Posts of FLAST NEWS RSSFri, 24 Jul 2026 02:51:06 GMTIn Hong & Lai (No 2) [2026] FedCFamC1A 125, Riethmuller J allowed the appellant’s appeal after finding that the refusal of an adjournment denied him a real opportunity to present his case. The appellant was part-way through a property trial when the matter was adjourned. On the resumed hearing date, his lawyers did not appear, his Legal Aid position was unresolved, and s 102NA prevented him from personally cross-examining the respondent. The primary judge refused an adjournment, proceeded with the hearing, and dismissed the appellant’s property application. On appeal, that refusal was found to have affected the final result and caused a miscarriage of justice.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The parties were in dispute about whether their de facto relationship ended in April 2011 or October 2022. That date mattered because the appellant filed his property settlement application on 5 December 2023. If the relationship ended in 2022, the application was within time. If it ended in 2011, the application was long out of time and required an extension.The final hearing began on 25 September 2025. Both parties were legally represented. The hearing was not completed because the Court had another matter to hear, so it was adjourned part-way through the appellant’s cross-examination to 4 December 2025.On the resumed date, the appellant’s lawyers did not appear. The appellant sought an adjournment, explaining that there were issues with his Legal Aid representation and that he needed a lawyer to conduct the balance of the case. This was critical because an earlier order under s 102NA prohibited the parties from personally cross-examining each other. If the appellant remained unrepresented, he could not personally cross-examine the respondent.The primary judge refused the adjournment, proceeded with the hearing, found the de facto relationship ended in April 2011, refused an extension of time, and dismissed the appellant’s property application. The appellant appealed.Issues:Did the... Read more

]]>Fri, 24 Jul 2026 02:51:06 GMTIn Pandeva & Pandeva [2026] FedCFamC2F 882, Deputy Chief Judge Mercuri made final parenting orders for a nine-year-old child conceived through egg donation. The central dispute was not risk in either parent’s household, but how the child should be supported to understand her donor conception, what language should be used around the donor and the donor’s children, and whether the father should be permitted to continue facilitating the child’s relationship with the donor’s children. The Court maintained the existing 5 nights per fortnight arrangement with the father, refused the father’s proposed progression to equal shared care, ordered joint decision-making, and required the parents to engage a child psychologist to assist the child with her conception story in a developmentally appropriate way.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The parents had difficulty conceiving and ultimately had a child, X, through donor conception. Ms E agreed to donate an egg, and X was born in 2016. Before X’s birth, the parents, Ms E and Ms E’s partner attended fertility counselling and agreed they would be open with any child born through the process about the donor conception. The problem was that the adults later had different views about what “being open” meant in practice.The parents separated in October 2023. X had been living primarily with the mother and spending time with the father under a 5/9 arrangement. The father sought a transition to equal shared care. The mother opposed equal time and sought to maintain the existing arrangement.The major live issue was X’s relationship with Ms E and Ms E’s children. The father saw that relationship as positive and identity-affirming. The mother feared the father had over-involved Ms E and her family, causing confusion for X and potentially undermining the mother’s role. Ms E was not a party to the proceedings and sought no orders.Issues:Should the parents have joint decision-making responsibility, or should the mother have final say if they cannot ag... Read more

]]>Thu, 23 Jul 2026 04:47:54 GMTIn Lawrence & Stephanidi [2026] FedCFamC1A 115, the Full Court allowed the mother’s appeal in part. The mother failed to overturn the orders restraining her from relocating internationally with the children and failed to disturb the broader interim parenting pathway increasing the father’s time. But she succeeded on an important point: the mandatory therapy orders and the automatic reversal-of-care order were set aside. The Court held that the self-executing change of care was unreasonable and plainly wrong, and that the therapy orders were impermissible stand-alone orders not properly tethered to a parenting order.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The parties had two young children, aged five and four. The mother had previously taken the children to the United States in March 2023. After Hague proceedings and several court events, she returned with the children to Australia in May 2024.The primary judge made both final and interim parenting orders. The final orders restrained the mother from relocating to the United States with the children. The interim orders provided for the children to live with the mother in Australia, for the mother to have sole parental responsibility, and for the father’s time to increase gradually.The controversial orders required the mother to undergo therapy arising from findings about her mental health and to receive treatment to assist her to “accept” the Court’s findings that the father did not present an unacceptable risk to the children. If she failed to comply with any therapy order, the children would immediately live with the father, the father would have sole decision-making authority, and the mother’s time and communication would be suspended.Issues:Did the primary judge fail to give proper weight to safety and family violence?Were the relocation restraint and contingent transfer orders plainly unjust?Did the primary judge wrongly characterise the mother’s protective conduct as instability?Was too much weight given to the mother’s mental ... Read more

