Posts of FLAST NEWS RSSMon, 21 Sep 2026 21:28:59 GMTIn Morris & Lissa [2026] FedCFamC1A 163, the appellant grandmother appealed interim parenting orders that changed the child’s living arrangements after the respondents retained the child and raised allegations of abuse and risk in the appellant’s care. The primary judge ordered that the child live with the second respondent, spend time with the first respondent under the second respondent’s supervision, and spend time with the appellant only under professional supervision. The appeal was dismissed because the appellant’s grounds did not identify appealable error; they largely asked the appeal court to re-weigh contested evidence in a discretionary interim parenting decision.The result was costly: the appellant was ordered to pay the first respondent’s costs of $13,369, the second respondent’s costs of $13,369, and the Independent Children’s Lawyer’s costs of $7,916.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The proceedings concerned a child born in 2015. Final parenting orders made on 1 November 2023 provided that the child live with the appellant grandmother and spend gradually increasing time with the mother, supervised by the second respondent grandfather.In early January 2026, the child travelled from Sydney to Region M to spend overnight time with the respondents. The child was due to be returned to the appellant the next day, but the respondents retained the child and did not return her as required.Two days later, the child was taken to Queensland Police and participated in a recorded interview with the Child Protection Intelligence Unit. Shortly after that, the mother’s solicitors raised allegations that the appellant had abused the child and that there was an unacceptable risk in the appellant’s care.The appellant then filed an initiating application seeking, among other relief, a recovery order. A senior judicial registrar ordered the child’s return, but the respondents did not immediately comply. They instead took the child to New South Wales Police, where she was interv... Read more

]]>Mon, 21 Sep 2026 21:28:59 GMTIn Helias & Tadeu [2026] FedCFamC1A 161, the paternal grandfather and step-grandmother appealed after the primary judge refused to make orders for a four-year-old child to spend time with them. The appeal was dismissed. The Full Court made the central point clearly: the absence of an unacceptable risk of harm does not create a presumption that time must be ordered. Parenting orders are not made because contact is “safe enough”; they are made only if the order is in the child’s best interests.The case is important because the grandparents had never met the child, the father had taken no part in the final hearing, and the mother’s capacity to parent was accepted as likely to be detrimentally affected if orders for time were made.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The appellants were the child’s paternal grandfather and step-grandmother. The child was born in 2022 and was about four years old at the time of the appeal. The child’s parents separated before the child was born. The father took no part in the final hearing and did not seek any orders. Neither the father nor the appellants had ever met the child.The background was highly fractured. In July 2021, while the mother was pregnant, a dispute occurred at the grandparents’ home, after which they demanded that the parents leave. The primary judge found that forcing the pregnant mother from the home created a significant degree of unresolved antipathy toward the grandparents.After the child was born, the paternal grandfather sent a long and derogatory email to the maternal grandfather. The email accused the mother of being manipulative, criminal, a drug user and dealer, a neglectful parent and a child abuser. It also threatened that the grandparents would fight for custody, produce evidence, subpoena people, and “drag up every piece of dirt” they could find.The mother gave evidence that she was afraid of the grandparents, could not emotionally supervise time, and felt overwhelmed, fearful, unable to talk and brought to tear... Read more

