFamC1F 919 is one of the most confronting parenting judgments of 2025. After an appeal and rehearing, the Court made the rare and extreme order that two very young children live with their father and spend no time with their mother, despite evidence of mutual conflict and acknowledged love between the children and the mother.The decision is a stark illustration of how persistent emotional abuse of a child, lack of insight, and refusal to accept responsibility can ultimately outweigh biological attachment, history of primary care, and even a parent’s genuine love.FACTSThe FamilyTwo children: X (born 2018) and Y (born 2021) (¶1, ¶11)Parents married in 2013, separated April 2022 (¶10)Mother was primary carer until September 2024 (¶13)Proceedings commenced in May 2022; ICL appointed June 2022 (¶15)Key Traumatic EventsApril 2022 cliff incident: children witnessed mother drive off a cliff; father filmed part of the incident while holding Y (¶2)Recorded verbal abuse: mother taunted X and involved her directly in parental conflict, forcing loyalty choices (¶3–4)Repeated exposure of children to intense adult conflict (¶5–7)Procedural HistoryInterim supervised time for father (¶18–19)Children later placed with father; mother ultimately restrained from contact (¶21–26)Final parenting orders appealed and successfully set aside (¶23)Matter reheard before Carew J over 11 hearing days (¶31–32)ISSUES (IRAC – “I”)Did either parent pose an unacceptable risk to the children?Were allegations of coercive control and family violence proven?Is it in the children’s best interests to have a relationship with both parents?Can the Court order no time with a parent despite mutual love and attachment?RELEVANT LAW (IRAC – “R”)Key statutory provisions:Best interests paramount – s 60CA Family Law Act 1975 (¶70)Primary considerations – safety, family violence, meaningful relationships (s 60CC; ¶71–72)Family violence definition – s 4AB (¶73–76)Unacceptable... Read more

]]>Wed, 28 Jan 2026 22:16:14 GMTThe Full Court of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (McClelland DCJ, Riethmuller & Kari JJ) in Arrighetti & Qodirova [2026] FedCFamC1A 1 delivered a landmark appellate judgment clarifying the scope of judicial discretion in cases involving emotional and psychological harm to children. The Court dismissed a mother’s appeal challenging draconian parenting orders that imposed a six-month moratorium on contact with her daughter, indefinite supervision thereafter, and a total prohibition on contact between the child and the maternal grandmother. The case underscores the balance courts must strike between protecting children from emotional harm and preserving their right to maintain relationships with both parents under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.Facts and IssuesFacts:The child (aged 10) had lived primarily with the mother since 2018.The mother alleged the father sexually abused the child; these claims were not substantiated.The primary judge found that the mother and maternal grandmother’s entrenched and unjustified beliefs caused emotional harm to the child, justifying a change of residence to the father and a moratorium on maternal contact for six months, followed by indefinite supervised time.The mother appealed, arguing the measures were disproportionate, unsupported by evidence, and failed to consider alternatives that preserved the child’s relationship with her primary carer and extended family.Issues:Did the trial judge err in finding the mother posed an “unacceptable risk” of harm?Were the orders for six-month moratorium and indefinite supervision disproportionate?Did the primary judge fail to consider less restrictive alternatives that protected both safety and relationship continuity?Did the trial judge’s reasoning satisfy the obligation to explain key factual and legal conclusions?Rule (Law)Best Interests Principle: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 60B, 60CA, 60CC, 65AA, 65D. The child’s b... Read more

]]>Tue, 20 Jan 2026 05:32:25 GMTThe appellate judgment in Leena & Leena [2025] FedCFamC1A 241 (Hogan, Altobelli & McNab JJ) serves as a critical reminder that judicial neutrality must not only exist but must be seen to exist. The Court partially allowed an appeal from parenting and property orders after finding that the trial judge’s premature comments and conduct during the hearing gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. The case further addressed errors in the trial judge’s approach to contributions in the property settlement, setting aside those orders and remitting the matter for rehearing before a different judge.Facts and IssuesThe appellant (mother) and respondent (father) disputed both parenting arrangements for two children and property settlement orders.During trial, the mother applied for the primary judge’s recusal, arguing his comments suggested prejudgment. Her application was refused, and the final orders were made largely in the father’s favour.The judge commented mid-trial that he was “not persuaded” the father posed a risk to the children—before the father was cross-examined—and made remarks suggesting the mother would “never find [the father] good enough”.On appeal, the mother alleged apprehended bias, failure to consider material evidence, and error in applying a presumption of equal contributions in property division.The issues were:Whether the judge’s conduct and comments created a reasonable apprehension of bias.Whether the judge misapplied the law on property contributions, suggesting a presumption of equality.Whether the judge failed to provide adequate reasons and consider all relevant material.Rule (Law)Apprehended Bias Principle: A judge is disqualified if “a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question” (Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; Charisteas v Charisteas (2021) 273 CLR 289).Judicial Conduct and Commentary: Judges may offer provisiona... Read more