]]>Wed, 15 Jul 2026 23:26:29 GMTIn Steinar & Steinar [2026] FedCFamC1A 113, McClelland DCJ dismissed the mother’s application for the Court to provide trial and case management transcripts at public expense, but partially allowed her alternative application by dispensing with the requirement that she obtain and file transcript. The result was important: the mother did not get publicly funded transcript, but her appeal was not deemed abandoned merely because she could not provide it. The Court accepted that transcript may be relevant to some of her procedural unfairness and bias arguments, but held that her request was disproportionate, insufficiently supported by financial evidence, and weakened by prolix and poorly particularised appeal grounds.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The appellant mother appealed against parenting orders made under Pt VII of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) concerning the parties’ 14-year-old son. At first instance, the mother sought orders that would effectively make the continuation of the child’s relationship with the father dependent on the child’s wishes. The Independent Children’s Lawyer, supported by the father, sought a transfer of residence to the father and a moratorium on time with the mother.The primary judge found that the child was exposed to a risk of ongoing psychological harm in the mother’s care because of sustained non-compliance with orders and her inability to support the child’s relationship with the father. However, the primary judge did not take the more extreme step of immediately changing residence with a moratorium on maternal time, given the child’s age, attachments, and relationship with his sibling. Instead, orders were made for the father to have sole parental responsibility, while the child continued spending substantial time with both parents under structured arrangements.The mother then filed an Application in an Appeal seeking that the Court provide transcripts at public expense, not only for the trial but also for earlier case management events. ... Read more

]]>Sun, 12 Jul 2026 22:33:54 GMTIn Harridan & Harridan [2026] FedCFamC1A 104, the wife won her property appeal because the appeal court found the primary judge used the wrong method when assessing contributions. The trial judge had divided the case into separate contribution categories — initial contributions, contributions during the relationship, inheritance, and post-separation contributions — then effectively gave the wife only a 10% uplift for an inheritance that represented almost 50% of the existing property pool. Schonell J held that this compartmentalised approach was legally erroneous. Once that error was exposed, the appeal court was required to intervene, allow the appeal, and re-exercise discretion. The wife’s entitlement increased from 56% to 65% of a net pool of $6,641,254.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The parties had a long relationship of about 20 years, three adult children, and a substantial property pool. The wife was 54 and had significant health limitations arising from PTSD and a permanent back injury after a workplace assault. The husband was 66 and a tradesperson.During the relationship, the parties acquired several properties. Importantly, the wife received a substantial inheritance from her father’s estate in 2016, valued at approximately $3.3 million, including real property. That inheritance became the central issue in the appeal because it represented nearly half of the parties’ existing property.At trial, the wife sought a 75:25 outcome in her favour. The husband sought 70:30 in his favour. The primary judge found the net property pool was $6,641,254, assessed contributions at 60:40 in favour of the wife, then gave the husband a 4% adjustment under s 79(5), producing a final outcome of 56:44 in favour of the wife.The wife appealed. Her written grounds included inadequate reasons, factual error, and challenges to the contribution and s 79(5) findings. During oral argument, her counsel also advanced the clearer point: that the result fell outside a reasonable exercise of dis... Read more