]]>Fri, 18 Sep 2026 06:41:19 GMTIn AF Lawyers & Pirani [2026] FedCFamC1A 155, the Full Court dismissed an appeal by a law practice that had intervened in family law property proceedings to recover unpaid legal fees from its former client. The law firm tried to rely on its costs agreement, charging clauses over real property, and an asserted fruits of litigation lien. The appeal failed because the firm did not provide compliant costs disclosure and a costs agreement “as soon as practicable” after receiving instructions. The consequence was severe: the costs agreement was void under the Legal Profession Uniform Law 2014 (NSW), the charging clause could not be relied upon, there was no fruits of litigation lien, and the law firm was ordered to pay the second respondent’s appeal costs of $35,666.08.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The appeal arose out of financial proceedings between Ms Pirani and her estranged husband under s 79 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). Two law firms had acted for Ms Pirani at different stages and later intervened in the property proceedings to recover alleged unpaid legal fees. The appellant, AF Lawyers, acted for Ms Pirani from 24 April 2023 to 7 September 2023. The second respondent acted from 24 August 2023 to 17 September 2024.AF Lawyers sought declarations that it had a fruits of litigation lien, that its lien had priority over the second respondent’s claim, that its debt was secured by an equitable charge over the Suburb J property, and that other parties should be restrained from transferring assets to Ms Pirani before its costs were paid. Its claim depended on clauses in its costs agreements: clause 20 for the lien and clause 33 for the charge.The second respondent also claimed unpaid fees of $466,168.95 plus interest, and asserted its own charge over the Suburb J property. Ms Pirani opposed both firms’ claims.At first instance, the primary judge dismissed AF Lawyers’ claim because it had not provided its costs disclosure and agreement to Ms Pirani as soon as practicable... Read more

]]>Tue, 15 Sep 2026 22:55:46 GMTIn Falvo & Melita (No 3) [2026] FedCFamC1A 154, the Full Court dismissed the appellant’s appeal from a declaration that she and the respondent had been in a de facto relationship from July 2018 to April 2023. The critical feature of the appeal was not simply that she lost. It was that her written material used complex legal language, constitutional language, procedural fairness language, bias language and appellate terminology without demonstrating legal error. Her oral submissions then revealed she did not understand or could not properly engage with the legal concepts she had deployed in writing. The Court observed that the submissions may well have been generated with the aid of artificial intelligence, and treated the resulting volume, confusion and lack of connection to appealable error as conduct productive of cost and delay. The appeal was dismissed and she was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs fixed at $44,351 within 28 days.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The appellant, Ms Falvo, appealed from a declaration made under s 90RD of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) that she and the respondent, Mr Melita, were in a de facto relationship from July 2018 until April 2023. The respondent opposed the appeal. The Full Court dismissed it.The parties had met in late 2017 or early 2018 and commenced a romantic and sexual relationship by early 2018. The appellant accepted there had been a romantic relationship but argued it was brief and that the relationship was really a business relationship, not a de facto relationship.The primary judge had made extensive findings supporting the existence of a de facto relationship. These included that the parties spent many nights together, had a continuing sexual relationship, shared daily life, shared holidays, lived between both properties and later exclusively at the appellant’s property, were engaged to marry, publicly presented as partners, shared information with the same lawyer, and that the respondent provided substantial financial s... Read more

]]>Tue, 15 Sep 2026 04:26:57 GMTIn Alloway & Longo [2026] FedCFamC1A 152, Campton J allowed the appellant’s appeal from orders declaring that the parties’ de facto relationship ended in October 2021, refusing leave under s 44(6) to bring a de facto property and maintenance claim out of time, and dismissing the appellant’s Pt VIIIAB claims. The appeal succeeded because the primary judge’s reasoning relied heavily on broad adverse credibility findings against the appellant and favourable credibility findings for the respondent, without adequately reconciling those findings with objective evidence, concessions, post-separation sexual relations, holidays, events, co-parenting, tax evidence, property occupation issues and the respondent’s inconsistent evidence. The matter was remitted for rehearing before a different judge.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The appellant, Mr Alloway, appealed from a declaration under s 90RD that his de facto relationship with Ms Longo commenced in 2012 and terminated in October 2021. It was uncontroversial that there was a cessation of the relationship in October 2021, but the appellant asserted that the relationship later recommenced in June/July 2022 and finally ended in October 2023.That date mattered. If the relationship finally ended in October 2023, the appellant’s application for de facto property adjustment under s 90SM would have been within the two-year time limit under s 44(5). If the relationship ended in October 2021, the application was out of time unless leave was granted under s 44(6).The appellant’s initiating application sought de facto property adjustment, de facto spouse maintenance and parenting orders for the parties’ two children, X and Y. The respondent sought dismissal of the Pt VIIIAB claims for want of jurisdiction and different parenting orders. The appeal proceeded on the basis that the dismissal order concerned only the de facto financial claims, not the unresolved parenting dispute.The primary judge found that the de facto relationship had not r... Read more