]]>Thu, 15 Jan 2026 04:07:50 GMTIn Willis & Mulder [2025] FedCFamC1A 217, Justice Austin of the Federal Circuit and Family Court (Division 1, Appellate Jurisdiction) overturned a property settlement after the wife uncovered explosive new evidence — her husband, who claimed to be a pensioner with no income, had secretly declared a $176,000 annual salary to a lender just months later. The appellate court found that while the trial judge made no legal errors based on the original evidence, the husband’s post-trial loan documents “collided violently” with his sworn testimony. This new evidence fatally undermined the trial findings under s 75(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), leading the Court to set aside the orders and send the matter back for rehearing.📜 Facts and IssuesFactsThe parties married in 2006 and separated in 2021.The wife commenced property proceedings in 2023; the husband, self-represented at trial, claimed he was on a Commonwealth old-age pension with no other income.The primary judge divided property 65/35 in the husband’s favour, rejecting claims of non-disclosure and finding both parties equally deficient in financial transparency.Shortly after judgment, the wife obtained loan application documents showing the husband declared an annual taxable income of $176,000, and affirmed he was self-employed.The wife appealed, arguing this new material proved both non-disclosure and a miscarriage in the primary judge’s s 75(2) assessment.IssuesWhether the husband’s undisclosed income and post-trial loan documents justified admitting fresh evidence on appeal.Whether the trial judge erred in failing to adjust property division under s 75(2) for financial disparity.Whether non-disclosure or false evidence warranted setting aside the final orders.⚖️ LawStatutory FrameworkFamily Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 75(2), 79 — financial and contribution-based adjustment principles.Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) s 35(b) — power to receive further evidence on appeal.Evidence Act ... Read more

]]>Thu, 04 Dec 2025 00:32:33 GMTIn Nootkamp & Brulja (No 4) [2025] FedCFamC1A 210, the Full Court of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1) dismissed a husband’s fourth attempt to overturn enforcement orders made to implement final property settlement orders from 2024. The self-represented appellant alleged judicial bias, procedural unfairness, and discretionary error, but the Full Court (Austin, Sutherland & Riethmuller JJ) found that he was simply re-litigating issues already determined and had been given ample opportunity to comply with the original orders. The Court reinforced the narrow grounds for alleging bias and the high threshold for obtaining leave to appeal interlocutory property orders.📜 Facts and IssuesFactsFinal property orders were made in October 2024 dividing the parties’ assets, including two properties (“Suburb E” to the wife and “Suburb J” to the husband).The husband was to pay the wife $128,469, and if he failed, his property (Suburb J) would be sold to satisfy the debt.He failed to comply and instead filed multiple enforcement and appeal applications, including to the High Court, all of which were dismissed.In August 2025, the Family Court made enforcement orders giving the wife possession of Suburb J to sell it if the husband did not pay the required sum.The husband appealed again, alleging bias, denial of procedural fairness, and factual error in the judge’s assessment of evidence.IssuesWas there judicial bias, actual or apprehended, by the primary judge?Was procedural fairness denied during the enforcement proceedings (e.g. refusal of adjournment, amendment or cross-examination)?Did the trial judge err in exercising discretion in enforcing the final property orders?Was there any legal error in applying repealed cost provisions?⚖️ LawThe Court applied well-established appellate and procedural principles:Leave to Appeal (Interlocutory) – Medlow & Medlow (2016) FLC 93-692 at [44]–[57]: leave requires doubt about the correctness of the orde... Read more

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