]]>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 05:28:19 GMTIn Gowden & Taggart [2026] FedCFamC1A 106, Schonell J dismissed the appellant’s Application in an Appeal seeking further expedition and asking the Court to meet the cost of transcript for an appeal against interim parenting orders involving a newborn child born through an altruistic surrogacy arrangement. The Court accepted the appellant had acted promptly and recognised the sensitivity of the matter, but held that the appeal was already listed within a little over two months, which effectively amounted to expedition. The Court also held that a transcript was not required because the interim hearing proceeded on the papers, there was no cross-examination, and the grounds of appeal challenged the reasons and orders rather than anything arising from oral evidence. The appellant was therefore relieved of the obligation to provide the transcript, but the broader application was dismissed.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The case concerned a newborn child, X, born in 2026. The matter arose from a complex altruistic surrogacy arrangement involving the child’s intended parents and the appellant, who was the surrogate and the biological father’s sister. The intended parents and the surrogate are Aboriginal. The primary judge recognised the matter as complex and sensitive, involving family fracture, intergenerational trauma, cultural issues, child protection records, and competing allegations about drug and alcohol use, family violence and mental health.Proceedings were commenced in Division 2 on 7 April 2026, four days after X was born. An interim hearing occurred on 7 May 2026, and interim parenting orders were made on 14 May 2026. Those orders provided that X live with the intended parents, that they have joint decision-making responsibility, and that X spend time with the appellant on specified days.The appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on 1 June 2026 and an Application in an Appeal on 4 June 2026. She sought expedition of the appeal and an order that the Court dispense with the... Read more

]]>Tue, 30 Jun 2026 23:15:37 GMTIn Fowles (No 3) [2026] FedCFamC1A 103, the Full Court granted limited leave to appeal where the applicant was subject to a harmful proceedings order and sought to challenge contravention orders that imposed a conditional 12-month term of imprisonment. The central issue was whether the primary judge should have applied the **criminal standard of proof — beyond reasonable doubt — rather than the civil standard — balance of probabilities — before making orders that could result in imprisonment. Leave was granted only on that ground. The other proposed grounds were rejected as irrelevant, misconceived, lacking reasonable prospects, or insufficiently particularised.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The applicant was subject to a harmful proceedings order under s 102QAC of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). Because of that order, he could not simply file an appeal as of right. He needed leave under the harmful proceedings regime before instituting appeal proceedings.The proposed appeal concerned orders made on 19 September 2025 after findings that the applicant had contravened final orders made on 6 October 2023. Those final orders required him to make payments for, or for the benefit of, the wife and to sign a document.The primary judge made a serious enforcement order: if the applicant did not comply with specified obligations within 60 days, he would be sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment, commencing from arrest and ending earlier if he complied with the obligations or by further order.Issues:Could the applicant, despite a harmful proceedings order, be granted leave to appeal?Did the proposed appeal have reasonable prospects of success?Should contraventions under Pt XIIIA that may lead to imprisonment be proved beyond reasonable doubt?Were the alternative grounds about s 140 Evidence Act, reliance on prior findings, and refusal of an adjournment sufficiently arguable?⚖️ Applicable Law – Legislation, Regulations, RulesFamily Law Act 1975 (Cth)s 102QAC — harmful proceedings orders.s... Read more

]]>Mon, 29 Jun 2026 23:59:38 GMTIn Rocchi & Hadak [2026] FedCFamC1A 100, Williams J dismissed the father’s appeal from final parenting orders that provided for the children to live with the mother, the mother to have sole decision-making responsibility except as to the children’s names, and the father to spend initially supervised time with the children after family therapy, progressing later to unsupervised time. The appeal failed because the father’s grounds and Summary of Argument did not properly identify appealable error. Instead, they were dense, repetitive, overlapping and largely attempted to re-agitate the case he had run unsuccessfully at trial.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The parties had two children. After separation, the children spent time with the father for a period, but that time ceased in May 2023. The parenting dispute then proceeded to a contested trial.The final orders provided that:the children live with the mother;the mother have sole long-term decision-making responsibility, except for changing the children’s names;the children spend time with the father, initially through a contact centre;the family attend family therapy;the father’s time progress gradually to unsupervised time, ultimately reaching three nights a fortnight during term time, holidays and special occasions.The father appealed, alleging procedural unfairness, inadequate reasons, misapprehension of evidence, improper reliance on expert evidence, misapplication of the best-interests framework, risk assessment errors, factual findings not open on the evidence, and discretionary error.He also filed an Application in an Appeal seeking to adduce further evidence, issue subpoenas to police officers, rely on subpoena material from District Court proceedings, and rely on amended orders if the appeal succeeded. That application was dismissed.Issues:Should the father be permitted to adduce further evidence on appeal?Were the father’s appeal grounds properly framed and compliant with the Rules?Did the primary judge deny the f... Read more