]]>Mon, 14 Sep 2026 04:38:32 GMTIn Pensak & Department of Families, Seniors, Disability Services and Child Safety (No 2) [2026] FedCFamC1A 147, the Full Court dismissed the father’s appeal from Hague return orders requiring the children to be returned to Japan. The irony is obvious: the Court accepted that there was enough concern about the father’s former solicitor’s conduct to admit further evidence and refer the solicitor to the Legal Services Commission, Queensland. But the appeal still failed because the father could not prove that the solicitor’s conduct made the trial procedurally unfair, caused a miscarriage of justice, or would realistically have produced a different result. The Court’s message was blunt: professional misconduct concerns may justify regulatory referral, but they do not automatically undo final orders.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The father, an Australian citizen and Indigenous Australian man, appealed Hague Convention return orders concerning two children who were dual citizens of Australia and Japan. The mother was a Japanese citizen. The children had lived in Japan for a substantial period before the mother and children travelled to Australia in August 2024. Return flights to Japan were booked for September 2024, but the father retained the children’s Japanese and Australian passports and prevented their return. The State Central Authority later applied for return orders at the mother’s request.At the first day of the hearing before the primary judge, the father’s then solicitor, Mr G, applied for an adjournment. The primary judge refused. The reasons for refusal included that the Japanese law material relied on by the respondent had been in the father’s possession for more than seven months; late material was limited and the father was permitted to respond in the witness box; the ICL tender bundle largely contained documents authored by, or known to, the father; and the proposed subpoenas were either not served, too broad, irrelevant, or not in proper form.Immediately a... Read more

]]>Fri, 11 Sep 2026 03:09:40 GMTIn Rahman & Rahman (No 2) [2026] FedCFamC2F 998, Judge Murdoch dismissed the husband’s application for the trial judge to recuse herself from property proceedings. The husband argued apprehended bias based on two matters: first, the refusal of his adjournment application and the possibility the trial might proceed in his absence; second, the judge’s treatment of his solicitor, including referral of that solicitor to the Office of the Legal Services Commissioner. The judgment refers to the OLSC, not the Legal Services Board. The recusal application failed because the referral concerned the solicitor’s courtroom conduct and did not decide, or logically affect, the parties’ substantive property dispute.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The husband commenced property proceedings seeking 55% of the parties’ net property, including superannuation. The wife sought dismissal of his application. The husband was represented throughout by D Law Firm, and the wife by Dina Lawyers.The litigation history was poor from the husband’s side. Earlier orders required full and frank disclosure and an Undertaking as to Disclosure. The wife complied, but the husband did not. His time for disclosure was extended, but he again failed to comply. There was then no appearance by or for the husband at a later court date, and directions were made for his legal representative to explain why a personal costs order should not be made, although no personal costs order was ultimately made at that stage.The matter was listed for final hearing. The husband filed adjournment applications, but the matter remained listed. On 5 March 2026, there was no appearance by or for the husband, and the final hearing dates were confirmed. The wife was granted leave to proceed undefended if the husband did not appear at trial.On 12 March 2026, the matter came before Judge Murdoch for final hearing. Counsel appeared for the husband, instructed by Mr E, but the husband himself was not present and had filed no trial material. The... Read more