]]>Wed, 17 Jun 2026 04:43:58 GMTIn Rocchi & Hadak [2026] FedCFamC1A 100, Williams J dismissed the father’s appeal from final parenting orders that provided for the children to live with the mother, the mother to have sole decision-making responsibility except as to the children’s names, and the father to spend initially supervised time with the children after family therapy, progressing later to unsupervised time. The appeal failed because the father’s grounds and Summary of Argument did not properly identify appealable error. Instead, they were dense, repetitive, overlapping and largely attempted to re-agitate the case he had run unsuccessfully at trial.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The parties had two children. After separation, the children spent time with the father for a period, but that time ceased in May 2023. The parenting dispute then proceeded to a contested trial.The final orders provided that:the children live with the mother;the mother have sole long-term decision-making responsibility, except for changing the children’s names;the children spend time with the father, initially through a contact centre;the family attend family therapy;the father’s time progress gradually to unsupervised time, ultimately reaching three nights a fortnight during term time, holidays and special occasions.The father appealed, alleging procedural unfairness, inadequate reasons, misapprehension of evidence, improper reliance on expert evidence, misapplication of the best-interests framework, risk assessment errors, factual findings not open on the evidence, and discretionary error.He also filed an Application in an Appeal seeking to adduce further evidence, issue subpoenas to police officers, rely on subpoena material from District Court proceedings, and rely on amended orders if the appeal succeeded. That application was dismissed.Issues:Should the father be permitted to adduce further evidence on appeal?Were the father’s appeal grounds properly framed and compliant with the Rules?Did the primary judge deny the f... Read more

]]>Wed, 17 Jun 2026 04:43:13 GMTIn Rockford & Burnell [2026] FedCFamC1A 99, Strum J mostly dismissed the husband’s appeal from an indemnity costs order requiring him to pay the wife’s costs of the financial proceedings. The husband had been ordered to pay $171,900 on an indemnity basis, principally because of his litigation conduct, false evidence, non-disclosure, collateral pressure on the wife and her solicitor, and unreasonable rejection of offers. The appeal succeeded only on a small mathematical correction, reducing the amount to $164,700. Because the husband’s success was minor and the wife conceded the error once identified, he was still ordered to pay the wife’s appeal costs, with the $7,200 overpayment set off against those costs.🧩 Facts and IssuesFacts:The original property proceedings ran over six trial days and produced final property orders under s 79. The wife later sought costs. The primary judge ordered the husband to pay the wife’s costs on an indemnity basis, fixed at $171,900.The primary judge’s reasons relied heavily on findings made in the property judgment, including that the husband:gave deliberately false and misleading evidence;failed to make adequate disclosure;engaged in coercive and controlling behaviour;caused the wife significant anxiety and pressure;pursued allegations against the wife’s solicitor;threatened collateral legal action;was belligerent about children’s school fees and financial support; andprolonged the proceedings through groundless contentions and unnecessary complexity.The husband appealed the costs order. He alleged bias, failure to consider one of his settlement offers, factual errors, calculation errors, and an improper exercise of discretion. His earlier appeal from the substantive property judgment had been deemed abandoned, so the findings in that judgment remained undisturbed.Issues:Did the primary judge’s adverse findings create a reasonable apprehension of bias in the later costs judgment?Did the primary judge fail to consider a material settl... Read more

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