]]>Mon, 31 Aug 2026 23:39:50 GMTIn Gaddy & Gaddy (No 3) [2026] FedCFamC2F 1245, Judge Suthers dismissed the mother’s application to reconsider final parenting orders. The Court found there had been no significant change in circumstances since the final parenting orders were made. Instead, the later events showed a continuation of the same concerns that had justified the original protective orders: serious mental health issues, lack of insight, ongoing persecutory beliefs, repeated ADVO breaches, bail breaches, police intervention, and litigation conduct that exposed the father to psychological harm and oppression. The Court also made a harmful proceedings order restraining the mother from instituting further proceedings against the father without leave, restricted her ability to file documents and email the Court, and directed targeted information-sharing with police and mental health services for welfare and safety purposes.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The parties were the parents of three children, X, Y and Z. Final parenting orders had already been made in December 2022 after defended trial. Those orders placed the children with the father and gave him sole discretion about the children spending time with the mother, because the Court had found that although the children had meaningful relationships with both parents, the need to protect them from harm outweighed the benefit of time with the mother.The mother later sought to reopen or reconsider the final parenting orders. By closing submissions, she sought fresh parenting orders for the children to live with her and spend supervised time with the father. The father opposed the application, arguing it was vexatious or failed the statutory threshold under s 65DAAA, and he sought a harmful proceedings order.The original parenting decision had been based on findings that the mother had a long history of serious mental health difficulties, including psychotic episodes, hospital admissions, poor insight and non-compliance with treatment. The original... Read more

]]>Mon, 31 Aug 2026 01:58:03 GMTIn Cadel & Galea [2026] FedCFamC1A 142, the mother appealed final parenting orders limiting her time with two very young children. Her central argument was that the primary judge wrongly characterised conduct arising from her mental health crisis — including self-harm, overdosing and suicidal ideation — as family violence. Schonell J rejected that argument. The appeal was dismissed, subject only to a slip-rule correction changing one word in the parenting orders. The case is important because it draws a hard line: a parent’s mental illness may explain context, but it does not automatically prevent self-harm-related conduct from being family violence if it causes another family member to be fearful and exposes children to emotional or psychological risk.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The mother and father had two children, X, aged five, and Y, aged three. The parties separated in mid-2023, and the mother commenced parenting proceedings in November 2023. At the final hearing, it was common ground that the children should live with the father and that he should have sole long-term decision-making responsibility. The main dispute was the time the children should spend with the mother.The primary judge accepted that the children enjoyed close and nurturing relationships with both parents and needed consistency, stability and an ongoing relationship with each parent if safe to do so. The mother’s treating psychiatrist gave evidence, and the primary judge found that the mother’s diagnoses included ADHD, complex PTSD and bipolar affective disorder.Both parents alleged family violence. The primary judge accepted that the father had perpetrated family violence against the mother during one incident in early 2023 but rejected the balance of the mother’s allegations. The primary judge also found that the mother had perpetrated family violence against the father, including overdosing on Valium on multiple occasions, pushing him, and causing self-harm by grabbing his arm and using i... Read more

]]>Thu, 27 Aug 2026 04:10:07 GMTIn Massey & Carmichael [2026] FedCFamC1A 139, Campton J allowed the appellant’s property appeal because the primary judge’s reasons did not adequately explain the separate 75/25 contribution assessment applied to the respondent’s superannuation pool. The appellant failed on procedural fairness, failed to prove that a two-pool approach was legally unavailable, and failed on the valuation challenge to the respondent’s C Street property. But she succeeded because the reasoning pathway from the evidence to the superannuation percentage was missing. That defective reasoning affected the overall property division, so Orders 1 to 7 were set aside. On re-exercise, the Court adopted a single-pool approach, assessed contributions at 62% to the appellant and 38% to the respondent, made a 1% s 90SM(5) adjustment to the respondent, and ordered an overall division of 61% to the appellant and 39% to the respondent.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The parties were in a long de facto relationship from about 1999 to early 2022. The appellant was aged 70 and the respondent aged 62 at the appeal. There were no children of the relationship.At the start of the relationship, the appellant owned several real properties, including the J Street properties, which remained in specie at trial and had substantial value. She had been an educator but sustained a workplace injury in 1999 and thereafter received an invalidity superannuation pension of $778 per week, which could not be commuted to a lump sum and was treated as a financial resource, not property available for division.The respondent worked throughout the relationship and accumulated superannuation. She also owned the C Street property, which she purchased in 1999. During the relationship, the parties acquired, renovated and sold multiple properties, including jointly owned property at Suburb H. The primary judge found that both parties contributed, but that the appellant made substantially greater renovation and project-work contributions.... Read more

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